


THE GREEK WORLD

500-440 BC

by Ken Webb

Here it is: the factual detail, the historiography, revision exercises and advice on how to write responses on The Greek World 500 – 440 BC.



eBook

“Everything you wanted to know about The Greek World 500 – 440 BC, but were afraid to ask.”

THE GREEK WORLD 500-440 BC

by Ken Webb M.A. (Oxon), C.Ed

*“Everything you wanted to know about
The Greek World 500-440 BC, but were afraid to ask.”*

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1st Edition

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About the author

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"The Greek World 500-440 BC" is one of fourteen titles in the "Everything you wanted to know about... but were afraid to ask" series *written specifically* for the new NSW Modern and Ancient History syllabuses commencing 2018-19. Other titles in this series include:

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Foreword

This book has been written with the HSC specifically in mind:

- it strictly follows the format of the Ancient History syllabus;
- its content has been designed with the type of questions in mind which might be asked in the HSC;
- the advice given for responding to questions on “The Greek World 500 – 440 BC” is the result of years of teaching and studying this period, and marking the HSC.

It is hoped that this book will provide students with:

- solid historical information, but not too much that students will drown in an excess of the written word as can happen with some works;
- enough archaeological evidence and historiographical information from the ancient sources and modern writers to supplement student arguments;
- a chance to frequently consolidate information;
- some of the techniques required for writing effective essays.

THE GREEK WORLD 500 – 440 BC

At the turn of the 5th Century BC, Greece was a geographical expression. There was a Greek language, a rich cultural heritage stretching back over centuries and shared religious/ mythological beliefs. However, there was no Greek state in the modern sense. Greece was a collection of independent city states.

In 499 BC, Ionian Greeks in Asia Minor rose unsuccessfully against the rule of their Persian masters. Athens and Eretria assisted in the abortive revolt, earning both states the ire of the Persian King, Darius. Within a decade, Persia launched a major military campaign against mainland Greece, with Athens and Eretria as the key targets. This campaign collapsed on the battlefield at Marathon. Ten years later, the new Persian king, Xerxes, launched a far greater campaign against the Greek mainland. Led by Sparta and Athens, the Greek states successfully resisted the Persians, who were gradually pushed out of the Aegean Sea region and Ionia.

Athens created The Delian League as a means of securing the future defence of Greece. However, Sparta returned to its internal concerns. Within two decades, The Delian League had gradually evolved into an Athenian Empire in which Athens’ allies had become Athens’ subjects. Internally, Athens’ political development continued in a democratic direction while the city was beautified.

Balancing the power of Athens was Sparta’s Peloponnesian League, formed in the mid-6th Century BC. Rivalry and distrust between Athens and Sparta turned into open conflict in the 450s. A Thirty Year Peace was signed between Athens and Sparta in 446 BC but the seeds of long-term conflict had been sown. This conflict would become The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC).

The Chronological context

The period 500 – 440 BC is a dramatic one in the history of Ancient Greece.

- The Persian Empire attempts to invade Greece on two occasions, only to be thwarted by the Greeks on each occasion.¹
- The Athenian Empire rises to its greatest height.
- Giant figures dominate the Greek landscape - Miltiades, Themistocles, Pausanias, Cimon, Pericles.
- The rivalry between Sparta and Athens, which would culminate in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), develops.
- Athens' democracy blossoms.
- The architectural glory of Athens appears.

However, it needs to be remembered that the Greek World could point to major achievements for centuries before the 5th Century BC. During the early centuries of the 2nd millennium BC, the Minoan civilisation based on the island of Crete held sway. Towards the latter part of the 2nd millennium, Mycenae dominated.² A so-called “dark ages” ensued before the Greek city states embarked on three centuries of colonisation from Spain to the eastern shores of the Black Sea. Politically, the political systems of many Greek city states underwent a series of changes from monarchy to aristocracy/ oligarchy, tyranny and democracy. Sparta developed its own unique system based on the ideas of its lawgiver, Lycurgus.³ The end of the 5th Century BC saw the Greek world enveloped in its own ‘world war’ as Sparta and its allies battled Athens and its allies in the Peloponnesian War.

Sparta’s victory over Athens led to its brief period of supremacy in the Greek world. This would come to an end at the Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC at the hands of Thebes. A brief Theban supremacy would be replaced by that of Macedon, first under Philip and then his son, Alexander, ‘the Great’, whose empire would stretch to the borders of India. Alexander’s early death resulted in his empire being divided up between his successors as the world entered the ‘Hellenistic Age’. The power of the Greeks gradually came to an end as they were supplanted by the Romans.

Greek developments from the Minoans to the post-Alexander age were accompanied by the rise and fall of various near-Eastern powers including, Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Lydia, Medea, Persia.

Ancient Greece’s chronological context is summarised in Figure (i).

1 Three invasions if the ill-fated effort of Mardonius in 492 is included (see page 17).

2 The legendary Trojan War allegedly took place during this time.

3 Even Plutarch, who wrote a ‘life’ of Lycurgus, states that the actual existence of Lycurgus cannot be proven.

Figure (i) The chronological context of Ancient Greece

	The Greek World	Beyond the Greek World
c 2400-c 1400 BC	The Minoan civilisation became distinctive in the island of Crete about 2400 BC. From c 2000 BC, palaces were constructed such as Knossos. By the middle of the 2nd millennium BC, the Minoans ruled not only Crete but held a naval hegemony over the Aegean. They traded from the Western Mediterranean to Egypt and Syria.	Old Kingdom Egypt (c 2686-2181 BC) The building of the pyramids Middle Kingdom Egypt (c2040-1797BC)
c 1600-c 1100 BC	The Mycenaean civilisation dominated Greece in the second half of the 2nd millennium BC. Mycenae is situated south west of Corinth on the Peloponnese peninsula. The story of the Trojan War is alleged to have occurred between about 1250 and 1200 BC.	New Kingdom Egypt (c 1567-1070 BC) Tutankhamun (c1332-1323 BC)
c 1100-c 800 BC	This period is often referred to as the Dark Ages. Mycenaean centres went into decline or were destroyed. 'Dorian' peoples began invading north and north west Greece, many ending up in the east and the Peloponnese. 'Ionian' peoples were settling in the Aegean islands and western Asia Minor. Ionians were the same race as the Athenians.	The Assyrian Empire (c 911-609 BC) Founding of Rome (753 BC)
c 800-c 500 BC	From about 800 to 500 BC, the Greeks colonised much of the Mediterranean region from Spain to Italy to Sicily to Asia Minor and the Black Sea.	Rule of King Nebuchadnezzar in Babylon (604-561 BC)
c 700-c 500 BC	Tyranny became a common form of government in many Greek states in this period. Tyrants included Periander in Corinth, Orthagoras in Sicyon and Polycrates in Samos.	Cyrus King of Persia (559-530 BC)
c 600- c 500 BC	Athens and Sparta gradually developed their distinctive social and economic systems. For Athens, the century was bookended by the reforms of Solon and Cleisthenes.	Croesus King of Lydia (560-546 BC) Darius King of Persia (522-485 BC) Roman Republic established (509 BC) Xerxes King of Persia (485-465 BC)
500-440 BC	The Persians Wars/ the Delian League and Athenian Empire/ Democracy in Athens/ growth of Spartan-Athenian rivalry.	
431-404 BC	The Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens from which Sparta finally emerged victorious in 404 BC.	
404-371 BC	Sparta briefly dominated the Greek world after 404 BC but it was unsuited to such an imperialist role. Its defeat in 371 at the hands of Thebes ended Sparta's supremacy and the Peloponnesian League fell apart.	
371-360 BC	Thebes dominated Greece for a decade but the death of its king, Epaminondas in battle ended Thebes' supremacy.	
359-336 BC	The individual city states of Greece came under the domination of Philip of Macedon.	
336-323 BC	Philip was assassinated in 336. He was succeeded by his young son, Alexander (the Great). Alexander restored order in Greece after the unrest that had followed his father's death. In a decade, he conquered the Persian Empire and established his own empire as far as India.	Rome controls the Latin cities
c 323-c 148 BC	Alexander died in 323 BC. The empire was divided amongst his leading generals. The period after Alexander, during which time Greek culture spread far and wide, is referred to as the Hellenistic Age. By the mid-2nd Century BC, the growing power of Rome ended Greek independence.	Rome annexes Etruria (280 BC) Roman victory over Macedon (168 BC) Rome at war with Carthage (264-241, 218-201, 149-146 BC) Roman control of Greece

The Geographical context

Greece is situated at the southern end of the Balkans peninsula at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. The Greek World of ancient times comprised what we understand today as the mainland of Greece, the multitude of islands in the Aegean Sea, and the area along the western seaboard of Asia Minor (Turkey) from Caria in the south east corner to the Chersonese (Gallipoli peninsula) in the north.

In ancient times, Greece was a geographical expression, not a unified political unit. Politically, Greece was a collection of independent city states. These city states shared a common culture, spoke the same language, believed the same myths and worshipped the same gods. However, they jealously protected their independence. Geography partly explains the development of Greece into separate, jealousy independent city states. The prevalence of rugged mountains and isolated valleys assisted the development of independent political units. The mountainous nature of much of the Greek landscape and the lack of arable land stimulated the process of colonisation in the seventh and sixth centuries BC as population pressures mounted.

Greece is surrounded by water. To the west is the Ionian Sea, to the south the Cretan Sea and to the east the Aegean Sea. Being surrounded by the sea, and blessed with many sheltered harbours, it is not a surprise that the Greeks became expert sailors and developed contacts beyond their shores. The southern part of Greece is a peninsula called the Peloponnese which is connected to the northern part of Greece by the Corinthian isthmus. The easily defended isthmus effectively cut off the Dorian Peloponnesians from the rest of Greece. In ancient times, the Peloponnese comprised six regions: Achaea, Elis, Messenia, Laconia, Argolis and Arcadia. Sparta is situated in central Laconia, in the fertile valley of the Eurotas river, the plain of Sparta, approximately only 70 sq kms in size. The river Eurotas flows south towards the Laconian Gulf. Laconia extends about 1600 sq miles and is predominantly mountainous. To the north is the Arcadian range, to the west the Taygetus mountains and to the east the Parnon mountain range runs southwards towards Cape Maleia. To the east of the Parnon range is the rugged Aegean coastline.

The northern part of Greece comprised the south east region of Attica, where Athens is situated, Boetia, Phocis and Aetolia in central Greece, and in the north Thessaly. Off the north east coast of Greece is the large island of Euboea which contained the cities of Eretria and Carystus; to the west was the island of Corcyra (Corfu). In the north east beyond Thessaly is Chalcidice. Between Greece and Asia Minor is a host of islands included Lesbos, Samos, Chios and the sacred island of Delos.

The mountainous areas of Greece experience very cold winters and the plains regions can become very hot in summer. The southern and eastern regions experience a more moderate climate. Summers are generally hot and rainfall at these times is very limited.

Exercise i.i

Place the following periods in the correct chronological order.

1st period		Rule of Philip II
2nd period		The period of colonisation
3rd period		Roman defeat of Greece
4th period		The Persian Wars
5th period		The Minoan Civilisation
6th period		The empire of Alexander
7th period		The Mycenaean civilisation
8th period		The Spartan supremacy
9th period		The Peloponnesian War
10th period		The century of Solon and Cleisthenes

Exercise i.ii

Complete the following passage using the terms listed below.

Greece is a largely _____ and its lack of arable land was a key factor in the move for _____. The Greek mainland is almost totally split by the _____, whose outlet leads to the _____. The narrow _____ links the _____ in the south, populated by _____ people, from the northern regions which include Attica, populated by _____ people. The southern region of Greece contains the region of Laconia whose principal city is _____. The region of Attica's principal city is _____. The _____ Sea separates the mainland from _____ and contains many island states including _____ and _____.

AEGEAN SEA - CORINTHIAN ISTHMUS - DORIAN - SAMOS - SPARTA
 CORINTHIAN GULF - LESBOS - MOUNTAINOUS - IONIAN - IONIAN SEA
 COLONISATION - ATHENS - PELOPONNESE - ASIA MINOR

Section 1 ■ The Persian Wars

Chapter 1: Origins: Persian imperialism, Ionian Revolt

Some introductory thoughts

Western civilisation is very much the product of Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome. Much of western architecture, language, philosophy, law, education, science and a host of other disciplines, owe an enormous debt to the two great classical civilisations. It is important to be aware of this ancient context when The Persian Wars are considered. For Greece, and by inference for the modern west, the victory of the Greek states is seen in heroic and indeed epochal terms.

However, to view The Persian Wars in such a way is to be unhistorical. As Dr Douglas Kelly of the ANU argued in a lecture some years ago, even the defeats of 480-79 BC were but a pin prick on the power of the Persian Empire. The Greek playwright, Aeschylus, referred to the Persian defeat of 480 BC as the greatest disaster ever to befall Persia. However, even the Greek historian, Herodotus, was sensible enough to see that Persian power had not been destroyed. The poet Robert Graves penned a work during the years of World War II called *The Persian Version*. Graves' opening lines suggest a Persian view of the defeat against Greece.

*Truth-loving Persians do not dwell upon
The trivial skirmish fought near Marathon.*¹

In his lecture, Kelly also pointed out that the whole notion of Greek unity in 480-79 BC was something of a myth. At the Battle of Plataea in 479 BC, there were more Greeks fighting against each other than in any other Ancient battle.

A key factor in the glorification of the Greek success is the fact that the vast majority of the information available to historians comes from Greek sources.²

- The main written source is *The Histories*, written by the 5th Century BC Greek historian Herodotus. Herodotus' credulity and clear admiration for Athens means that his work must be considered with care.
- The Athenian playwright, Aeschylus, wrote his play *The Persians*, in 472 BC, only eight years after the Athenian victory at the Battle of Salamis, a battle in which the playwright fought.
- The Greek historian Thucydides wrote his *History of the Peloponnesian War* towards the end of the 5th Century BC.
- During the 1st Century AD, the Greek biographer Plutarch wrote about the lives of leading Greek and Roman leaders.³
- There are also various archaeological and epigraphical sources such as The Troezen Decree⁴ and The Serpent Column at Delphi⁵.

The background and causes of the Persian Wars can be considered by separating the two invasions of 490 BC and 480 BC. An outline of the causes of the first invasion is given in Figure 1.1 and focuses on issues such the dynamic of imperialism, the possible incompatibility of east and west, and the impact of the Ionian Revolt of 499-98 BC on the Persian King, Darius. This will require

¹ Graves, Robert, *Poems Selected by Himself*, Penguin, London, 1966

² The sources will be commented upon in more detail as they arise.


³ Though Plutarch was writing hundreds of years later, it is believed that he had access to sources which have since been lost.

⁴ This relates to a decision by the Athenian Assembly to evacuate Athens before the start of the second Persian invasion.

⁵ This listed the Greek states that fought against the Persians.

a brief examination of the growth of Persia and an examination of the Ionian Revolt. The causes of the second invasion will see an examination of the fallout of the Battle of Marathon and the role of Darius' successor, Xerxes.

Figure 1.1: An overview summary of the causes of The First Persian War



NB: For some specific historiographical references, see the “*What do the historians say?*” section at the end of the chapter.


The growth of the Persian Empire

For almost a thousand years to c 1600 BC ⁶, the Middle East had been dominated by the Egyptians, whose empire extended to the River Euphrates. Egyptian control of the region then passed to the Assyrians who by c 1250 BC controlled the area between the Caspian Sea and the Syrian coast. Following the collapse of the Assyrian Empire in the late 7th Century BC, power passed to a number of successor states including Babylon and Media.

Early 6 th Century BC (to c 584 BC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ In 584 BC Astyages became the ruler of Media. ■ Cyrus (the Great) was born in 585 BC and he took the throne of the small region of Persis in 559 BC. He slowly asserted his power with a series of military reforms.
550 BC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Astyages feared the growing power of Cyrus and prepared to attack him. Cyrus allied himself with Babylon and then led a revolt against the Median Empire. ■ As Astyages' men deserted to the Persians, Cyrus gained control of the empire in 550 BC.
547-46 BC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Croesus, the King of Lydia (roughly the western half of modern day Turkey), controlled most of Asia Minor from the Aegean coast to the River Halys in central Asia Minor (Turkey). ■ A great admirer of Greek culture, Croesus sought advice from the Delphic oracle. He was told that if he crossed the River Halys, he would destroy an empire and that this would happen when a mule sat on the throne. ■ Croesus crossed the Halys, invaded Cappadocia but after indecisive military action returned to the Lydian capital of Sardis. Croesus hoped for support from allies, including Sparta but it was not forthcoming. Cyrus attacked the Lydians with camels. Sardis fell in 546 BC and Croesus was captured. ■ Herodotus tells the story of Croesus' life being saved when a storm put out the flames as he was being burned at the stake. ■ The oracle had proven correct: Croesus had destroyed an empire, his own. The mule was Cyrus who had mixed parentage: Persian and Median.
546-30 BC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Lydia fell to Cyrus in 546 BC and within a few years the Ionian cities of western Asia Minor had fallen under Persian rule. ■ The Ionian cities were Greek. Some of them welcomed Cyrus and were willing to rule in his name, others fled. ■ In 539 BC, Cyrus had taken over Babylon. ■ Cyrus had carved out a sizeable Persian Empire. One of the key features of Cyrus' rule was his tolerance of non-Persian culture and religion. Parts of his empire were ruled by non-Persians, eg in Lydia. Some of his key generals were Medes. ■ Cyrus died fighting on his eastern frontier in 530 BC. ■ He was succeeded by his son, Cambyses.

⁶ "c" means "circa" or about. It is obviously not always possible to provide specific dates for events in early ancient times as it is for modern events.

Figure 1.2 shows the extent of the Persian Empire by c 500 BC.



530-22 BC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ In 526 BC, Cambyses attacked Egypt and within a year had defeated the pharaoh, Psammithecus III and had most of the country under Persian control. ■ Further plans of expansion against Carthage and Ethiopia came to nothing. In 522 BC a revolt inside Persia led by a man called Gaumata (who claimed to be Cambyses' dead brother) forced him to return home. He died on his way home. ■ The sources do not treat Cambyses well. Herodotus claims he was mad having murdered his brother (Smerdis) and his wife.
522-12 BC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The new king, Darius, called a halt to the further expansion of the empire. He faced a series of revolts against Persian rule in Babylon, Armenia, Media and Elam. By 516 BC he was firmly in control. In 513 BC, northern India and the Indus Valley were conquered. ■ He married Atossa, daughter of Cyrus, widow of Cambyses. ■ Darius introduced a series of reforms that strengthened the administration of the empire. These included dividing the empire into 20 regions, or satrapies, introducing a new coinage, establishing a capital at Susa, road construction and placing spies (the king's eyes) around the empire to ensure the loyalty of the satraps.

The Scythian Campaign: 513-12 BC

In 513 BC, Darius' forces crossed the Bosphorus⁷ on a floating bridge built by the Samian (of Samos) engineer, Mandrocles. He marched into Thrace (modern Bulgaria/ Romania) and defeated the various tribes that opposed him. He then crossed the River Danube into Scythia (southern Russia).

- Darius' motives for the move into Scythia are uncertain? Was it to expand the empire, to establish mining settlements, secure his newly won Thracian province or had he intended to march eastwards across the northern part of the Black Sea?
- The campaign was a near disaster and Darius was forced to retreat back into Thrace. Some of the Greek forces left at the Danube crossing were encouraged by the Scythians to destroy the pontoon bridge. This was considered but not carried out; the Greek tyrants under Darius realised they needed his support to stay in power.
- Darius left Megabates in Thrace with 80 000 troops to establish Persian control of Thrace. Megabates even managed to gain the submission of Amyntas, king of Macedon.
- During Darius' absence, revolts broke out in Chalcedon and Byzantium in north west Asia Minor. They were quickly put down.

Did the events in Scythia represent an incursion or a full-scale military campaign? The traditional view is that it was a campaign in the order of 60 days and, following Herodotus, that it was a disaster. Herodotus enjoys making disparaging comments about Darius' departure from Scythia:

...as soon as night fell (Darius) began the homeward march...as for men (left behind) they were incapacitated by sickness and he did not want them... Darius... was, in point of fact, deserting (them)... the Persian remnant, realising that Darius had betrayed them, held out their arms in sign of surrender...⁸

An alternative view sees Scythia as lasting almost of three years duration.⁹

At this stage, it was certainly not inevitable that the Persian Empire would go to war with the Greek city states. The Ionian Greeks had by and large remained loyal to Darius and the king would have wanted to consolidate after the events in Scythia. However, gaining the submission of Macedonia certainly showed growing Persian interest in mainland Europe. It was to be events on the island of Naxos in 501 BC and then Ionia itself in 499-98 BC that would turn the eyes of Darius towards Greece.

The Ionian Revolt: 499 BC


Background

The events of the Ionian Revolt can be seen as the 'spark' that ignited Darius' decision to invade Greece. Before the revolt, it might be argued that the dynamic of Persian imperial expansion made a move on mainland Greece likely. Certainly Darius had already shown interest in mainland Europe. However, if a Persian invasion of Greece before the Ionian Revolt was possible, after the revolt it was a certainty. Figure 1.3 summarises the factors behind the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt.

⁷ The site of modern Istanbul, formerly Constantinople and in classical times Byzantium..

⁸ Herodotus, The Histories, Book IV, 136

⁹ See "CAIS: The Circle of Ancient Iranian Studies – The Strategy of Darius the Great" - http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Military/Persian_wars/persian_wars_darius_strategy.htm. For anyone interested in examining the Persian Empire in detail, this is a very useful site.



The event which sparked the Ionian Revolt was the failed attack on the island of Naxos in 500 BC.

- In 501 BC, some wealthy Naxian oligarchs had been expelled from Naxos following a rising against them by the democratic party. They sought refuge in the Ionian city of Miletus, ruled by the pro-Persian tyrant, Aristagoras.
- Aristagoras was the son-in-law of Histiaeus, the previous tyrant who had, since 512 BC, been forced to live in the Persian capital, Susa, as the 'guest' of Darius.
- Aristagoras convinced the satrap of Western Asia, Artaphernes (Darius' half-brother), to launch an attack on Naxos which could lead to Persian expansion across the Aegean.
 - Aristagoras believed that success would see him given charge of the island.
- After a failed four month siege of the island, the attack on Naxos was called off and the 200 strong fleet returned to Ionia.
 - Herodotus would have us believe that the Persian commander, Megabates, had betrayed the expedition, by warning the Naxians of the attack, because of a quarrel he had with Aristagoras.
- Herodotus then says that Aristagoras, fearing the displeasure of Darius because of the failure of the revolt, now planned revolt from Persian rule.

Aristagoras was now unable to keep his promise to Artaphernes. The call upon him to meet the expenses of the men's pay had landed him in difficulties and he was afraid that, owing to the failure of the attempt on Naxos and his quarrel with Megabates, he might lose his position in Miletus.¹⁰

¹⁰ Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book V, 35

Events were moved along when Aristagoras received a message from his father-in-law, Histiaeus, in a most unusual manner.

- Histiaeus had long resented his forced stay in Susa.
- He shaved the head of his slave, pricked the word “revolt” on to the bare scalp and then waited for the slave’s hair to grow. Once this had happened, he sent the slave to Aristagoras with instructions for his head to be shaved on arrival.
- Herodotus states that any hesitation Aristagoras had about rebelling, ended with the arrival of Histiaeus’ slave.

*...something else occurred to confirm his purpose: this was the arrival from Susa of a slave, sent by Histiaeus, the man with the tattooed scalp, urging him to do precisely what he was thinking of, namely to revolt...*¹¹

The combination of Aristagoras’ fears, Histiaeus’ message, the blow to Persia’s prestige following failure in Scythia and Naxos, combined to persuade Ionia’s Greek leaders to raise the standard of revolt.

Figure 1.4 Ionia and the Aegean Sea

The map in Figure 1.4 shows in detail the cities of Ionia. Miletus is positioned in the south, south east of the island of Samos. The large island of Naxos, the object of Aristagoras’ hopes, is due west of Miletus. The Bosphorus and Thrace, areas of importance to Darius during the Scythian expedition, are located at the north of western Asia Minor. The Hellespont, the Propontis and the Bosphorus provide a sea route linking the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea.¹²



Course of the Ionian Revolt

499: The pro-Persian tyrants were driven from power. Coes, the tyrant of Mytilene, (in the island of Lesbos, north west of Miletus) was stoned to death.

Aristagoras sought the aid of city states on the Greek mainland. The Spartan king, Cleomenes was not persuaded. Herodotus says Cleomenes took the advice of his daughter, Gorgo¹³.

"Father, you had better go away, or the stranger will corrupt you."

Aristagoras had better luck in Athens and Eretria. Eretria agreed to send five ships and men; Athens agreed to send 20 ships and men under the command of Melanthis.

Athens’ motives were mixed: sympathy for their fellow Greeks in Ionia, concern at the activities of the former tyrant Hippias in the Persian court and a desire to establish control of trade links with the Black Sea.

Herodotus makes the comment that Aristagoras found it easier to convince 30 000 Athenians than one Spartan. Herodotus also comments on the future significance of this decision.

¹¹ Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book V, 35

¹² The Hellespont is now known as The Dardanelles (site of the disastrous 1915 Gallipoli campaign) and The Propontis is known as the Sea of Marmara. In ancient times, the Black Sea was referred to as The Pontus Euxinus.

¹³ Gorgo would later marry her half-uncle, Leonidas, the Spartan commander at Thermopylae in 480 BC.

The sailing of this fleet was the beginning of trouble not only for Greece, but for other peoples.¹⁴


The revolt reached its climax with the destruction of Sardis (in Lydia, north east of Miletus). The burning of Sardis threw Darius into a rage and he swore to seek vengeance on the Athenians. There is a story that Darius ordered an attendant at dinner each day to call out: *Sire, remember the Athenians!*

The revolt now began to fall apart. Histiaeus was sent to Ionia to bring the rebellion to an end. Artaphernes accused Histiaeus of fomenting the rebellion merely to bring about his return to power. Aristagoras deserted the revolt even before Histiaeus had returned. He was killed in Thrace.

The revolt finally came to end following the Battle of Lade in 494 BC. Persian armies closed in around Miletus and hundreds of Persian navy vessels moved in. The Ionians had 353 ships. Heavily outnumbered, the Greeks were defeated. However, their cause was not helped by the desertion of 49 Samian and 70 Lesbian ships.

Miletus was besieged and its people sold into slavery.

Figure 1.5: The results of the Ionian Revolt



An alternative argument re-Darius' interest in Athens

In 507 BC Athenian envoys had visited the Persian satrap in Sardis to seek an alliance and they offered 'earth and water', the accepted symbols of submission. This proved to be an unpopular move inside Athens and the alliance was repudiated. However, the actions of the Greek envoys were viewed differently inside Persia.

Persia believed that the envoys' action meant that Persia had gained a suppliant. More than that, their religious beliefs told them that they had gained a permanent subject.

The Persians were often tolerant of the type of government its suppliant states had but submission was a solemn undertaking.

Athens had willingly submitted to the power of Ahura Mazda.

Thus, Athens' decision to disobey Artaphernes and not to take back the tyrant Hippias in 499 BC was viewed seriously by the Persian king. It represented the actions of a vassal state breaking a solemn contract.

¹⁴ Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book V, 98

When Athens aided the Ionians this was an example of a disobedient subject state helping other disobedient states.

War against Athens was about Persia reclaiming and chastising a recalcitrant and openly rebellious subject. It is in this context that both Marathon and Xerxes' later expedition must be viewed.¹⁵

For those wishing to get stuck into Herodotus

There is nothing as good as going back to the original words of Herodotus to get a Greek understanding of the events of the Persian Wars. However, few students (or teachers) have the time or the dedication to follow the example of "Count Laszlo de Almasy"¹⁶. There are many online versions of Herodotus to which students can refer if they do not have a print copy. The author has used the following, though its style may not suit everyone.

<http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/hh/hh1010.htm>

(This version also has a Greek version for those very few who can read it.)

The following is a list of more detailed references that students might care to follow up. Students of Extension History might find this a useful exercise if they are studying Herodotus as one of their historians.

Croesus' consultation of the Delphic oracle	Book 1, 53-56
Croesus and the snakes	Book 1, 78-80
Croesus saved from death, Cyrus' reaction	Book 1, 86-90
Persian Customs	Book 1, 131-140
Babylonian customs	Book 1, 195-200
Egyptian customs	Book 2, 35-50
Embalming in Egypt	Book 2, 86-89
Aristagoras' argument with Megabates	Book 5, 33-34
Darius' treatment of Miletus	Book 6, 18-21

¹⁵ Granger, R, *Persia and Greece*, from *Teaching History*, Vol 28, No 3, HTA of NSW, October 1994, p20

¹⁶ Count Laszlo de Almasy is the character, played by Ralph Fiennes, in the 1996 Oscar winning film "The English Patient". The Count always tries to keep a copy of Herodotus close to him.

Exercise 1.1

Match the name from the list below with the description given on the left.

1	Former tyrant of Athens	
2	Persian king told to “Remember the Athenians”	
3	Former tyrant forced to live in Susa	
4	Father of history or father of lies	
5	King of Sparta	
6	King of Lydia defeated by the Persians	
7	Persian king who was accused of madness	
8	Instigator of the Ionian Revolt	
9	Satrap of Western Asia	
10	Persian king who threw off Median rule	

CROESUS	HIPPIAS	CYRUS	ARTAPHERNES
HERODOTUS	CAMBYSES	CLEOMENES	HISTIAEUS
	DARIUS	ARISTAGORAS	

Exercise 1.2

Place the events listed on the right in the correct chronological order.

1 st event		THE BURNING OF SARDIS
2 nd event		EGYPT BECOMES PART OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE
3 rd event		ARISTAGORAS RECEIVES A MESSAGE FROM HISTIAEUS
4 th event		THE DEATH OF CAMBYSES
5 th event		THE BATTLE OF LADE
6 th event		DARIUS' SCYTHIAN CAMPAIGN
7 th event		ARISTAGORAS VISITS ATHENS SEEKING HELP
8 th event		CROESUS' DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF CYRUS
9 th event		PRO-PERSIAN TYRANTS OF IONIA DRIVEN FROM POWER
10 th event		ARISTAGORAS' FAILED ATTACK ON NAXOS

What do the historians have to say about “Origins: Persian imperialism, Ionian Revolt”?

1. Russel Granger: Persia and Greece

Granger’s excellent article raises several issues often not mentioned in conventional texts re-relations between Persia and Greece. The traditional view handed down via Herodotus and other Greek writers, is that there existed long-term antipathy between Greece and Persia, based on the Greek longing for “liberty”. Granger suggests that Persia attracted Greeks and Greek states. Hundreds of Greeks who had worked for the Persians in the two centuries before the time of Alexander the Great are known by name. Granger points out that even the Delphic Oracle had made overtures to Persia. Granger points out that public opinion in Athens had not always been anti-Persian. Persia provided stability, international order and protection for the wealthy classes.

*The Persians had acquired the reputation of being wealthy, generous and relatively easy-going masters. They had been seen at close quarters to be civilised, god-fearing, truth-telling aristocrats, good at riding and hunting, just as Greek aristocrats liked to be.*¹⁷

2. J B Bury: A History of Greece

Generations of students of an earlier time learned the story of Greece through the eyes of J B Bury. Bury’s view of the origins and significance of the Persian Wars is quite at odds with that of Granger. Bury presents an old-fashioned, English “Whig interpretation” of the clash between Greece and Persia.¹⁸ Writing at a time of British greatness, Bury shares a deep faith in the strength of British democracy and freedom. As a result, from his perspective, the Persian Wars represent a clash of ideologies – freedom and democracy versus slavery and authoritarianism. He makes the point that if the Ionian revolt had occurred when the tyrant Hippias ruled Athens, Athens would not have helped the Ionians, and so there would have been no later Persian invasion of Greece.

*Athenian character had been developed under free democratical institutions... The Persian invasion was brought about by the same political causes which enabled Athens to withstand it. The Ionian Greeks would not have risen in revolt but for the growth of a strong sentiment against tyrannies – the same cause which overthrew the Pisistratids (Athens’ 6th Century tyrant rulers) and created Marathonian Athens.*¹⁹

3. Raphael Sealey: A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC

Sealey takes a different tack. He sees the views of Herodotus as being too simplistic, arguing that they result from the way Herodotus seeks to construct his history. Sealey is not out to glorify Athens and argue the ‘clash of civilisations’ line. He takes issue with Herodotus’ view that there was a chain of grievances and counter-grievances. Herodotus tends to present historical developments as “happened and so therefore this happened”. Sealey points out that Herodotus even extends this type of thinking into the natural world.²⁰ For Sealey, the factor behind the Persian Wars was much more straightforward – good old-fashioned imperialism.

*...the aim was conquest. The ultimate reason for the Persian invasions can only be discerned in general and somewhat uninformative terms; one may speak of the tendency of empires to expand or note that the Persian ruling class set a value on conquest.*²¹

¹⁷ Granger, R, *Persia and Greece*, from *Teaching History*, Vol 28, No 3, HTA of NSW, October 1994, p18

¹⁸ This is not the place to get side-tracked into a discussion of Whig history. However, *Extension History* students who examine the Whig Interpretation, and perhaps study Macaulay, might investigate Bury more.

¹⁹ Bury, J B, *A History of Greece*, Macmillan, London, 1951 (Third Edition), pp 249-50

²⁰ See Herodotus’ description of the winged serpents of Arabia: Book III, 109

²¹ Sealey, R, *A History of The Greek City States 700-338 BC*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976, p 180

Chapter 2

Invasion of 490 BC: Battle of Marathon, role of Miltiades

Mardonius in Thrace

By 494 BC, the Ionian Revolt had finally been brought under control. If Herodotus is to be believed, Darius was now burning with a single-minded obsession to punish the Athenians and Eretrians. However, before he dealt with Athens, Darius sought to reestablish his control in Thrace and Persian influence in Macedonia which had been temporarily eclipsed during the Ionian Revolt. To achieve these aims, Darius appointed his son-in-law, Mardonius, as commander-in-chief.

The Persian force under Mardonius set out westwards in 492 BC;

- Mardonius' first action was to deal with Ionian political matters, removing the tyrants of the region.

...for Mardonius deposed all the despots of the Ionians and established popular governments in the cities...¹.

- Mardonius then crossed the Hellespont into Europe, and, Herodotus says, was heading for Athens and Eretria.
- Thrace and Macedonia were subdued quickly with little difficulty.
- The island of Thasos (in the northern Aegean Sea, off the coast of Thrace) was also taken under Persian control. Herodotus tells us:

...and in the first place they subdued with their ships the Thasians, who did not even raise a hand to defend themselves...²

The Persian fleet then attempted to sail around the promontory of Mt Athos when disaster struck. Herodotus describes the scene in typically dramatic fashion:

...and then starting from Acanthos they attempted to get round Mount Athos; but as they sailed round, there fell upon them a violent North Wind, against which they could do nothing, and handled them very roughly, casting away very many of their ships on Mount Athos. It is said indeed that the number of the ships destroyed was three hundred and more than twenty thousand men; for as this sea which is about Athos is very full of sea monsters, some were seized by these and so perished, while others were dashed against the rocks; and some of them did not know how to swim and perished for that cause, others again by reason of cold."³


¹ Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book VI, 43

² Herodotus, *Book VI*, 44

³ Herodotus, *Book VI*, 44

Can we believe Herodotus?

This is perhaps a useful place to comment on the reliability of Herodotus' account of the Persian Wars. The early books of Herodotus contain amazing and fantastical tales. Even the disaster off Mt Athos stretches credulity with its stories of sea monsters devouring Persian sailors. Indeed, it is easy to criticise the work of Herodotus, as Figure 2.1 attempts to do.



This is not the place to get into a detailed “Extension History-style” analysis of Herodotus as a historian ⁴, yet a few points in Herodotus' defence are perhaps appropriate at this stage.

- Much of what Herodotus says can be corroborated by other sources.
- He was an educated and well read man and often quotes other writers of his and earlier times.
- In Herodotus, the gods do not determine human outcomes (as was often the case in Homer).
- He was not perhaps as credulous as he has been described:

...Sometimes he casts doubt on reports of an incident, indicates his skepticism about particular claims, reports what he heard without believing it himself and dismisses accounts outright...⁵

⁴ For this see: Webb, K, *Extension History: The Historians*, HTA of NSW, Annandale, 2006, Chapter 2

⁵ Hughes-Warrington, M, *Fifty Key Thinkers on History*, Routledge, London, 2001, p 160

The Persian Invasion of 490 BC

In 490 BC, Darius was ready for another attack on the Greeks. Leading this expedition were one of his Median generals, Datis, and his nephew, Artaphernes. Was Darius intent on destroying Athens? This is probably unlikely.

- Athens was a wealthy city and would be a valuable asset for the empire.
- The presence of Hippias with Datis and Artaphernes suggests that the Persians had plans to use the former ageing Athenian tyrant as a puppet ruler. Hippias would not be needed if Athens became a smouldering ruin.

Before the Persian fleet departed Ionia, heralds were sent to the Greek city states, giving them the opportunity to submit by offering the Persian king 'earth and water'. Most of the island states and many mainland states did in fact 'medise' in this fashion.⁶ Athens, Eretria and Sparta refused to medise but they took no joint action.

Darius decided to direct his attack against Athens and Eretria, using a small but efficient force of 200 warships and 25 000 under Datis and Artaphernes. The Persian fleet 'island-hopped' across the Aegean, from Asia Minor to Samos to Naxos to Delos. At Delos, the Persians honoured Apollo. From Delos the fleet sailed to the Cyclades and then to the island of Euboea. Facing no opposition, the Persians quickly took Carystus on the southern tip of Euboea.

...seeing that the Carystians would neither give them hostages nor consent to join in an expedition against cities that were their neighbours, meaning Eretria and Athens, they began to besiege them and to ravage their land; until at last the Carystians also came over to the will of the Persians...⁷

From there, the Persians moved on Eretria. The city held out for six days. The city was eventually taken, burned to the ground and its people taken to Susa as slaves. Herodotus recounts that the Persians:

...entered the city, plundered and set fire to the temples in retribution for the temples which were burned at Sardis, and also reduced the people to slavery according to the commands of Darius...⁸

- The Greeks were not united in the face of the Persian threat. There had already been evidence of widespread medism.
- Even Athens and Eretria had no joint plan of action.
- Divisions existed inside Athens between those who sought a restoration of Hippias and democrats.
- Members of the Peloponnesian League were reluctant to assist Athens, believing that Darius' anger was directed only at Athens and Eretria.
- Legend has it that the Athenian runner, Pheidippides, ran a distance of 225 kms in two days to reach Sparta. When he arrived in Sparta and told of Athens' peril, the Spartans replied that they could not move their troops north as they were celebrating a religious festival and would have to wait for the coming of the full moon.

⁶ The term medism refers to the submission of a state to the Persians.

⁷ Herodotus, Book VI, 99

⁸ Herodotus, Book VI, 101

Exercise 2.1

Read each statement. Indicate whether you think each is either true or false.

1	Mardonius quickly reestablished Persian influence in Thrace.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
2	Herodotus claims that 20 000 Persians were lost off Mt Athos.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
3	There is no particular bias towards the Athenians in Herodotus' account.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
4	Herodotus is frequently prone to exaggerating his account of events.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
5	Herodotus' account frequently assigns an active role to the gods.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
6	It is certain that the Persian intended to destroy the city of Athens.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
7	The invasion fleet of 490 was keen to avoid the perils of Mt Athos.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
8	Eretria's punishment was reminiscent of the treatment meted out to Sardis.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
9	The Greeks were united in their desire to stand up to the Persian attack.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
10	Sparta immediately sent troops north to help the Athenians.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE

The Battle of Marathon: 490 BC

(i) Background

Having dealt with Eretria, the Persian forces crossed from Euboea to the region of Attica on the Greek mainland. Well aware of the attack to come, the Athenians raised a force of 9000. However, when they sought the assistance of other Greek states, only the Boeotian town of Plataea obliged, sending a force of 1000 hoplite soldiers.

- The Athenian forces were placed under the command of the Polemarch Archon, Callimachus, whose Council of War contained the ten generals (strategoí).
- The leading strategoi was Miltiades, the former tyrant of the Chersonese. Miltiades was to be the key figure in the organisation of the battle.

- It was on Miltiades' advice that the Athenian assembly decided to meet the Persian forces at Marathon, about 40 kms north east of Athens.
 - The Persians beached their ships in the Bay of Marathon.
 - They set up camp in the plain of Marathon between the Great Marsh at the north of the bay and the banks of the river Charadros.
 - The Athenians set up camp in the foothills of Mt Agriliki.
- Sources vary, but it would seem that the Athenians were outnumbered approximately 10 000 to 25 000.

For several days, the opposing forces watched each other and waited. The Persians clearly had the advantage: they had superior numbers and their feared archers. In addition, they were expecting treacherous action inside Athens in favour of Hippias.

Figure 2.2 Greece and the Aegean Sea



(ii) The cavalry

Debate exists on the issue of the Persian cavalry – or lack thereof – at Marathon.

Strangely, though the Persians had disembarked their cavalry, they took no part in the battle. Herodotus describes the fleet's final preparations:

...and there came to them also the ships for carrying horses, which in the year before Darius had ordered his tributaries to make ready. In these they placed their horses, and having embarked the land-army in the ships they sailed for Ionia with six hundred triremes...⁹

Historians are divided on the reasons for the Persian failure to use the cavalry. Ehrenberg suggests:

...part of the Persian fleet with the cavalry onboard... was sailing south to round Attica and enter

9 Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book VI, 95

the Saronic Gulf...¹⁰

However, Sealey is not convinced. He prefers to rely on Herodotus' account and argues that:

*...although Herodotus fails to mention the Persian cavalry in his account of the fighting, he probably believed that they took part; for he says that the Persians were amazed at the Athenian attack, as they saw that the Athenians were few and were advancing at a charge, although they had neither cavalry nor arrows.*¹¹

(iii) The decision to fight


The Athenian generals were divided. Should they attack or wait? Miltiades urged action but with the strategi eveny divided, he needed Callimachus' support. Herodotus tells how Miltiades convinced Callimachus to fight.

*...if we fight a battle before any unsoundness appears in any part of the Athenian people, then we are able to gain the victory in the fight, if the gods grant equal conditions. These things then all belong to you and depend on you; for if you attach yourself to my opinions, you have both a fatherland which is free and a native city which shall be the first among the cities of Hellas; but if you choose the opinion of those who are earnest against fighting, you shall have the opposite of those good things of which I told you.*¹²

Miltiades' arguments won the day; Callimachus used his casting vote to support Miltiades' plan.

(iv) The Battle

Figure 2.2: Summary of the Battle of Marathon



¹⁰ Ehrenberg, V, *From Solon to Socrates*, Routledge, London, 1973, pp 139-40

¹¹ Sealey, R, *A History of The Greek City States 700-338 BC*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976, pp 190-1

¹² Herodotus, Book VI, 109

Why did the Athenians win the Battle of Marathon?

The Athenians were quite rightly proud of their victory at Marathon. The odds were stacked against them as they were overwhelmingly outnumbered, had little support from other Greeks and faced the possibility of potentially fatal divisions at home. Several factors combined to explain the Athenian success.

1. The skilled leadership of Miltiades was clearly a significant factor.
 - a. The time he had spent in the Chersonese gave him knowledge about potential Persians tactics and how to deal with them.
 - b. His ability to convince Callimachus and then to devise an appropriate strategy were crucial.
2. The Athenian and Plataean hoplites were better armed than their Persian enemies.
 - a. The Athenians wore greaves that protected their legs, wore a cuirass which protected their upper bodies and carried a shield.
 - b. The Persians wore little armour and had only wicker shields. This was a grave disadvantage in close man-on-man fighting.
3. The Athenians made good use of the terrain.
 - a. Fighting at Marathon neutralised the strongest part of the Persian forces – the cavalry.
 - b. Miltiades' tactic of rushing the Persian centre prevented them from taking advantage of their superior numbers.
4. There was also the issue of morale.
 - a. The Athenians (and Plataeans) were fighting for their homeland; defeat meant slavery or worse.
 - b. The Persian force was a multi-national outfit, less drilled in cooperative combat than their Greek enemies and likely to be far less motivated.

The results and significance of the Battle of Marathon

Marathon deservedly stands out as one of the great battles of history. This is not because of its scale, there have been many more dramatic and many far larger encounters in military history.

(a) There were several key, short-term results:

- a. Athenian casualties were light (192) whereas the Persians had lost over 6000 and were forced to return home.
- b. Athens was saved from possibly experiencing Eretria's fate.
- c. Miltiades briefly became Athens' undisputed leader.
- d. Athens' reputation amongst the Greeks soared. Herodotus notes with pride the attitude of the Spartans when they finally arrived. Once their religious festival was over, 2000 Spartans marched north:

...and though they had come too late for the battle, they desired to behold the Medes; and accordingly they went out to Marathon and looked at the bodies of the slain: then afterwards they departed home, commending the Athenians and the work which they had done.¹³

¹³ Herodotus, Book VI, 120

- e. The Athenians thanked their gods for their victory and major offerings were made to Athena, Apollo and Artemis.
- f. The heroes of Marathon gained a special place in Athenian life.¹⁴ Their memory lived on:
 - i. The Athenian Agora bore evidence of the memory of Marathon as seen in the Stoa Poikile which showed scenes from the battle;
 - ii. When an Athenian delegation spoke in Sparta just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides has them say:

...This is our record. At Marathon we stood out against the Persians and faced them single-handed...¹⁵

- iii. In his play “The Acharnians”, the playwright Aristophanes has a chorus complain about the treatment of Marathon veterans:

...Then, when we were at Marathon, we were the ones prosecuting the attack, but now we are the ones wicked men prosecute, and get convicted too...¹⁶

(b) In the medium term, relations with Persia now dominated thinking in Athens.

- a. This would affect relations with other Greek states, naval policy and internal politics.
- b. Another greater attack from the east was highly likely as Darius, and his successor Xerxes, would never leave matters as they were settled after Marathon.

Taking a broader view, Marathon arguably has an even greater significance. What would have been the result of a Persian victory at Marathon? Athens and mainland Greece would have come under Persian control. Would a Persian-controlled 5th Century Athens have produced the ideas on law, government, science and philosophy, the literature and the architecture that would permeate the western world for centuries to come? We cannot know the answer but it is an interesting notion to ponder.

Miltiades' role at Marathon was crucial:

It was Miltiades who had convinced the Athenian Council to meet the Persians at Marathon. Miltiades was clearly recognised as the most able strategoi, a fact that is supported by Callimachus' willingness to accept his advice. It was Miltiades who pressed most strongly for the decision to attack the Persians even though the odds seemed so strongly stacked against the Athenians.¹⁷ It was probably Miltiades who commanded the central body of the Athenian forces at Marathon.

¹⁴ A comparison might be made here to the reverence granted to Anzacs who fought at Gallipoli and later at Kokoda.

¹⁵ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Book 1, 73

¹⁶ Aristophanes, *The Acharnians*, 967-8

¹⁷ Herodotus infers that Miltiades waited until it was his turn to command before attacking (Book 6, 115). This is not true, as the rotation of command system amongst the strategoi was not introduced until late 490 BC.

The career of Miltiades:

549 – Born, son of Cimon, an Athenian aristocrat.

524 – Served under the Peisistratid tyranny in Athens.

516 – Seized power in the Chersonese (Gallipoli area).

513 – Served under Darius during the Scythian Campaign.

510 – Driven out of the Chersonese and returns to Athens.

499 – Joins the Ionian Revolt and later captures Lemnos and Imbros which he cedes to Athens.

496 – Returns to the Chersonese and rules for three years.

493 – Following the collapse of the Ionian revolt, he returns to Athens and is tried for his former tyrannical rule in the Chersonese.

490 – Elected one of Athens' ten generals. Plays the leading role at the Battle of Marathon.

489 – Leads an offensive in the Cyclades but fails to capture Paros. He is wounded, returns to Athens, is impeached, tried, condemned and fined 50 talents – an extraordinary amount.

488 – Dies from the effects of his wound, probably gangrene. He was probably in prison at the time. His son, Cimon, would become one of Athens' leading figures in the 470s and 460s.



Miltiades remembered in a Greek postage stamp.

Exercise 2.2

Answer the following questions in the spaces provided.

1	What help did the Athenians receive during the Battle of Marathon?	
2	Who were the principal Athenian commanders at the Battle of Marathon?	
3	Why might the Persians have been unable to use their cavalry at Marathon?	
4	What was the extent of the Athenian success at the Battle of Marathon?	
5	What four factors help explain the Athenian success at Marathon?	
6	What role did Sparta play in the Battle of Marathon?	
7	What was the Spartan view of the Athenian actions at Marathon?	
8	What was the highly likely medium term result of the Battle of Marathon?	
9	What action was Miltiades involved in in 489 BC?	
10	What eventually happened to Miltiades?	

What do the historians have to say about the Invasion of 490 BC: Battle of Marathon, role of Miltiades?

1. A R Burn: Persia and the Greeks

Burn refers to the “mystique” which the Battle of Marathon assumed for the Greeks. He compares it to the Scottish victory over the English at the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314 or the English success over the Spanish Armada in 1588. He further makes the point that the invader in each case was only weakened temporarily and that the danger of a future attack still remained. And how did the Greeks now behave?

...the Greeks, with their usual incurable optimism, underestimated the continuing danger. They returned in the following years to the gratification of their internal grudges, while Persia returned to the strategy of an advance round the Aegean, convinced that greater forces would be needed for the conquest of the Greek mainland... ¹⁸

2. J A R Munro: The Deliverance of Greece

Munro highlights the enormous debt that the Athenians owed to Miltiades, a man who soon to be so badly treated by the citizens he had saved. Munro points out that it was Miltiades who understood the Persian way of doing things, Miltiades who understood his strengths and weaknesses, and Miltiades who was proved to be the master of timing, waiting for just the right time to act. Miltiades was quick to seize the best position and knew just when to take the offensive.

...driven to attenuate his centre, he snatched victory out of its defeat. Marathon was a triumph of the intelligent use of tactics, discipline and armament.. ¹⁹

3. Victor Ehrenberg: From Solon to Socrates

Ehrenberg comments on the impact of Marathon on both Greek confidence and Persian intentions. Greek self-confidence increased but no real damage had been done to the enemy. To the Athenians the victory at Marathon seemed like a miracle. Ehrenberg points out that in Athens the belief quickly grew that there must have been some divine assistance in events though he also states there was also no lack of Athenian civic pride. Many dedications to the gods were made.

...Both sides had learnt a good deal about one another. The Persians, in particular, must have realised the error of their strategy; it was the obvious thing for them to return to Mardonius' plans... On the Greek side the weakness of the Persian infantry...made a deep impression, and the belief that Persian superior power was not invincible created a false idea of the enemy... ²⁰

¹⁸ Burn, A R, *Persia and the Greeks*, Edward Arnold, London, 1962, p 256

¹⁹ Munro, J A R, *The Deliverance of Greece*, from *The Cambridge Ancient History, IV The Persian Empire and the West*, CUP, Cambridge, 1964, p 252

²⁰ Ehrenberg, V, *From Solon to Socrates*, Routledge, London, 1967, pp 141-2


Notes

Chapter 3: Inter-war period: preparation and developments in Persia and Greece

Overview

Athens was exultant following the victory at Marathon and its esteem in the Greek world was great. Sparta's admiration for the Athenian effort was noted in Chapter 2.¹ Following the Battle of Marathon, Miltiades led an unsuccessful expedition against Paros. His defeat was used by his enemies to impeach him and he eventually died in prison in 488 BC. The island of Aegina's² decision to medise in 490 BC had angered Athens. A rivalry which went back some years broke out into an inconclusive trade war that continued through the 480s. Political developments in Athens saw the increasing democratisation of the Athenian political system.³ The weapon of ostracism was used to remove leading figures such as Xanthippus and Aristides. By the end of the decade, the leading figure inside Athens was Themistocles. Themistocles convinced the Athenians to develop their naval power. As the threat of another Persian attack loomed larger at the end of the decade, those ostracised were recalled and a Greek Congress was held to plan joint Greek action. Persia's desire to avenge its defeat at Marathon was delayed by the death of King Darius and the outbreak of rebellion in Egypt. Once Xerxes had consolidated his power, he set about preparing a major invasion force to attack the Greeks. The Persians were ready to move on Greece by 480 BC.

Figure 3.1 summarises the structure of this chapter.



¹ See Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book VI, 120

² Aegina is situated in the Saronic Gulf, about 35 kms south east of Athens.

³ See Chapter 11

Timeline: 490-480 BC

- 490 - The Battle of Marathon
The Persians are defeated and return to Asia
- 489 - Miltiades' unsuccessful campaign against Paros
Death of the Spartan King, Cleomenes
- 488 - Death of Miltiades
- 487 - War breaks out between Athens and Aegina
It continues throughout the 480s
- 486 - Egypt revolts against Persian rule
- 485 - Death of Darius
Xerxes becomes King of Persia
- 484 - Xerxes suppresses the Egyptian revolt
The Athenian general, Xanthippus, is ostracised
- 483 - Themistocles convinces the Athenians to use their newly discovered silver
wealth on building a fleet construction of the canal at Mt Athos
- 482 - The Athenian statesman, Aristides, is ostracised
- 481 - The Congress of the Isthmus at Corinth meets
- 480 - Xanthippus and Aristides are recalled from exile as a Persian invasion looms

Developments in Greece

(i) The Athens-Aegina War

Aegina was the strongest naval power in the Aegean at this time and relations between Aegina and Athens had been poor for some time. Athens feared that Aegina would side with the Persians at the time of Marathon. To counter this threat Athens sought Spartan help, pointing out that by its medism Aegina was betraying Greece. The Spartan King, Cleomenes, took ten hostages from Aegina and gave them to Athens. This was enough to prevent Aegina openly siding with the Persians.

The death of the Spartan King, Cleomenes ⁴, in c. 489 BC changed things.

- The Aeginetans now demanded that Sparta use their influence to force Athens to return the hostages currently held in Athens. Athens refused the request of the Spartan King, Leotychides.
- War between Aegina and Athens was the result.
- An attempted pro-Athenian democratic coup in Aegina led by Nicodromus collapsed when Athenian help arrived too late. 700 democrats in Aegina were executed.
- Athens won a naval victory but its subsequent siege of the town failed when Aegina was able to gain the support of 1000 volunteers from Argos. The Athenians were routed as they fled to their ships.
- Tit for tat reprisals between the two cities continued for some years.

⁴ See the box that follows this section

The necessity of protecting Attica (Athens' region) from Aeginetan depredations, the ambition perhaps of ultimately reducing Aegina to subjection or insignificance, sensibly accelerated the conversion of Athens into a naval power.⁵

The death of Cleomones

Cleomenes' end was tragic. He had been accused of tampering with decisions of the oracle in order to remove his rival, Demaratus (who ended up living at Xerxes' court). He fled Sparta, was eventually pardoned for his crime and allowed to return to Sparta. However, he went mad, was chained up and guarded by a helot. Using threats against his lowly guard, he forced the helot to give him a knife. Herodotus tells what happened next:

...As soon as the knife was in his hands, Cleomenes began to mutilate himself, beginning on his shins. He sliced his flesh into strips, working upwards to his thighs, and from them to his hips and sides, until he reached his belly, and while he was cutting that into strips he died....⁶

(ii) Athenian political developments and the rise of Themistocles

The internal political developments inside Athens which gradually led to the creation of Athens' democracy will be considered more fully in Chapter 11. The key developments in the 480s BC included:

- the increasing use of ostracism
- the lessening importance of the position of archon
- the growing importance in the position of strategoi.

The growing importance of the post of strategoi was to be crucial. Gradually, any Athenian politician of ability and energy would seek election as a strategoi if he was to have any hope of making a mark in Athenian political life.

By the mid-480s, the weapon of ostracism was being used more and more.⁷

The first two men ostracised were Hipparchus and Megacles. Both these men were related to families that had been politically powerful in Athens in recent years and suggested that the democratic element inside Athens was becoming increasingly influential.

The leading political figures inside Athens at this time were Xanthippus, Aristides and Themistocles. None of these men was feared as a potential tyrant – the main reason for ostracism. However, ostracism would be used against them or by them to promote his political power.

Xanthippus was one of those responsible for bringing down Miltiades:

...Miltiades on his return to Athens, became the talk of the town; many were loud in their censure of him, and especially Xanthippus, who brought him before the people to be tried for his life on the charge of defrauding the public...⁸

- Xanthippus was ostracised in 484 BC.

⁵ Bury, J B, *A History of Greece*, St Martin's Press, London, 1967 (3rd edition), p 260

⁶ Herodotus, Book VI, 75

⁷ Ostracism worked as follows. Citizens would vote for a person to be ostracised (exiled) by placing the name of that person on an "ostrakon" and placing it in an urn. For the vote to be valid, at least 6000 votes had to be cast. The man with the most ostraka against him would be forced to leave Athens within ten days and not allowed to return for ten years. He did not lose his property or his citizenship.

⁸ Herodotus, Book VI, 136


- **Aristides** was known as ‘the just’ and was renowned for his honesty and integrity. Herodotus saw him as an upright man who, even though he was a major rival of Themistocles, was willing to work with his rival for the good of Athens. At the time of the Battle of Salamis in 480, Herodotus says:

...Themistocles was no friend of his (Aristides); indeed he was his most determined enemy; but Aristides was willing, in view of the magnitude of the danger which threatened them, to forget old quarrels in his desire to communicate with him...⁹

- Aristides was ostracised in 482 BC.

It was **Themistocles** who gained from the ostracism of his rivals.¹⁰ However, his success was far more important to Athens than the mere working out of political rivalries. Themistocles and Aristides had major policy differences which would have a major impact on the development of Athens. It was Themistocles’ political victory over Aristides which, arguably, would save Greece in 480 BC, and which would lead Athens on to the road of imperial domination.

Figure 3.2 illustrates this.

THEMISTOCLES	Themistocles	ARISTIDES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Opposed the idea that Athens should be mainly a military power ■ Believed that Athens should sacrifice its army for the navy ■ Saw Athens’ future as a sea state ■ Themistocles, as archon in 493-2 BC, began the fortification of the Piraeus peninsula which would eventually provide Athens with security and mercantile dominance in the Greek world ■ In 483 BC a rich deposit of silver was discovered at Laurion in the south east corner of Attica, and it was proposed that this new wealth be distributed amongst the Athenian citizenry ■ Themistocles argued successfully that it should instead be spent on building new ships ■ By 481 BC, Athens had over 100 modern triremes; by 480 BC it had over 200 ■ Athens was now the largest eastern Greek naval power, and only Corcyra and Syracuse had larger fleets ■ Themistocles’ foresight would be vindicated at the Battle of Salamis in 480 BC 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Was firmly of the belief that Athens should be a military power ■ Opposed the idea of sacrificing the army for a navy ■ Athens’ hoplite success at Marathon proved the wisdom of sticking with a primarily military force ■ Aristides accepted the agricultural nature of Attic life and the success Athens had experienced when its farmer citizenry obeyed the call to arms ■ Fifty years of military success against Chalcis, Boetia and Persia convinced him he was right ■ In this sense, Aristides was clearly conservative in outlook when compared to the revolutionary thinking of Themistocles ■ Herodotus seems to suggest that the war with Aegina weakened Aristides in his struggle for power with Themistocles by proving the wisdom of Themistocles’ thinking: <i>...The outbreak of this war at that moment saved Greece by forcing Athens to become a maritime power...</i>
	<p>FIGURE 3.2: THEMISTOCLES Versus ARISTIDES</p>	
	<p>Aristides</p> 	<p>Herodotus, Book VII, 144</p>

⁹ Herodotus, Book VIII, 79

¹⁰ Thucydides was effusive in his praise of Themistocles’ contribution to Athens’ cause. This will be considered in Chapter 5.

(iii) The Greeks prepare for invasion

By the end of the 480s, the Greek city states could not have been under any illusion but that an attack was coming from the east. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent heralds to all Greek states – except Athens and Sparta – demanding tokens of submission: earth and water. Clearly Athens and Sparta were beyond the scope of any possible Persian mercy.

- In 481 BC a **Congress** of the Greek states was called which met on the isthmus separating the Corinthian Gulf from the Saronic Gulf. It was presided over by Sparta.
 - The Hellenic League was set up.
 - It was decided that any Greek state which voluntarily ‘medised’ would be ‘tithed’, ie its wealth would be confiscated and a tenth given to the god at Delphi.
 - There were 31 Greek states at the Congress but absent were the northern states.
 - They knew that they would bear the brunt of an early Persian attack and they did not want to commit themselves until they were sure Greek forces, especially Spartan, were going to be sent north to protect them.
- An indication of **Greek unity** was the fact that existing inter-state feuds were put aside, eg the conflict between Athens and Aegina.
 - This now meant the two largest Greek navies would fight together against Persia.
- There was the question of **leadership** to be considered.
 - Spartan leadership of the land forces was automatic.
 - However, there was jealousy of growing Athenian power and the Greek states would only accept Spartan naval leadership. Athens yielded to this.
- Appeals were sent to **other Greek states** but to no avail.
 - Argos remained neutral.
 - Crete and Corcyra did not get involved.
 - The tyrant of Syracuse, Gelon, faced the possibility of an attack from Carthage and could not help, though he still made claims for leadership of the Greek cause.
- The Athenians approached the **Delphic Oracle** for advice. The oracle advised Athens not to resist Persia. Not happy with this, the Oracle was approached a second time. This time its advice was more cryptic, as was usually the case with oracular announcements.

*Yet Zeus the all-seeing grants to Athens' power
That the wooden wall only shall not fall, but help you and your children,
But await not the host of horse and foot coming from Asia,
Nor be still, but turn your back and withdraw from the foe,
Truly a day will come when you will meet him face to face,
Divine Salamis, you will bring death to women's sons
When the corn is scattered, or the harvest gathered in.* ¹¹

- The second message from the Oracle confused the Athenians.
 - Older men said that the wall referred to the ancient fence around the Acropolis.
 - Themistocles argued differently and said it referred to Athens' fleet. Themistocles' views won the day and he was able to persuade the people to eventually abandon Athens and fight at sea. ¹²

¹¹ Herodotus, Book VII, 141

¹² A more detailed look at the specific role of Themistocles will be given in Chapter 5

- A **second meeting** of the Greek states was held in 480 BC.
 - The Spartan king, Leonidas, was appointed to command the army, while the Spartan, Eurybiades, was made commander of the fleet.
 - Themistocles realised that if any form of Greek unity was going to be maintained, Athens must accept Spartan leadership.
- Athens also buried its earlier **internal political differences**. Aristides and Xanthippus were recalled from exile.

Exercise 3.1

Complete the following passage using the terms in the box below.

Following Athens' great victory at Marathon, _____ led an expedition to _____ . However, his failure led to his _____ and he died in prison in 488 BC. A year later Athens found itself at war with _____, a conflict that would continue spasmodically for several years. Democratic developments were changing Athenian political life. The use of _____ was allowing rising political figures to remove rivals. In 484 BC, _____ was ostracised and two years later _____ was also ostracised. _____ was becoming Athens' leading figure. He believed Athens should build up its _____ power and persuaded the people to use new _____ deposits to finance the building of ships. The threat from Persia led to the establishment of the _____ in 481 BC. _____ leadership of both army and navy forces was accepted. _____ led the Greek military forces while _____ was appointed naval commander. Notable absentees from the League included _____ and _____. Athens consulted the oracle at _____ twice, not satisfied with first advice given.

SPARTAN	PAROS	DELPHI	LEONIDAS	XANTHIPPIUS	SILVER
ARGOS	MILTIADES	AEGINA	SYRACUSE	THEMISTOCLES	OSTRACISM
EURYBIADES	NAVAL	ARISTIDES	IMPEACHMENT	HELLENIC LEAGUE	

Developments in Persia

(i) Internal problems

Herodotus tells us that King Darius was determined on revenge following his humiliation at Marathon. However, four years passed before any action was taken and then Darius faced a major revolt in Egypt in 486 BC. Egyptian affairs had to be settled before any Greek adventure could be considered. Matters became more complicated for the Persians when Darius died in 485 BC.

...Death, however, cut him off before his preparations were complete... and so (Darius) was robbed of his chance to punish either Egypt or the Athenians. ¹³


His successor was his and Atossa's son, Xerxes.

¹³ Herodotus, Book VII, 4

The Egyptian revolt was finally put down in 484 BC and the Egyptians were punished with the destruction of several of their temples. Persian imperial rule was usually very tolerant of the religious practices of subject peoples. Xerxes' brother, Ariamenes the satrap of Bactria, was also threatening revolt. He was bought off with gifts. In 482 BC, Xerxes then faced a revolt in Babylonia. The revolt was crushed ruthlessly and the rebels harshly treated. Their lands were confiscated and Babylonia was incorporated into the satrapy of Assyria.

By 481 BC, Xerxes was ready. However, he faced divisions over the issue of invasion at the court in Susa. Herodotus relates how Xerxes was torn between the advice of the 'youthful, reckless' Mardonius, and the 'wiser, more tempered' Artabanus.

Xerxes was not convinced by Artabanus and angrily rejected his advice.



(ii) The Persians prepare for war


The Persian invasion of 480 BC was a far bigger operation than that attempted in 490 BC. Herodotus states:

...As nobody has left a record, I cannot state the precise number of men provided by each separate nation, but the grand total, excluding the naval contingent, turned out to be 1, 700 000...¹⁴

Such a massive undertaking involved massive logistical preparations. The preparations undertaken by the Persians are summarised in Figure 3.4.

¹⁴ Herodotus, Book VII, 60

FIGURE 3.4: SUMMARY OF PERSIAN PREPARATIONS FOR INVASION IN 480 BC




Herodotus is not only a key source for learning about The Persian Wars. It is also a vastly entertaining read and it is no wonder Herodotus' contemporaries eagerly listened to his "performances" of his work. Here is a list of references from *The Histories* students might like to check.

- The debate between Mardonius and Artabanus, and Xerxes' violent reaction to Artabanus' advice:
Book VII, 9-10
- The story of Pythius who asked Xerxes for one of his sons to be allowed to stay with him and not join the invasion (MA 15):
Book VII, 38-39

- The story of Xerxes' punishment of the Hellespont with 300 lashes:
Book VII, 34-35
- The building of the Athos canal:
Book VII, 22-23

FIGURE 3.5: Approximate route of Xerxes' army's march into Greece



(iii) Why did Xerxes invade Greece?

Herodotus gives us a series of reasons to explain Xerxes' actions:

(a) a desire for revenge

*...My intent is to throw a bridge over the Hellespont and march an army through Europe against Greece, that thereby I may obtain vengeance from the Athenians for the wrongs committed by them against the Persians and against my father.*¹⁵

(b) a desire for imperial expansion

*...the expedition of the Persian king, though it was in name directed against Athens, threatened really the whole of Greece. And of this the Greeks were aware some time before; but they did not all view the matter in the same light.*¹⁶

(c) Mardonius' ambitions

*...All this he (Mardonius) said, because he longed for adventures, and hoped to become satrap of Greece under the king...*¹⁷

(d) a desire of some Greeks for Xerxes to invade

*...For, in the first place, it chanced that messengers arrived from Thessaly, sent by the Aleuadae, Thessalian kings, to invite Xerxes into Greece, and to promise him all the assistance which it was in their power to give...*¹⁸

¹⁵ Herodotus, Book VII, 8

¹⁶ Herodotus, Book VII, 138

¹⁷ Herodotus, Book VII, 6

¹⁸ Herodotus, Book VII, 6

(e) Economics

Xerxes would have been aware of the potential of Greece and he was eager to prevent Greek interference in his western possessions (Thrace and Macedonia) where there was gold and timber to be had.

(f) Hubris

Herodotus and the playwright Aeschylus like to argue that Xerxes' arrogance and desire for glory was the real reason for the invasion.

For all the analysis and historical debate, it is quite likely that Xerxes simply felt a filial duty to avenge his father's humiliation and restore the honour of the (Persian) Achaemenid dynasty.

Exercise 3.2

Read each of the statements that follow and indicate whether each is either a fact or an opinion. Circle your answer.

1	Xerxes used the revolts in Egypt and Babylon as an excuse for delaying an attack on Greece.	FACT / OPINION
2	The revolts in Egypt and Babylon were forcefully suppressed.	FACT / OPINION
3	Mardonius was motivated by self-interest when debating the issue of invading Greece.	FACT / OPINION
4	Mardonius and Artabanus gave Xerxes conflicting advice about invading Greece.	FACT / OPINION
5	Herodotus' account of the Persian wars cannot be trusted.	FACT / OPINION
6	Xerxes was motivated primarily by a desire to avenge his father.	FACT / OPINION
7	Logistical preparations for the Persian invasion were complex and took time.	FACT / OPINION
8	The Greeks showed enormous courage in their decision to stand up to the Persians.	FACT / OPINION
9	The Greeks acquiesced to Spartan leadership in face of the invasion.	FACT / OPINION
10	There was a significant degree of unity in the Athenian response to the coming invasion.	FACT / OPINION

What do the historians have to say about the Inter-war period: preparation and developments in Persia and Greece?

1. Raphael Sealey: A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC

Sealey makes the point that the Hellenic League did not represent the existence of an emergent nation. The League was merely a collection of sovereign states that had come together at the time of temporary danger. The evidence of this is that significant differences still appeared between the states at this time. Even medism was not deemed a serious crime until after the invasion argues Sealey.


...The reasons why many Greeks allied in 481 BC to resist the invasion must be sought in the particular circumstances of those cities, not in any general recognition of Persia as a national enemy...¹⁹

2. Victor Ehrenberg: From Solon to Socrates

Ehrenberg presents a more complex image of Xerxes than the ancient Greek sources tend to offer. Herodotus and Aeschylus present Xerxes as a pathetic wretch. Aeschylus, in his play “The Persians”, is particularly hard on Xerxes. Later Greeks liked to present Xerxes as a fool and an overbearing megalomaniac. Ehrenberg sees him as rather more than that.

...he could be cruel, but also magnanimous... But he was impetuous and overconfident, perhaps even conceited, as a man in his thirties with power and success might easily be...²⁰

FIGURE 3.6: Artist impression of Xerxes bridge of boats over the Hellespont



¹⁹ Sealey, R, *A History of The Greek City States 700-338 BC*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976, p 196

²⁰ Ehrenberg, V, *From Solon to Socrates*, Routledge, London, 1967, pp 150-1


Chapter 4

Invasion of 480-79: Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea and Mycale

Greek strategy versus Persian strategy

The strategies which the Greeks and the Persians intended employing were quite different. This difference was primarily the result of the resources available to each, and the geography of Greece and its waters.

Figure 4.1 Greek strategy



For obvious reasons, Persian strategy was going to be different. With vastly superior numbers of infantry and cavalry, Xerxes sought large-scale battles in open land. He could afford to lose large numbers of men and still emerge as the clear victor. As the invading army, the Persians had to maintain the offensive, securing defensive positions was not an option. With such vast forces, the Persians needed the army to keep in contact with the fleet in order to maintain adequate supplies.

However, Xerxes' vastly superior forces led to a degree of recklessness and a lessening of a major focus on strategy.



The Battle of Thermopylae: 480 BC

A Greek force of approximately 7000 or 8000 troops were sent north to Tempe in Thessaly. The force comprised 300 Spartans, as well as Phocians, Arcadians, Thebans and Thespians. It was decided that Tempe could not be defended and so the troops moved south to the pass at Thermopylae. Here the Spartan King, Leonidas, rebuilt an old wall and prepared to defend the narrow passage. Leonidas learned of a mountain path that could bypass Thermopylae and so 1000 Phocians were sent to defend this.

- The Persians waited several days before attacking.
- When the attack began, Persians losses were considerable as even Xerxes' elite troops, "The Immortals", could not break the Greek defences.

Herodotus describes the scene:

*Then the Medes, having met so rough a reception, withdrew from the fight; and their place was taken by the band of Persians under Hydarnes, whom the king called his "Immortals": they, it was thought, would soon finish the business. But when they joined battle with the Greeks, 'twas with no better success than the Median detachment - things went much as before - the two armies fighting in a narrow space, and the barbarians using shorter spears than the Greeks, and having no advantage from their numbers. The Lacedaemonians fought in a way worthy of note, and showed themselves far more skilful in fight than their adversaries, often turning their backs, and making as though they were all flying away, on which the barbarians would rush after them with much noise and shouting, when the Spartans at their approach would wheel round and face their pursuers, in this way destroying vast numbers of the enemy. Some Spartans likewise fell in these encounters, but only a very few. At last the Persians, finding that all their efforts to gain the pass availed nothing, and that, whether they attacked by divisions or in any other way, it was to no purpose, withdrew to their own quarters.*¹

- However, the Greeks were to be betrayed by a native of the region, Ephialtes. He led Hydarnes and The Immortals through a mountain path. The Phocians prepared to fight, but the Persians moved on quickly.
- Once Leonidas learned he would soon be surrounded, he sent most of his troops south. He remained with his 300 Spartans, the Thebans (kept as hostages) and the Thespians who volunteered to stay.
- Showing great courage, the Greeks fought to the last man. Leonidas was killed and a battle occurred over possession of his body. Leonidas' body was later mutilated by the Persians.

*... (Xerxes) proceeded to pass through the slain; and finding the body of Leonidas, whom he knew to have been the Lacedaemonian king and captain, he ordered that the head should be struck off, and the trunk fastened to a cross.*²


Cinema loves the story of "The 300". The 1961 film, "The 300 Spartans", starring Richard Egan, still plays well if one doesn't mind the occasional anachronisms. It is often loyal to the version of Herodotus.³ More recent is the 2007 film "300" based on the historical fantasy novel by Frank Miller.⁴

¹ Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book VII, 211

² Herodotus, *Book VII*, 238

³ *This version can also be viewed as a piece of Cold War propaganda. When the Greeks talk of the struggle between "freedom and tyranny", 1960s audiences would have recognised the parallel struggle between western democracy and Soviet communism.*


⁴ *The author still enjoys Richard Egan as Leonidas; younger readers will probably prefer the 2007 fantasy version.*



The Battle of Artemisium: 480 BC

- A Greek fleet was positioned at Artemisium on the northern tip of the island of Euboea, about 110 kms due east of Thermopylae. There were 271 Greek vessels under the command of Eurybiades, while according to Herodotus, the Persian fleet was 1200 strong.
- Bad weather forced the Persians to seek anchorage off Cape Sepias, north and opposite to Artemisium. Binding their ships eight deep in the face of a three day storm, the Persian fleet suffered major damage.
- The Greeks were able to ride out the storm in the lee of Euboea.
- Two hundred Persian vessels were sent south to come up around the southern tip of Euboea but they were wrecked on the rugged southern coast.
 - We need to be wary of possible exaggeration by Herodotus.
 - The Greeks were joined by 53 Athenian vessels that brought news of the Persian wreck.
- Xerxes ordered his fleet at Cape Sepias to take on the Greeks in order to bring supplies to his troops. A closely fought, crowded battle ensued. Greek losses were significant.
- When news of the defeat at Thermopylae was received, the Greek fleet departed south under the cover of night. The encounter at Artemisium had not resulted in a decisive victory for either side.

Figure 4.2 summarises the main results of Thermopylae and Artemisium.



Exercise 4.1

Read each statement. Indicate whether you think each is either true or false.

1	Greek and Persians forces were numerically fairly even.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
2	The Persians preferred to fight in tight, narrow locations.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
3	The Greeks had originally planned to make a stand at Tempe.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
4	The Persians were faced by only 300 Greeks at Thermopylae.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
5	Xerxes' Immortals found it difficult to break through the Greek defence.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE

6	The Persians were greatly aided by Greek treachery.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
7	The Battle of Artemisium resulted in a clear cut Persian victory.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
8	Herodotus' account is totally discredited by The Troezen Inscription.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
9	The Persians failed to capture the temples at Delphi.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
10	After Artemisium, the Persian fleet was unable to attempt diversionary attacks.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE

The Battle of Salamis 480 BC

Xerxes reached Athens in September 480 BC. He had all those who had remained on the Acropolis slaughtered.

*... The Persians rushed to the gates and opened them, after which they massacred the suppliants, when all were slain, they plundered the temple, and fired every part of the citadel.*⁵

There now arose disagreement amongst the Greeks about what strategy to follow next.

- The Peloponnesians argued that the best strategy was to strengthen the Isthmus and hold off the Persians there.
 - The Corinthians, in particular, favoured fighting at the Isthmus.
- Themistocles argued that the best idea was to tackle the Persian fleet in the Bay of Eleusis, between the island of Salamis and the Greek mainland.
 - Themistocles argued that the Persian fleet could simply avoid the Isthmus and sail around to another location.
 - In the narrow straits around Salamis, the Persians would not be able to manoeuvre their larger vessels.
- The Corinthians chided Themistocles, saying he was a man without a city. Themistocles' retort was strong:

*...Hereupon Themistocles spake many bitter things against Adeimantus and the Corinthians generally; and for proof that he had a country, reminded the captains, that with two hundred ships at his command, all fully manned for battle, he had both city and territory as good as theirs; since there was no Grecian state which could resist his men if they were to make a descent...*⁶

- He spoke warmly to Eurybiades, encouraging him to support his plan but at the same time warned that he would lead his people to Italy to establish a new city if a decision was taken not to fight at Salamis.


⁵ Herodotus, Book VIII, 53

⁶ Herodotus, Book VIII, 61

- The Spartan naval commander accepted Themistocles' argument.
- There was also disagreement about strategy in the Persian camp.
 - Xerxes' leading commanders were eager for a battle and did not want to waste time.
- Only Queen Artemesia of Halicarnassus urged caution on Xerxes.

Xerxes was resolved to fight at Salamis.

Figure 4.3: Salamis and the position of Greek and Persian forces



The statue below can be found in the new Acropolis Museum in Athens. It shows evidence of violent strikes on the body associated with destruction of the Acropolis by the Persians in 480 BC.

Figure 4.3a: Kore



FIGURE 4.4: SUMMARY OF THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS 480 BC

Xerxes brought his ships up in a line between Salamis and Piraeus. This had the effect of blocking a possible Greek escape through this southern route. He also placed troops on the island of Psyttaleia positioned in the middle of the waterway.

The Persian fleet comprised approximately 600 vessels. The Greek fleet numbered about 390 vessels. The Greek fleet was placed behind the promontory of Cynosura, on the eastern edge of Salamis. Themistocles hoped to lure the Persians into the narrow strait where the Greeks would be more able to manoeuvre their smaller vessels.

There was still dissension in the Greek camp about the decision to fight. To forestall this, Themistocles sent a secret message to Xerxes, using his faithful slave, Sicinnus. He told Xerxes that the Greeks were divided, many did not want to fight, and that the fleet was going escape via the western exit from the Bay of Eleusis.

Xerxes was taken in by the message. Through the night, he secretly moved his 200 Egyptian vessels to block the western exit. Xerxes now had a significantly reduced force.

The Corinthian ships sailed north into the Bay of Eleusis, apparently to defend against the Egyptian fleet in the west. Xerxes ordered his ships into the narrow straits to follow them. Herodotus describes what happened next:

Against the Athenians, who held the western extremity of the line towards Eleusis, were placed the Phoenicians; against the Lacedaemonians, whose station was eastward towards the Piraeus, the Ionians. Of these last a few only followed the advice of Themistocles, to fight backwardly; the greater number did far otherwise.... Far the greater number of the Persian ships engaged in this battle were disabled, either by the Athenians or by the Aeginetans. For as the Greeks fought in order and kept their line, while the barbarians were in confusion and had no plan in anything that they did, the issue of the battle could scarce be other than it was. (Book VIII, 85-6)

By nightfall the Persian armada had been practically destroyed. Lacking room in the narrow confines of the strait, the Persian ships rammed each other as they tried to manoeuvre. Seated on his throne, Xerxes watched it all. (See the extract from Aeschylus' "The Persians" in the "What do the historians say" section at the end of the chapter.) Aristides landed troops on the island of Psyttaleia and the Persian forces there were killed.

Results of the Battle of Salamis

The Greek victory was certainly a turning point in the war against Persia. However, victory at Salamis did mean that Persia had been defeated and that the war was over. The main results of The Battle of Salamis can be summarised as follows:

- Xerxes quickly returned to the Hellespont with 60 000 troops as he was concerned at the possibility of revolt breaking out in Ionia. Artabazus returned to Greece, dealing with a revolt in Potidaea along the way.

- Greek forces pursued the Persians as far as Andros. Their aim was to punish medising states, though their attempt to punish Andros failed. Themistocles had urged the Greeks to follow the Persians to Asia Minor but the Peloponnesian states were strongly opposed to this idea.
- Though the Greeks had been victorious at sea, the Persians had not been defeated on land. There was still a large Persian army in Greece and all of Greece north of the Isthmus was under Persian control. The Persian commander, Mardonius, took his forces to winter quarters in Thessaly. The war was not over.
- However, Salamis was a turning point in terms of Persian strategy. It was now not possible to carry out joint naval-military operations and supplying the Persian army was now problematical.
- Greek morale was raised. The aura of Persian invincibility had been broken. A victory on land would free Greece and be likely to foment revolt once again in Ionia.
- For Athens, Salamis was of major importance for many reasons.
 - Themistocles policy of promoting Athenian naval power was vindicated. Athens' future was as a naval power.
 - Themistocles was, for a while, Greece's preeminent leader.
 - The "thetes" had proven their value to the Athenian state. This would have later repercussions for the development of Athenian democracy.⁷

The Battle of Plataea: 479 BC

Following the Battle of Salamis, Mardonius had taken his troops north to Thessaly. He tried to undermine the unity of the Greek forces. Using Alexander of Macedon as an intermediary, he offered Athens its autonomy, land and gold to rebuild its city and temples if it would join the Persians. Athens' refusal led to a second Persian devastation of the city. The Persians also sent gold to some of Sparta's enemies in the Peloponnese, such as Argos, in order to try and undermine Spartan resistance.

The Athenians attacked the Spartans for once again deserting them and again threatened to leave the Greek alliance and come to terms with the Persians if Sparta did not act against the Persians. Sparta's reluctance to act was certainly not the result of cowardice but more likely its fear of moving large numbers of troops out of the Peloponnese and leaving its restless Helot population.⁸ However, there were those in Sparta keen to move against the Persians. Most notable was Pausanias.

- Pausanias was the nephew of King Leonidas.
- He served as regent for Leonidas' son, Pleistarchus, who was not old enough to serve as king in his own right.


Pausanias headed north with a force of 5000 Spartiates, 5000 periokoi and 35 000 helots.⁹ The Greeks and the Persians met at Plataea in the territory of Thebes.

The Battle of Plataea stretched over several days. Mardonius had gained the better position and was able to have a 900 acre stockade built with an open road to his ally, Thebes, available. The Greeks were forced into the hills near Plataea.

⁷ See Chapter 11

⁸ This fear was certainly real. Within fifteen years, Sparta did in fact face a major revolt from its Helot population.

⁹ Sparta's social system was tightly organised. At its simplest the Spartiates were the citizen soldiers, the periokoi were the craftsmen and trades people while the majority helots were slave farm workers.



- At first, Mardonius harassed the Greek forces with his cavalry, hoping to lure them on to the open plain. However, the Greeks were not tempted.
- The Greeks then moved westwards towards Plataea near the Asopus Ridge.
 - This location gave the Greeks more room, had the advantage of adequate water, and food supplies could be safely unloaded.
- Mardonius used his cavalry to prevent the Greeks taking water from the Asopus River.
- Persian forces then tried to waylay Greek food supplies, slaughtering 500 animals and their escorts in the process.
 - The Persian forces did not attempt to cross the Asopus River.
 - Instead they poisoned the Gargapina spring, the Greeks' last source of water.
 - Pausanias decided to withdraw to the foothills closer to Plataea where water was available.
 - This manoeuvre began at night but was not complete when daybreak came.
- Mardonius believed the Greeks were retreating and so ordered an attack.
 - In the confusion that followed, Mardonius' Greek allies, the Boetians and the Thebans, fought the Athenians on the Greek left wing where they were defeated.
 - The Spartans and the Tegeans fought on the right against the Persian infantry. The battle raged long and hard; Spartan discipline and skill were crucial to the Greek success.
 - Herodotus tells us that Mardonius fought in person "on his white charger" and that as long as he was in the thick of the battle, the Persians fought well.
- However, once Mardonius had been killed, the Persians fled in disarray. They fled to their camp which was stormed, no prisoners were taken.

The results of the Battle of Plataea 479 BC

- If Salamis had given the Greeks a chance at total victory over the Persians, Plataea made victory a reality. The remnants of the Persians struggled back to Asia, 40 000 under the command of Artabazus. If Herodotus is to be believed, only 3000 out of a 300 000 Persian force survived.

...He himself succeeded in reaching Byzantium; but a great part of his army perished upon the road – many being cut to pieces by the Thracians, and others dying from hunger and excess of toil. From Byzantium Artabazus set sail, and crossed the strait; returning into Asia.¹⁰

- Xerxes' ally Thebes was placed under siege. The leaders of the pro-Persian party in Thebes, Attaginus and Timagenidas, surrendered. They were taken to Corinth to be executed without trial, though Attaginus made an escape.
- Several dedications to the gods were made after the battle. For all their human skill and courage, the Greeks believed they had the gods to thank for their deliverance. Three great memorials to the Greek victory were created from the spoils of the Persian camp.
 - An eight metre Serpent Column was made and dedicated at Delphi. On the coils of the three serpents were carved the names of the 31 patriotic states who fought the Persians.¹¹
 - A five metre statue of Zeus was set up at Olympia and on its base were listed the 31 loyal states.
 - A three metre statue of Poseidon was set up at the Isthmus.
- As news of the Persian defeat spread, the Greeks gained new allies and revolts broke out in Ionia. In the wake of Plataea, the Greeks took the initiative in the war and attacked the Persians at Mycale.

The Battle of Mycale: 479 BC

Following the victory at Salamis, Greek refugees from Chios had requested the Greek fleet sail eastwards as the Ionian Greeks were ready to revolt. As mentioned earlier, this did not happen but the fleet did sail as far as Delos, roughly midway between Greece and Asia Minor. The Persian fleet had sailed to Samos. Herodotus relates how the Persian fleet had no intention of venturing back into Greek waters and believed its purpose was to guard against any Ionian revolt.

...They despaired, however, altogether of gaining any success by sea themselves, though by land they thought that Mardonius was quite sure of victory. So they remained at Samos, and took counsel together, if by any means they might harass the enemy, at the same time that they waited eagerly to hear how matters would proceed with Mardonius...¹²

Representatives from Samos arrived in Delos advising that the Persians had totally lost heart and that even the sight of a Greek fleet would be enough to incite revolt in Ionia.

- Under the command of the Spartan, Leotychides, the fleet sailed to Samos but found that the Persians had left and had beached their fleet near the Mycale promontory opposite Samos.
- Leotychides sailed close to Mycale and then landed his troops south of the Persian base.
 - The Athenians attacked the Persians and broke through their stockade.
 - The Spartans who had gone inland to attack the Persians made it to the battle in time to finish off the attack.

¹⁰ Herodotus, Book IX, 89

¹¹ This can now be found in Istanbul. It was taken there by Constantine the Great in the 4th Century AD.

¹² Herodotus, Book VIII, 130

- Ionian troops amongst the Persians quickly switched sides and were joined by the men of Miletus.

Herodotus takes up the story:

*...As for the Milesians... they, instead of obeying their orders, broke them in every respect. For they guided the fleeing Persians by wrong roads, which brought them into the presence of the enemy, and at last they set upon them with their own hands, and showed themselves the hottest of their adversaries. Ionia, therefore, on this day revolted a second time from the Persians.*¹³

Greece had been saved. However, the future of the Ionian Greeks remained uncertain, even despite the successful Athenian attack on Sestos in the Chersonese. Athens' action at Sestos was its first step in the creation of an Athenian empire and not the last time the Greeks would clash with Persia.¹⁴

Exercise 4.2

Place the events listed on the right in the correct chronological order.

1 st event		Themistocles sends a message to Xerxes The Battle of Artemisium Persians defeated at Mycale The Battle of Thermopylae Athens is evacuated Athenian attack on Sestos The Persian defeat at Salamis The Greeks abandon Tempe Themistocles threatens to take Athens' ships to the west The Battle of Plataea
2 nd event		
3 rd event		
4 th event		
5 th event		
6 th event		
7 th event		
8 th event		
9 th event		
10 th event		

¹³ Herodotus, Book IX, 104

¹⁴ See Chapter 7

What do the historians have to say about "Invasion of 480-79: Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea and Mycale"?

1. Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides is primarily concerned with the long conflict between Athens and Sparta during the last three decades of the 5th Century BC. In the early part of his history he provides details on the debate that took place at Sparta that led to the declaration of war. During the debate, an Athenian delegation is allowed to speak. During the course of their presentation, the Athenians praise their efforts against the Persians. Thucydides presents a strong argument about the crucial importance of The Battle of Salamis. Only Salamis prevented the Persians from being able to sail around the Peloponnese and defeat cities one by one.

...no system of mutual defence could have been organised in face of the Persian naval superiority. The best proof of this is in the conduct of the Persians themselves. Once they had lost the battle at sea they realised that their force was crippled and they immediately withdrew most of their army. That was the result, and it proved that the fate of Hellas depended on her navy.¹⁵

2. Aeschylus: The Persians

The Greek playwright, Aeschylus, fought at Salamis. In 472 BC, his play, *The Persians*, Aeschylus tells the story of the return of Xerxes to the Persian court and the unfolding tragedy of Salamis. The playwright has several motives, including the glorification of the Athenians and the dangers of hubris. However, an examination of Aeschylus' text also provides some explanation of the defeat of the Persians at Salamis.

...At first at this point the mass of the Persian force resisted but the bulk of the fleet in a narrow strait was confined and ship could not help ship but they with their bronze-mouthed rammings struck each other and broke the banks of oars. The ships of the Hellenes, not without cunning, attacked us in a circle and upturned were the hulls of ships and the sea could not be seen but was full of shipwrecks and the death of men.¹⁶

3. Raphael Sealey: A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC

Sealey gives a quite positive view of the generalship of Mardonius at the Battle of Plataea. He says Mardonius fought a good campaign, took reasonable risks but that his tactics came unstuck because the Greeks and Persians became involved in close order combat. In such a situation, the Greeks would always have the advantage. Sealey comments:

...Moreover, they (the Greeks) had the training and discipline to make their superiority tell. The victory at Plataea was won, not by strategic skill, but by the material equipment and training of the Greek infantryman.¹⁷

¹⁵ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Book 1, 73-4


¹⁶ Aeschylus, *The Persians*, 412-20

¹⁷ Sealey, R, *A History of The Greek City States 700-338 BC*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976, p 225

Chapter 5

Role and contribution of Themistocles, Leonidas, Pausanias, Eurybiades

Figure 5.1 Summary of the role and contribution of Themistocles



Most historians accept that the role of Themistocles in the victory of the Greeks against the Persians was crucial. From the historians of the 5th Century BC to writers from the modern era, the contribution of Themistocles is viewed as being of vital importance. (Themistocles’ career after Salamis will be considered in Chapter 7.)

Herodotus

Herodotus states that *“Themistocles was regarded everywhere as by far the wisest man of all the*

*Greeks; and the whole country rang with his fame.”*¹ The peers of Themistocles recognised his role and what Greece owed to him. When votes were taken for the prize of valour, the leading generals placed their own names first, but all put Themistocles second. However, jealousy from his rivals prevented Themistocles from winning his prize.

It was the Spartans who decided Themistocles deserved just deserts for his great efforts. The Spartans presented him with a chariot and on his departure from Sparta, was escorted to the Tegean border by the elite troops of 300 Knights. Herodotus highlights the high regard in which the Spartans held Themistocles.

*...Lacedaemonians received him handsomely, and paid him great respect. The prize of valour indeed, which was a crown of olive, they gave to Eurybiades; but Themistocles was given a crown of olive too, as the prize of wisdom and dexterity...*²

Thucydides

Thucydides describes Themistocles as a man “*who showed an unmistakable natural genius; in this respect he was quite exceptional, and beyond all others deserves our admiration.*”³

He was, argues Thucydides, a man who by virtue of his intellect, could consider complex matters and quickly reach a conclusion when time was of the essence. His point of view was invariably more reliable than that of others and he had an uncanny ability to look into the future and isolate the good and the evil in any course of action.

*...To sum him up in a few words, it may be said that through force of genius and by rapidity of action, this man was supreme at doing precisely the right thing at precisely the right moment.*⁴

Plutarch

Plutarch describes the high regard in which Themistocles was held by the Athenians and the affection that was held for him. He makes the point that Themistocles knew everyone by name and that he was considered to be an honest arbitrator in legal cases. When Xerxes sent envoys to Athens seeking its submission, Themistocles had them dealt with harshly, keen to avoid any possible medism. Plutarch makes this point about his contribution in the defeat of the Persians.

*...But the greatest of all his achievements was to put an end to all the fighting within Greece, to reconcile the various cities with one another and persuade them to lay aside their differences because of the war with Persia.*⁵

Victor Ehrenberg

Ehrenberg willingly acknowledges the skills and intellect of Themistocles, and makes reference to Thucydides’ glorification of the man. It was Themistocles’ naval policy, says Ehrenberg, which determined the course of the century. He was a man of great political foresight, intellectual power and diplomatic skill. However, like all great men, Themistocles was a flawed character.

*...Themistocles was brilliant but not a great character... Themistocles represents that generation which brought about the triumph of (his city), but at the same time set (his) ambition against the city...*⁶

1 Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book VIII, 124

2 Herodotus, *Book VIII*, 124

3 Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Book 1, 138

4 Thucydides, *Book 1*, 138

5 Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens*, *Themistocles*, 6

6 Ehrenberg, V, *From Solon to Socrates*, Routledge, London, 1967, p 191

J B Bury

There is no ambiguity in Bury's traditional History of Greece when it comes to lauding the role of Themistocles during the Persian Wars. He describes him as "*the greatest statesman of this critical period*", greater than even Miltiades. It was Themistocles' prescience in understanding the potentialities of his city state and steering it on to the course of naval development that marks him out for greatness. Not only did Themistocles realise the potential of Athens first, argues Bury, but he had the energy and perseverance to see his vision through.


...It may be said that he contributed more than any other single man to the making of Athens into a great state.⁷

Leonidas

Leonidas' name has sounded through the ages. His role was to lead his forces in a defeat. However, in the same way that Anzac forces forged a legend during the defeat at Gallipoli in 1915 by virtue of their courage and indomitable spirit, so too did Leonidas' example inspire Greece.

- It was Leonidas who led the Peloponnesian forces north in 480 BC which included the 300 Spartans. Leonidas' prompt action probably prevented several Greek states from medising.
- Leonidas realised that the pass at Tempe was indefensible and moved his forces back to the pass at Thermopylae.
- The stand taken at Thermopylae⁸ held the Persians at bay for several crucial days and allowed other Greeks time to organise.
- Above all, Leonidas' example of courage inspired the other Greek states to fight on against the invader.⁹

Figure 5.2: Herodotus' fulsome praise of Leonidas



⁷ Bury, J B, *A History of Greece*, Macmillan, London, 1951 (Third Edition), pp 263

⁸ See Chapter 4

⁹ Uncharitable Athenians would argue that Leonidas' action was merely an act of obedience and duty.

A modern view of Leonidas casts doubts on his military acumen. A R Burn is quick to acknowledge Leonidas' courage including his rejection of a boat to safety as not being the Spartan way.

*...He stayed, with his own regiment, so that others might live to fight another day; he keeps his place among the heroes, with all who have given their lives for a good reason when they might have lived longer...*¹⁰

However, Burn suggests that Leonidas erred in his judgment by not placing more troops to guard the hill route and not stationing some Spartans there. The pass might not have fallen so quickly if he had done this. This leads Burn to conclude:

*...Leonidas had not, perhaps, shown the highest qualities of generalship...*¹¹

Eurybiades

Eurybiades was the Spartan general who was placed in charge of the Greek fleet which was sent to Artemisium. Herodotus likes to point out that the Athenians should have commanded the fleet, but that *"they waived their claim in the interest of national survival"*.¹² Eurybiades was, at first, not keen to stay and fight at Artemisium. The Euboeans gave Themistocles 30 talents to arrange for the fleet to remain, at least until the Euboeans had time to evacuate their island. Themistocles passed on one sixth of the bribe to Eurybiades. Herodotus tells that this amount was *"enough to secure Eurybiades' consent."*¹³

When the fleet was assembled at Salamis, Eurybiades sought advice from his captains on the best place to fight. To his credit, Eurybiades was convinced of the arguments presented by Themistocles that the best strategy was to stay and fight in the straits of Salamis. Herodotus explains it this way:

*...At these words of Themistocles, Eurybiades changed his determination; principally, as I believe, because he feared that if he withdrew the fleet to the Isthmus, the Athenians would sail away, and knew that without the Athenians, the rest of their ships could be no match for the fleet of the enemy. He therefore decided to remain, and give battle at Salamis...*¹⁴

Following the Greek victory at Salamis, Themistocles was keen to take the battle to the Persians in Asia. He wanted the bridges over the Hellespont to be destroyed. Eurybiades argued strongly against any such action:

- It would force Xerxes to stay in Greece where he could hardly remain inactive. He would fight, gradually win over some states, and the whole of Europe might go over him.
- The annual harvests would allow Xerxes' army to live off the country.

*... "If," he said, "the Greeks should break down the bridges, it would be the worst thing that could possibly happen for Greece."*¹⁵

In recognition of his efforts, Eurybiades was awarded the prize of courage, the wreath of olive. This is the same honour given to Themistocles when he visited Sparta.

Pausanias

Following the defeat of Persia, Pausanias' reputation suffered due to his arrogance, his high-handedness and his aping of Persian dress and customs.¹⁶ However, his role and contribution in the defeat of Persia at the Battle of Plataea is what concerns us here. Even Herodotus is willing to

¹⁰ Burn, A R, *Persia and the Greeks: The Defence of the West*, Edward Arnold, London, 1962, p 418

¹¹ Burn, p 418

¹² Herodotus, Book VIII, 2

¹³ Herodotus, Book VIII, 5

¹⁴ Herodotus, Book VIII, 63

¹⁵ Herodotus, Book VIII, 108

¹⁶ See Chapter 7

heap upon Pausanias the most extravagant of praise.


...The fight went most against the Greeks, where Mardonius, mounted upon a white horse, and surrounded by the bravest of all the Persians, the thousand picked men, fought in person. So long as Mardonius was alive, this body resisted all attacks, and, while they defended their own lives, struck down no small number of Spartans; but after Mardonius fell, and the troops with him, which were the main strength of the army, perished, the remainder yielded to the Lacedaemonians, and took to flight. Their light clothing, and want of bucklers, were of the greatest hurt to them: for they had to contend against men heavily armed, while they themselves were without any such defence.

*Then was the warning of the oracle fulfilled; and the vengeance which was due to the Spartans for the slaughter of Leonidas was paid them by Mardonius - then too did Pausanias...win a victory exceeding in glory all those to which our knowledge extends.*¹⁷

Pausanias' conduct at the battle when he faced Mardonius at Plataea was of fundamental importance. Though the Persians had been defeated at Salamis and Xerxes had returned to Asia, the war was far from over. The Persians still occupied northern Greece, the Greek alliance was still fragile and a Persian victory in the field could have changed the whole story of the Persian Wars.

Pausanias faced a myriad of problems during the Battle of Plataea.

- He commanded a force of over 100 000 men from 24 separate states which were fiercely independent and often jealous of each other. Maintaining the unity of the Greek army was no mean achievement.
- Pausanias faced major logistical problems of supplying his troops with food and drinkable water.
- He had to fight in a location which gave the advantage to the Persians.
- There was also the ever present threat of the Persian cavalry.



Despite all the difficulties, Pausanias led his troops to a famous victory, “*exceeding in glory all those to which our knowledge extends*”. Herodotus’ praise of Pausanias is even more notable when the anti-Peloponnesian feeling present in Athens, at the time Herodotus wrote, is taken into account.

Exercise 5.1

Place the name of either Themistocles, Leonidas, Eurybiades or Pausanias as it applies to each of the statements list below on the left.

1	I managed to keep the disparate Greek army together to face the forces of Mardonius.	
2	Thanks to my foresight, Athens developed major naval forces.	
3	I argued strongly against destroying the bridges on the Hellespont.	

¹⁷ Herodotus, Book IX, 63-64

4	I overcame major logistical problems to defeat the Persian forces at Plataea.	
5	My stand at Thermopylae arguably gave the Greeks crucial time to plan a defence.	
6	My message to Xerxes could have been gravely misinterpreted had we lost at Salamis.	
7	My decision not to flee south in 480 BC meant my name is still recalled in the 21 st Century.	
8	I established a useful working relationship with the Athenian, Themistocles.	
9	Herodotus is particularly extravagant in his praise of my military victory.	
10	I was placed in charge of all Greek naval forces.	
11	Thucydides is particularly fulsome in his praise of me.	
12	I insisted on the Thebans having to face the Persians in northern Greece.	
13	Along with Themistocles, I won the Spartan prize of honour, the wreath of olive.	
14	I moved my troops south from the pass at Tempe to Thermopylae.	
15	If it had not been for me, the success achieved at Salamis might have counted for nothing.	
16	Though Eurybiades was in charge, it was my advice the fleet took to heart when fighting.	

Chapter 6

Reasons for Greek victory and Persian defeat


The reasons for the Greek victory and the Persian defeat have really been covered in the previous chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to provide some structure to the issue of the result by focussing on some general themes. The detail relating to each of the points that will be mentioned can be found in Chapters two, three, four and five. ¹

- A quick brainstorm of reasons for the Greek victory/ Persian might come up with some of the following ideas:
 - Pausanias' skilful leadership at Plataea
 - Themistocles' policy of developing Athenian naval strength
 - Xerxes' over-confidence
 - Greek unity
 - superior Greek armour and equipment
 - the weather
 - the geography of Greece
 - morale
 - the example of Leonidas
 - Themistocles' stubbornness at Salamis
 - the inconclusive nature of the Battle of Artemisium
 - Spartan leadership
 - Athens' willingness to accede to Spartan naval command of the navy
 - the impact of the Battle of Mycale
 - the impact of the delaying of Persian forces at Thermopylae
 - the decision to fight at Salamis
 - Mardonius' recklessness in persuading Xerxes to invade Greece
 - short Greek supply lines
 - the Persian need to supply a massive army in foreign territory
 - the Greek view that the gods were on their side
 - superior Greek military tactics and organisation
 - Persian failure to make effective use of their cavalry
 - superiority of the Greek trireme over the more cumbersome Persian craft
 - the Greek decision to avoid reckless, early confrontations
 - etc, etc...

It is worth considering the heading of this chapter: Reasons for Greek victory and Persian defeat – they are not necessarily the same thing, though of course they conclude with the same result. What follows are some more detailed explanations.

¹ This chapter will deal only with the Greek victory/ Persian defeat of 480-79 BC, not the earlier invasion of 490 BC and the Battle of Marathon.

(1) The issue of leadership




(2) The role of geography and the elements

In order to invade Greece, Xerxes' forces had to march through Asia Minor, cross the Hellespont, travel through Thrace, into northern Greece and thence to Attica. The fleet attempted to keep in contact with the army by hugging the coastline. This fact alone presented the Persians with major problems.

- lines of communication and supply were long
- it was necessary to live off the land
- Greece's mountainous terrain is not conducive to high agricultural yields which a massive army of the Persian size would need
- naval failures would jeopardise the land/ sea strategy of the Persians
- the storm off Cape Sepias, the indecisive result at Artemisium, and the wreck off southern Euboea resulted in this
- the existence of narrow mountain passes in northern Greece made possible the Greek holding action at Thermopylae
- the tightness of the Straits of Salamis and the Bay of Eleusis greatly assisted Greek naval tactics
- following Plataea, long distances had to be covered by retreating Persian forces which made possible frequent attacks, as experienced by Artabazus
- Greek naval power was well suited to the Aegean with its multiplicity of island states

Figure 6.2

(3) The issue of armour, equipment and tactics



(4) The issue of Greek unity

In the 5th Century BC, Greece was a geographical expression not a political entity. There were dozens of independent city states who jealously guarded their independence and took every opportunity to extend their power and influence at the expense of a neighbour, if that was the way to do it. Xerxes would have been well aware of this. Rivalries existed between Athens and Aegina, and between Sparta and Argos. Indeed, when planning for the invasion, Xerxes sent advance heralds who offered the various states the opportunity to submit to Persian power. Any state which “medised” in this way would be spared the wrath of the Persian king. Some Greek states did, indeed, medise.

However, what proved remarkable during the war was the cohesiveness of the Greek forces. Had Greek unity broken down, as on occasions it threatened to do, the Persians might well have been victorious. Greek unity was impressive.

- The Congresses called in 481 and 480 BC led to the creation of the Hellenic League within which the Greek states agreed to fight.
- The Serpent Column lists 31 independent states.
- At Plataea, Pausanias commanded troops from 24 states.
- The Greeks willingly accepted Spartan leadership of both military and naval forces.
- Athens was willing to accept Spartan naval leadership even though it had every right to be considered the preeminent naval power at the time.
- Athens and Aegina had fought continually throughout the 480s BC. Yet, they were allies against Persia. Herodotus relates that at Salamis it was generally agreed that the Aeginetans displayed the greatest courage of all the Greek allies.

- Sparta was willing to overcome its natural tendency to avoid sending its Spartiates outside of the Peloponnese, for the greater Greek good. This was seen with Leonidas taking his troops north, Pausanias' force at Plataea and Spartan involvement in the Battle of Mycale.

In contrast to Greek unity, the Persians forces were a heterogeneous collection of different races, cultures, religions and languages. Herodotus likes to point out that the Persian soldier fought through fear from what his king would do to him if he failed. The Greek soldier fought voluntarily in defence of his homeland. Greek motivation would have had a significant impact on maintaining a high level of morale.



THE SERPENT'S COLUMN IN ISTANBUL

What do the historians have to say about Reasons for Greek victory and Persian defeat?

1. Raphael Sealey: A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC

As was mentioned in Chapter 4, Sealey is full of praise for Greek training and discipline. This was in particular evidence during the Battle of Plataea. However, Sealey does not see the training and discipline of the Greek troops as the key elements.

...The Persian cavalry were mounted archers and, although they had javelins as well as arrows, they were most effective at some distance from the enemy; in close fighting they could be overcome by well armed and well disciplined infantry. In the fighting of 480 and 479 the Greek hoplites were better equipped than any of the various infantry contingents which the Persians could put into the field; in particular their defensive armour was more comprehensive...²

2. Aeschylus: The Persians

Aeschylus' play, performed in 472 BC, is set in the Persian court at Susa. It presents the Persian defeat as a catastrophe. An exhausted messenger appears who tells the story of Salamis, reeling off the names of various Persian generals who had been killed. Xerxes eventually returns, dressed in torn and tattered clothes, and with the Chorus, he laments the magnitude of Persia's defeat. Aeschylus is clearly promoting the role of Athens in the war. However, he is also promoting the idea that Xerxes failed due to his hubris. In one scene, he has Xerxes' mother, Atossa, summon the ghost of her dead husband, Darius. On hearing of the Persian defeat, Darius chides his son's hubris, his rashness, his youthful impetuosity and his rejection of his father's commands.³

*....With the lightning's speed
Jove on my son hath hurled his threaten'd vengeance:
Yet I implored the gods that it might fall
In time's late process: but when rashness drives
Impetuous on, the scourge of Heaven upraised
Lashes the Fury forward; hence these ills
Pour headlong on my friends....*

*.....Xerxes, my son, in all the pride of youth
Listens to youthful counsels, my commands
No more remember'd; hence, my hoary friends,
Not the whole line of Persia's sceptred lords,
You know it well, so wasted her brave sons....⁴*

3. Victor Ehrenberg: From Solon to Socrates

In his description of the Battle of Plataea Ehrenberg stays largely loyal to the version given to us by Herodotus, though he rightly questions the figures given by Herodotus regarding each side's losses. He points out the significance of the death of Mardonius and how Artabazus' flight sealed the fate of the Persians. However, Ehrenberg sums up the reasons for the victory of the Greeks as follows:

...Victory was due to intelligent leadership as well as great courage and discipline by almost everybody on the Greek side.⁵

² Sealey, R, *A History of The Greek City States 700-338 BC*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976, p 225

³ For the sake of dramatic effect, Darius' own rashness in Scythia and against Greece in 490 BC is conveniently forgotten.

⁴ Aeschylus, *The Persians*, 738-44, 782-86

⁵ Ehrenberg, V, *From Solon to Socrates*, Routledge, London, 1967, p 172

ADVICE ON WRITING ESSAYS

Introduction to essay writing

People who have been marking the HSC for a few years can read an essay and with little hesitation can say “that’s a ‘B’ level answer, 16/ 25, or that’s a ‘mid-A’ range answer, 23/ 25, or this is ‘D’ answer, 8/ 25”. HSC markers do occasionally disagree about answers but once they share their disagreements, the value of the essay becomes clear. It is one of the comforting things about how Ancient History is marked at the HSC, that the legendary level of accuracy is almost scientific.

The reason for this is that essay writing is both a literary and a scientific skill. There is no mystery in writing a good essay. Certainly some people are better writers than others: they might have a wider vocabulary, they might know more, they might have a better turn of phrase, they might be smarter and so understand the issues more clearly. However, everyone can come to terms with the basics and write a reasonable essay.

So what makes for a successful essay?

1. Answer the question.

This sounds almost trite and an insult to the intelligence, but the majority of responses presented in the HSC which score poorly, do so because they do not answer the question. Failing to answer the question can be done in a variety of ways. In summary it can happen because:

- a. A student fails to address the issues presented in the question, ie he or she decides to write about something else. For example in the essay:

Assess the importance of the role of Themistocles in bringing about the victory of the Greeks in the Persian Wars.

A student decides to argue that:

- Themistocles’ role was not that important.
- It was the efforts of the Spartans that were crucial in bringing about the Greek victory.

(This might well be a student who has not prepared the topic thoroughly or who has gambled on being asked about the role of Sparta.)

A student cannot simply twist the question around and decide to write ‘his own question’. Even if he really believes that Themistocles was of little importance, the issue of Themistocles’ role has to be addressed, even if it is to argue against his importance. Having ‘proven’ Themistocles’ role was of no importance, a student might argue that ‘it is this other issue which was important in bringing about the Greek victory’.

A student might argue that:

- • Yes, Themistocles’ role was of significant importance in bringing about the victory of the Greeks and then go on to discuss this; however, they cannot be considered in isolation and need to be seen in connection with other issues such as.....
- As a rule of thumb, if you are going to pursue this style of argument, make sure that at least half of your essay deals with the subject of the question, in this case ‘Themistocles’ role in the Greek victory’.
- Of course there is no substitute for focusing entirely on the issue.

- b. A student writes about the issues presented in the question, but instead of providing an

argument to answer the question, they simply 'narrate' or 'tell a story'. For example in the essay:

Explain the reasons for the defeat of Persia in 490 BC and 480-79 BC.

A student fails to present an argument, instead she simply narrates:

- She might describe the Battle of Marathon, Miltiades' later fate, developments in the Greek and Persian world in the 480s, the Hellenic Congress, the Battle of Thermopylae, Salamis, Plataea and Mycale.
 - This is all relevant, factual detail but she is merely telling a story and not presenting an argument which is 'giving reasons for the defeat of Persia'.
- c. A student does not really understand the question and has so little factual detail they are unable to sustain even a narrative response.
- d. A student does understand the question and attempts an argument but has so little factual detail that the argument cannot be sustained.

'c' and 'd' can only be fixed up with solid work and revision on the part of the student; 'a' and 'b' can be learned.

2. Provide an argument in your introduction which will form the basis of the essay.

The introduction is the most important paragraph of the essay; if it is written properly it should leave the marker in no doubt what is going to come up in the essay. So what does a good introduction involve?

- a. Avoid the dramatic 'setting the scene' method. For example in the essay:

Assess the importance of TWO military events in the course of the Persian War?

A student should avoid opening like this:

- The courage displayed by Leonidas and his brave 300 Spartans at Thermopylae has justly gone down in the annals of heroism. As thousands of Persians besieged the small Spartan force as it gallantly sought to preserve the torch of Greek freedom, Leonidas and his men agreed to pay the ultimate sacrifice for the greater good of future civilisation.....
- b. Avoid providing lots of factual detail in the introduction. Introduce the broad areas you will discuss, but leave the detail to the body of the essay. For example in the essay:

Assess the importance of naval battles in the course of the Persians Wars.

This is not a good introduction:

- Themistocles was eager to fight the Persian fleet in the narrow confines of the Straits of Salamis and the Bay of Eleusis because he believed his smaller triremes would have a tactical advantage and so to ensure this sent a secret message to Xerxes. In this message, he told Xerxes that the Greeks were planning.....
- c. Be careful with length. Three lines is not an introduction, no argument can be properly introduced in such a small space. However, a page and half is too long. With average sized writing, 6-8 lines should be enough to present the argument of the essay.
- d. Present an argument in your introduction. There is no 'right' answer to an Ancient History essay question; the right answer is the argument which you have presented, logically developed and backed up with detailed factual evidence. For example, for the essay:

Assess Themistocles' role in the Greek defeat of the Persians in 480-79 BC

A student might try to argue:

- Themistocles played a pivotal role in helping to bring about the defeat of the Persians in 480-79 BC. His earlier promotion of Athenian naval power and his efforts at forging Greek unity ensured the Greeks were adequately prepared for the Persian invasion. His tactical skills at Artemisium and Salamis were fundamental in ensuring Greek success. His willingness to play politics and use underhand methods also greatly helped in making a Greek victory possible.

3. Provide your essay with a structure.

Your introduction should show where the essay will lead, eg the above introduction might lead to the following structure:

- some points on Themistocles' actions as archon in 493 BC and his efforts to build an Athenian fleet in the 480s;
- his effort to forge unity, willingness to give up naval command;
- a discussion of the Battle of Artemisium;
- an analysis of the Battle of Salamis and why it was important for the future course of the war;
- his willingness to consider bribery, blackmail and secret communications to achieve his ends.

(NB: this is only one of a hundred ways of dealing with this question)

4. Structure paragraphs carefully. Some simple rules to obey:

- open with a topic sentence which outlines what the paragraph is going to be about;
- develop the argument presented in the topic sentence;
- support the argument with specific factual detail;
- at all times endeavour to support your argument with reference to the ancient sources, be they literary, archaeological, numismatic;
 - depending on which sources are used, it may be appropriate to analyse and evaluate those sources;
 - eg Herodotus is often criticised for being credulous, prone to exaggeration and overly pro-Athenian;
 - eg the Atheno-centric stance of Aeschylus possibly overplays the significance of Salamis to the Persians;

NB: Evaluate sources you use rather than merely referring to them, if this is possible or appropriate!

- if appropriate, support the detail with historiographical reference to modern historians;
- link your paragraphs – this can be achieved easily with certain stock phrases, eg:
 - “not only was ‘x’ of significance but ‘y’ also had an impact...”
 - “in addition to “a and b”, “c and d” were also to benefit from.....”
 - “in contrast to “e”, “f” reacted quite differently....”


NB: Do not open paragraphs with historiography. The aim should be for the student to show the marker what he knows. Therefore, open with your ideas, back it up with factual detail and then, if appropriate, back up your idea with what a historian has said:

- argument>detail>(maybe) historians' ideas;

- do not name drop for the sake of it – markers are not fooled or impressed by having lots of historians’ dropped into an essay when their books have almost certainly never been looked at;
- Fewer historians mentioned is better than lots.

NB: To quote or paraphrase? Teachers have different views on this. The author prefers paraphrasing as it shows that you understand what the ancient source/ modern historian is saying; giving a three line quotation merely shows you have remembered a three line quotation, whereas paraphrasing the historian’s view in your own words shows that you have understood what you are writing. However, short pithy quotations can be quite effective.

The diagram below sums up some of the main ideas the have been discussed in this section.



ESSAYS 1

Responding to HSC questions on the Persian Wars

The purpose of this section is to provide some ideas for the type of questions which might be asked on the first section of the syllabus: Persian Wars. These outlines are not presented as the ‘be all and end all’ responses to these questions. To provide a sense of reality to this section, what follows is a ‘first draft response’ to each question, ie what were the first ideas that came into the author’s head as he thought about each question?

Essay No 1

Evaluate the significance of naval battles in the course of the Persian War, 480-479 BC.

This appears to be a fairly straightforward question. However, there are a few pitfalls about which students need to be aware.

- The text type is “evaluate”. This means it is necessary to make a judgment about the naval battles. It is not enough to simply describe the battles of Artemisium and Salamis, though some narrative detail will obviously be needed throughout the answer.
- The question clearly stipulates a time-frame: 480-479 BC.
 - Obviously, students should avoid straying into the pre-war period, though a mention of Themistocles’ promotion of Athenian naval power would be worth mentioning briefly.
 - Also avoid straying beyond 479 BC, though a brief mention of events immediately after 479 BC might be relevant.
- Avoid falling into the trap of narrating the entire story of the war between the Greeks and the Persians.

Students need to provide an argument in the introduction which outlines the argument that the essay will attempt to prove. Sometimes an essay works with one single line of argument. However, on occasions a response whose argument has several strands can be effective.

Naval battles were of fundamental importance in the determining the outcome of the Persian War, 480-479 BC. Persian strategy relied upon a successful linkage between land and sea forces. If this link could be broken then the Persian war machine would be gravely weakened. The Battle of Artemisium did much to achieve this. The Battle of Salamis proved to be a major turning point in the war if not actually determining the outcome of the entire war.

Open up with a discussion of the principal ideas of Persian military strategy.

- make note of Xerxes’ advance on Greece from Sardis > the Hellespont > across Thrace to northern Greece;
 - refer to the canal at Mt Athos;
- discuss the importance to the Persian military machine of the need to keep the army and fleet together;
- thus, any Greek success in breaking this link or weakening Persian naval forces would have a major impact on Persian strategy.

Briefly explain the background of the Battle of Artemisium.

- give some descriptive background: positions of the rival fleets, brief reference to Thermopylae;
- comment on Greek and Persian positions;
- refer to the storm at Cape Sepias;
- the wreck of the Persian ships off southern Euboea;
- provide details of the Battle of Artemisium.

Consider the significance of the actual battle.

- Greek losses were considerable;
- but the outcome of the battle was indecisive – explain this;
- Greek fleet able to move south to fight again;
- comment on Persian naval losses:
 - now no longer to split the fleet;
 - diversionary raids, eg on the Peloponnese, now not possible.

Provide some background on the Battle of Salamis.

- refer to size of fleets/ composition/ leaders;
- geography of the area around Salamis:
 - describe it;
 - comment on the tactical implications.
- briefly refer to the debate amongst the Greeks about where/ when/ and how to fight the Persians;
 - bring in Themistocles' views and his threats at leaving;
 - Themistocles' victory in the debate is crucial – explain this;
- Themistocles' message to Xerxes and its significance.

The actual battle and its significance in terms of the entire war:

- some narrative detail about the course of the battle is appropriate;
- refer to the scale of the Greek victory and its impact:
 - Xerxes forced to return to Asia, fearing Ionian revolts;
 - impact on Greek morale;
 - without victory at Salamis, major Spartan participation would not have been guaranteed;
 - Mardonius leaves Attica for northern Greece;
- qualify the extent of the impact of Salamis:
 - the war was not over;
 - a major Persian army still in Greece, most of Greece still occupied and this army had to be removed;
 - Pausanias and the Battle of Plataea still needed.

Throughout the answer, try to include reference to the ancient sources where appropriate, (eg Herodotus, Aeschylus) though of course avoid name-dropping and gratuitous lengthy quotations. If

reference to the ideas of a modern historian can be used to assist an answer, include it.

Naval battles were very significant in determining the outcome of the Persian War, 480-479 BC. They affected the fundamental basis of Persian strategy, limited Persian options in their campaigning and weakened Persian forces so significantly that Xerxes had to flee and a defeat of Mardonius' troops would mean the end of the Persian threat.

Essay No 2

To what extent was Themistocles' contribution the key factor in bringing about a Greek victory in the Persian Wars, 480-479 BC?

"To what extent" questions are always fraught with dangers. This can be seen by examining the possible responses to this question. Students might choose to argue one of the following:

- Themistocles was of fundamental importance in bringing about a Greek victory; without him there would have been only defeat.
- Themistocles was very important in bringing about Greek victory but of course other factors were also important.
- Themistocles was not important in the Greek victory. Of much greater importance were the failings of the Persians themselves and the role of Pausanias.
 - Option 1 would work well, and a strong argument could be made to support that line of argument.
 - Option 2 is also acceptable. However, students need to be aware that it is necessary to focus on the issue in the question, ie Themistocles' contribution. Thus, be sure to allow about 40-50% of the answer to focus on Themistocles before bringing in other factors.
 - Option 3 is dangerous. Students cannot simply dismiss what is in the question and answer "their own question". Such a strategy could result in a very poor mark.

For the purposes of the following explanation, Option 2 will be followed.

Themistocles was arguably the key factor in bringing about Greek victory in 480-479 BC. His efforts in the pre-war years, his leadership and tactical skills at Artemisium and Salamis, and his persuasive arguments all combined to offer the Greeks hope of victory. However, Themistocles, alone, could not determine the fate of the war. The efforts of the Spartans and weaknesses on the Persian side were of equal importance.

Even before the war, Themistocles played a key role in creating the circumstances in which a victory might be possible.

- refer to his promotion of Athenian naval power/ the use made of the Laurion silver deposits/ the strong position this left the Greeks in;
- his efforts in forging Greek unity in 481 and 480 BC;
- his relationship with Eurybiades.

At Artemisium and Salamis, Themistocles played a key role.

- provide some details about both battles;
- particular attention can be paid to his arguments of where and when to fight;
- refer to the evacuation of Athens (and the debate about this);
- both battles were crucial in deciding the outcome of the war (refer to some of the points mentioned in Essay No 1 here);

- Thucydides' praise of Themistocles would work well here.

However, after Salamis, the war was not over and Greece's fate lay in the balance. Spartan involvement was of equal importance to that of Themistocles.

- explain the idea behind this view;
- Leonidas' example at Thermopylae: this was crucial for giving the southern Greeks time and for its inspiring example;
- Pausanias' victory at Plataea was what finally decided the war, and if he had failed at Plataea the outcome of the war could have been quite different;
- the Persians also bear some responsibility for their defeat; include things such as Xerxes' recklessness, Mardonius' ambition, the inferior armour and equipment of Persian forces;
- students might even ponder the Greek view that the gods were in part responsible for the outcome of the war.

Clearly Themistocles was of major importance in bringing about a Greek victory due to his pre-war efforts, his leadership and his tactical skills. However, it would be simplistic to suggest he alone was responsible. The Spartans also played a key role and the Persians, themselves, can be blamed for their failed performance in the war.

Other possible questions on the Persian Wars might include:

- Explain the origins of the Persian Wars.
- Assess the reasons for the defeat of the Persians in 490 BC and 480-479 BC.
- Who contributed more to the defeat of Persia: Sparta or Athens?
- How important was the contribution of Miltiades and Pausanias to the course of the Persian Wars?
- Assess the importance of TWO military events in the course of the Persian Wars.

Section Two ■ Development of Athens and the Athenian Empire

Chapter 7

Delian League: origins, aims, organisation and activities to the Battle of the Eurymedon River

The defeat of the Persians in 480-79 saw the beginning of a major new phase in Greek history. Persia had been expelled from Greece, but it was far from destroyed. Thus, there remained concern amongst the Greek states about a possible future revival of Persian power. To prevent this from happening the Greek states remained united in order to stand up to any future Persian threat and to free those Greeks that remained under Persian control.

However, the leadership of the Greeks now switched from Sparta to Athens. As Sparta reverted to its traditional isolationist stance, Athens filled the leadership vacuum. However, between 478 BC and the 450s, the alliance of the Greek states was gradually transformed. What began as a voluntary grouping of like minded city states with a common, defensive purpose evolved into a totally Athenian-dominated empire. This chapter is concerned only with the developments that occurred up to the Battle of the Eurymedon River in 467 BC. ¹

The origins of the Delian League

Modern historians refer to the grouping of the Greek states after the Persian Wars as **The Delian League** or **The Confederacy of Delos**. However, Greeks of the early 5th Century BC would have used the phrase The Athenians and their allies. The “Delian League” grew out of the Hellenic League of 481 BC which had been formed to confront the forces of Xerxes.

When the Hellenic League was formed, the Greek states accepted the leadership of Sparta with little protest. Even Athens was willing to accept Spartan leadership of the fleet. However, the Delian League came under the leadership of Athens. There were several reasons for this.

A major reason for Athenian, rather than Spartan, leadership of the League was due to the behaviour of Pausanias. Pausanias had arguably saved Greece at the Battle of Plataea. However, his behaviour after Plataea soon alienated even his strongest admirers.

In 478 BC, Pausanias had been sent out to free those Greeks in Ionia who were still under the control of Persia. He succeeded in taking Byzantium.

Pausanias’ arrogant behaviour in Asia Minor alienated the local Greek population. He entered negotiations with Xerxes and saw himself as a future satrap of Greece. He treated people brutally, and began acting and dressing like a Persian.

The allies refused to serve under Pausanias. ²

He was recalled to Sparta and replaced by one Dorcis. He too was rejected by the Greek allies. ³

...Most of the allies, finding that they could not endure the harshness and contempt with which they were treated by Pausanias, put themselves under the orders of (the Athenians) Aristides and Cimon, who as soon as they had won this following, sent word to the ephors to recall Pausanias, since he

¹ The real transformation of the alliance into an Athenian Empire will be covered in Chapters 9 and 10.

² Plutarch tells the story of Pausanias killing a young girl, Cleonice, who had come to his room to be seduced but on waking the sleeping Pausanias, was killed by him as he thought an assassin had come into his chamber. After this, her spirit came to Pausanias every night and stopped him sleeping.

³ Pausanias ended his life in disgrace. He was recalled to Sparta and when he was about to be arrested, he escaped to the temple of Athena of the Brazen House. Just before he could starve himself to death, he was dragged out and allowed to die. An ignominious end for one of Greece’s greatest heroes.

was bringing dishonour to Sparta and disunity to Greece.⁴

The allies thrust leadership on to the Athenians.

...So Athens took over the leadership, and the allies, because of their dislike of Pausanias, were glad to see her do so.⁵

Sparta was not unhappy about an end coming to its overseas involvement. When Dorcis was rejected by the allies, there was no Spartan protest.

Sparta was more concerned about domestic matters, primarily its constant concern about the possible restlessness of its **helot** population.

The presence of Spartiates so far from home was a potential threat to the domestic stability of the Spartan state.

Athens was certainly well **qualified** for leadership of the Athenian alliance.

It had proven itself at Salamis.

It was a major naval power and so the logical choice as leader of an Aegean confederacy.

At this time, Sparta-Athenian relations were good and no Spartan objections were heard about Athens taking the leading role in the alliance.

The Athenians also shared a similar racial descent as the Ionian Greeks.

A final factor assisting Athens on the road to leadership was the widely acknowledged acceptance of the honest character of **Aristides**, known as “the just”. Due to Aristides’ unquestioned honesty and integrity, he was trusted to look after the affairs of the allies as well as those of Athens.

...Of all Aristides’ virtues it was his justice which most impressed itself on the masses, since it was this which he practised most consistently and which affected most people...⁶

Figure 7.1 The aims of the Delian League



The organisation of the Delian League

a) **Membership:** When an ally joined the Delian League, the inference was certainly that membership was to be permanent. When a state joined the League, iron bars were thrown into the sea. The alliance would thus stay in place until the iron bars floated to the surface.

...(it was Aristides) who swore the oaths to the Ionians that they should have the same enemies

⁴ Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens, Cimon*, 6

⁵ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1*, 96

⁶ Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens, Aristides*, 6

and friends, to confirm which they sank lumps of iron in the sea.⁷

b) **Finances:** In order to maintain a permanent alliance capable of military action at any given moment, a steady flow of financial funds was of crucial importance. The task of working out each state's financial contributions to the League was worked out by Aristides.

- It was decided that a total of 460 talents per annum would be required.
- This amount each state would pay (the phoros) was adjusted over time, once every four years.
- The League's funds would be collected and looked after by ten officials known as the Hellenotamiae. These men were always Athenian.
- Some states preferred to contribute only money.

Some states contributed ships to the League.


These were usually the larger islands such as Chios, Lesbos, Naxos and Samos.

This became unpopular because these states had to keep their boats and their crews at the ready in case of a Persian attack.

This proved to be very expensive. As a result, several states that had previously contributed ships, chose to give money instead and surrendered their fleet to the alliance (ie Athens).

3. **Delos:** The headquarters of the Delian League was Delos.


Figure 7.2 The advantages of Delos as the League headquarters



4. **Voting and autonomy:** At first all states were independent and allowed their own form of government. It is not certain whether each state had equal voting rights in the League synod, though it can be taken for granted that Athens would have been able to at least use its influence and prestige to bring smaller states around to its way of thinking. Another problem in understanding the functioning of the Delian League concerns the paradox of alleged independence and autonomy of each state, when placed against the denial of the right of any state to secede from the League.

⁷ Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, 23.5


Figure 7.3 The activities of the Delian League to the Battle of the Eurymedon River



Clearly, Athens was showing that its power within the League could not be ignored. The signs for a possible evolution of the League into an Athenian Empire were there but there is no evidence that this was Athens' intent right from the start. However, Athens' power in the League was substantial:

- Athens was the unchallenged permanent leader;
- Athens was the hegemon of the Delian League. This gave it enormous influence:
 - Aristides had the job of assessing each ally's tribute payment;
 - Cimon commanded the League fleet;
 - The Treasury officials were all Athenian;
 - The Synod was run by the Athenians.
- And most importantly, Athens had the military muscle as its fleet was more powerful than any other state.

Figure 7.4 Early League activities



The Battle of Eurymedon 467 BC

The existence of the Delian League proved its worth when it was learned that Xerxes had assembled another major military force against Greece at the River Eurymedon, in Pamphylia in southern Asia Minor. Cimon organised a fleet of 300 ships, 200 of which were Athenian. His fleet sailed to Asia Minor and at the mouth of the Eurymedon River; over 200 Persian ships were sunk. Cimon then followed this up with a crushing defeat of the Persians on land.

...a furious battle developed, in which the Athenians lost some of the bravest and highest in the rank of their soldiers. But at last, after a fierce struggle, they threw back the barbarians with great slaughter and captured the army and its camp which was full of all kinds of spoil...⁸


Cimon then sailed south to Cyprus where he defeated a Persian led Phoenician fleet. Plutarch explains that these victories were decisive in the story of Greco-Persian conflict.

...This blow so dashed the king's hopes that he accepted the terms of that notorious peace, whereby he agreed to stay away the distance of a whole day's ride from the Greek seaboard of Asia Minor and not to let a single warship or armoured vessel sail west of the Cyanean and the Chelidonian Islands...⁹

⁸ Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens, Cimon*, 13

⁹ Plutarch, *Cimon*, 13

What had Athens and the allies lost and gained from the Delian League by the time of the Battle of Eurymedon?



Exercise 7.1 Answer the following questions in the spaces provided.

1	By what term would Greeks of the 5 th Century BC have known The Delian League?	
2	Why did Sparta not take up the leadership of the League?	
3	Why was Aristides such an asset for the Athenians?	
4	What were the fundamental aims of the Delian League?	
5	What suggested that League membership was permanent?	
6	How was the League financed?	
7	Why was Delos a good choice for the treasury and headquarters for the League?	
8	Who were the hellenotamiae?	

9	What were the big gains for League members?	
10	What were the big gains for Athens from its position of leadership?	

Exercise 7.2 Place the events listed on the right in the correct chronological order.

1st event		THE ATTACK ON CARYSTUS
2nd event		THE CAPTURE OF BYZANTIUM
3rd event		THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS
4th event		THE REVOLT AND DEFEAT OF NAXOS
5th event		THE RECALL OF PAUSANIAS
6th event		THE DEFEAT OF SKYRUS
7th event		DEFEAT OF THE PHOENECIAN FLEET AT CYPRUS
8th event		THE SIEGE OF EION
9th event		THE BATTLE OF EURYMEDON
10th event		THE BATTLE OF MYCLAE

What do the historians have to say about "Delian League: origins, aims, organization and activities to the Battle of the Eurymedon River"?

1. C H R Horsley: Some aspects of the Athenian Empire

Horsley outlines the reasons why Athens was chosen to lead the Greek alliance. He argues an orthodox case pointing to anger over Pausanias' behaviour, Spartan domestic insecurity, Athens' repute following Salamis and its common heritage with the Ionian Greeks.

*...So then, the common descent which the Athenians shared with the Ionian Greeks from Asia Minor, Spartan isolationism, Athens' proven ability to lead and her possession of a good and tried navy, together with various domestic political matters at Athens and Sparta, including the role of certain individual politicians, are some important matters to account for why the Hegemonia was given to Athens...*¹⁰

2. Simon Hornblower: The Greek World 479-323 BC

Hornblower suggests that there were signs of an Athenian impulse to empire from the early days of the Delian League. Though Cimon and Themistocles differed in their political outlook, both approved of the growing power of Athens. The logic of Themistoclean imperialism, says, Hornblower, fitted in well with the expansion for which Cimon was responsible. Indeed, foreign expansion was well received by ordinary Athenians.

*...Individual Athenians felt no compunction at this tightening of the screws: some Athenian parents of about this time called their sons Karystonikos, shamelessly exulting in the 'Victory over Karystos', and the name Naxiades, ... can be similarly explained.*¹¹

3. A R Burn: Persia and the Greeks

Burn concludes his lengthy narrative of the conflict between the Persians and the Greeks (546-478 BC) with a cursory overview of the transformation of the Delian League from voluntary alliance to Athenian empire. He points out that as Athens was preoccupied with episodes in northern Asia Minor and the Aegean, the Persians had reestablished their power over Cyprus and rebuilt their Levantine fleet. Having dealt with Naxos, Cimon now moved on the revived Persians.

*...Cimon sailed east of Knidos, bringing Phaselis into the Confederacy, not without resistance, and winning the proudest triumph of the Delian League in the destruction of the new Phoenician and Levantine fleets in the mouth of the River Eurymedon; a second and greater Mykale.... The triumph at the Eurymedon laid open the Levant...*¹²

¹⁰ Horsley, C H R, from *Some aspects of the Athenian Empire*, a lecture delivered at the University of Sydney, May, 1978

¹¹ Hornblower, S, *The Greek World 479-323 BC*, Routledge, London, 2002, p 22

¹² Burn, A R, *Persia and the Greeks*, Edward Arnold, London, 1962

Chapter 8: Role and contribution of Cimon and Aristides the Just

Cimon and Aristides both played a key role in the development of Athenian power, from the days of the Persian Wars to the gradual transformation of the Delian League into an Athenian Empire.

Aristides “the just”

Aristides was born in c 530 BC. He was the son of Lysimachus whose family was moderately well off. Aristides was a close friend of the Athenian statesman, Cleisthenes, who was responsible for introducing democratic reforms into Athens at the end of 6th Century BC. ¹ However, Plutarch tells that it was the Spartan, Lycurgus, whom Aristides admired above all others. ² As a result, it is not surprising that Aristides favoured a more conservative form of government. This brought him into conflict with Themistocles. The Roman biographer, Cornelius Nepos, comments harshly on Themistocles’ overcoming Aristides in the 480s when he says:

*...and it was seen in their case how much eloquence could prevail over integrity.*³

Aristides’ integrity and reputation for honesty remains the foremost thing that is remembered about his career. Plutarch rarely tires of reminding his readers of Aristides’ uprightness. The following quotations from his life of Aristides give a flavour of Plutarch’s view of the Greek statesman.

*...Aristides’ (nature) was founded upon a steadfast character, which was intent on justice and incapable of any falsehood, vulgarity, or trickery even in jest.*⁴

*...he believed it his duty to give his services to his country at all times freely and without reward, not merely in terms of money, but also of reputation.*⁵

*...He was a sturdy champion of justice, who was as little swayed by personal sympathy or the desire to do a favour as he was by feelings of anger or hatred.*⁶



To further illustrate his point, Plutarch tells a story about Aristides’ ostracism in 482 BC. He met an illiterate and uncouth country man who asked Aristides to write the name “Aristides” on his ostrakon. When Aristides asked if “this Aristides” had done the man any harm, the man replied no. He said that he was sick of hearing him being called “the just” all the time. On hearing this, Aristides took the ostrakon, wrote his name on it, and handed it back to the man. ⁷ This scene is shown in the 19th Century painting by the German artist, Eugene-Ernst Hillemacher.

¹ See Chapter 11

² Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens, Aristides*, 2

³ Cornelius Nepos, *Lives of eloquent commanders, Aristides*, 1

⁴ Plutarch, *Aristides*, 2

⁵ Plutarch, *Aristides*, 3

⁶ Plutarch, *Aristides*, 4

⁷ Plutarch, *Aristides*, 7



Aristides

490 BC

Aristides was one of the generals at the Battle of Marathon. He supported the policy of Miltiades at the battle and so, when his turn came to take command, he willingly handed over to Miltiades. By doing this:

*...he provided Miltiades with the strength which comes from undivided authority, for each of the generals at once agreed to give up his day of command and came to Miltiades for his orders...*⁸

Plutarch notes that Aristides and Themistocles fought with great distinction, side by side.

489-88 BC

A year after Marathon, Aristides was elected Archon Eponymous, thus giving his name to the year.

480s BC

Aristides supported the conservative policy of maintaining Athens as a land power. This brought him into conflict with Themistocles who was pushing for Athens to become a naval power.

482 BC

Aristides was ostracised. This was an indication of Themistocles growing political influence in Athens.

480 BC

As a Persian invasion was imminent, those leading Athenian citizens who had been ostracised were recalled, and so Aristides returned to Athens. Plutarch relates how Aristides convinced Themistocles to give up their quarrel in the face of the Persian danger. Themistocles accepted this and said to Aristides: *I admire the example you have set me and I shall try to follow it and to do better still in the future.*⁹

480 BC

Aristides supported Themistocles' strategy at Salamis, arguing that his scheme was the best. It was Aristides who landed infantry forces on the island of Psyttaleia who killed all Persian troops who made it there.

479 BC

Aristides went to Sparta and reproached the Spartans for failing to move north to fight the Persians where they occupied Greece. A Peloponnesian force eventually marched north to fight at Plataea. Aristides commanded 8000 Athenian troops at the Battle of Plataea.

478 BC

Plutarch relates that Aristides successfully argued against a scheme of Themistocles to destroy the allied naval station which would have established Athenian naval superiority over the other Greek states. Aristides told the Greek assembly that nothing could be more advantageous for Greece and

⁸ Plutarch, *Aristides*, 5

⁹ Plutarch, *Aristides*, 8

nothing more iniquitous. The assembly backed Aristides.

478 BC

Following the arrogant and cruel behaviour of Pausanias, the Spartans decided to withdraw from actions in Asia Minor. The leadership of the Greek states now fell to the Athenians, primarily Aristides and Cimon.

*...it happened, through the indiscreet conduct of Pausanias, and the equity of the Aristides, that all the states of Greece attached themselves as allies to the Athenians, and chose them as their leaders against the barbarians.*¹⁰

478-77 BC

So trusted was Aristides, that the Greek states agreed to allow him to work out what each state should contribute for the common cause. Aristides calculated that a sum of 460 talents was required and he allocated a sum that was required of each state.

*...he drew up the list of assessments not only with scrupulous integrity and justice, but also in such a way that all the states felt they had been appropriately and satisfactorily dealt with.*¹¹

It was Aristides who made all the Greeks swear an oath to keep the alliance against Persia, and solemnised it by throwing iron bars into the sea.

468 BC

Aristides maintained a key position in Athens. He lived to see Themistocles ostracised but he made no attempt to seek advantage from his rival's downfall. Aristides died in 468 BC, possibly during an expedition to the Pontus but Plutarch tells us that there are various versions of Aristides' death.

What do the historians have to say about Aristides the Just?

1. Robin Osborne: Greece in the Making 1200-479 BC

While discussing leadership of the Greek cause during the Persian invasion, Osborne of course pays great credit to Themistocles. However, he is also keen to point out that Aristides had played a key role at the time. He states that there are stories from the time that give Aristides a key role in the events of 480 BC. He mentions Aristides' support to Themistocles at Salamis and his role at Psyttaleia.

*...and he is the Athenian general at Plataea... he is the man responsible for rejecting Persian overtures after Salamis, he is part of the subsequent embassy to Sparta... and he is the man summoned by name by Alexander of Macedon when he deserts the Persian side...*¹²

2. Herodotus: The Histories

Herodotus praises Aristides for his actions before and during the Battle of Salamis. He records that Aristides forgot old rivalries and ensured Themistocles of his support. He then informed the Greek delegates who were discussing what to do that the fleet was surrounded, and that the only possible strategy was that being proposed by Themistocles. Herodotus also praises Aristides' actions on the island of Psyttaleia.

¹⁰ Cornelius Nepos, *Lives of eloquent commanders, Aristides*,

¹¹ Plutarch, *Aristides*, 24

¹² Osborne, R, *Greece in the Making 1200-479 BC*, Routledge, London, 1996, p 340


...During the confused struggle a valuable service was performed by the Athenian Aristides, son of Lysimachus... He took a number of the Athenian heavy infantry, who were posted along the coast of Salamis, across to Psyttaleia, where they killed every one of the Persian soldiers who had been landed there.¹³

Exercise 8.1

Read each statement. Indicate whether you think each is either true or false.

1	Aristides preferred a more conservative style of government.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
2	Plutarch frequently refers to the honesty and integrity of Aristides.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
3	Aristides was a strong opponent of Miltiades at Marathon.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
4	Themistocles and Aristides had divergent views on naval policy.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
5	Aristides managed to avoid the craze for ostracism in the 480s BC.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
6	Themistocles and Aristides continued to be rivals during the Persian Wars.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
7	Aristides played no part in the events surrounding the Battle of Salamis.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
8	Aristides was the Athenian commander at the Battle of Plataea.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
9	Aristides supported Athenian leadership of the Delian League.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
10	Aristides manoeuvred for the ostracism of Themistocles.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE

¹³ Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book 8, 98



Cimon

Cimon


Plutarch hides little about Cimon's life, choosing to mention his womanising, his drinking and his incest. However, what comes through Plutarch's version of Cimon's life is a strong admiration for his statesmanship, his military skill and his integrity. He describes Cimon as a man of war who had:

...gained brilliant successes against the barbarians... (yet he was also a) moderate statesman who succeeded better than any others in giving (his country) a breathing space in which to recover from the violence of party strife..¹⁴

...He was as brave as Miltiades and as intelligent as Themistocles, and he generally admitted to have been a juster man than either... in statesmanship he showed himself immeasurably their superior, even when he was quite young and inexperienced in military matters...¹⁵

...Cimon was already a rich man, and so he saw to it that the money which he was credited with having won honourably from the enemy in his campaigns was spent even more honourably on his fellow citizens...¹⁶

Figure 8.1 Cimon's background



480 BC

When Themistocles was arguing his case for evacuating Athens just before the Battle of Salamis, Cimon openly showed his support for the idea by dedicating a horse's bridle to the goddess on the Acropolis as a token of the fact the city needed not knights but men to fight at sea.

...and then went down to the sea; and because of this action many of his countrymen began to take heart again...¹⁷

Cimon is reported to have fought bravely at Salamis, a fact that endeared him to his countrymen.

¹⁴ Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens, Cimon*, 3

¹⁵ Plutarch, *Cimon*, 5

¹⁶ Plutarch, *Cimon*, 10

¹⁷ Plutarch, *Cimon*, 5

Early 470s BC

Cimon's natural inclination was to more conservative or aristocratic principles. He was a great admirer of Sparta. Consequently, this made him a rival of Themistocles and hence he joined Aristides in opposing Themistocles.

478-77 BC

While Pausanias was becoming more unpopular amongst the Greek allies, the men under Cimon's command were admired for their discipline. Athens soon took leadership of the alliance with Cimon and Aristides as its chief commanders.

476-75 BC

Under Cimon, the Greek allies removed the Persians from Eion. To avoid capture, the Persian commander, Butes, set fire to the city. Cimon took control of a city in ruins. However, the surrounding country was fertile and so Cimon handed the region to the Athenians who then established a colony there.

Plutarch suggests this action was very popular amongst the people for:

*...under Cimon they had the opportunity to carry the war into their enemies' country and ravage it, and beside this they won new territory which they could colonise...*¹⁸

Thucydides comments briefly on the siege of Eion.

*...Under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades, they captured this place and slaves of the inhabitants...*¹⁹

474-73 BC

Cimon led League forces in the defeat of the non-Greek pirates on Skyrus. It was from here that Cimon brought home the bones of the legendary Athenian hero, Theseus, back to Athens.

*...This affair did more than any other achievement of Cimon's to endear him to the people...*²⁰

At this time, some of the Greek allies were tiring of having to man the ships of the fleet and continue fighting. Some Athenian generals were angered by this. Cimon was far more clever. He said he understood the views of the allies and allowed them to offer empty ships or money rather than fight. The League's fleet was becoming increasingly manned by Athenians. The result of this was that due to Cimon's policy, the Athenians were more and more dominating the alliance. Plutarch explains it this way.

*...and thus in a short while, using the funds the allies had contributed, he made the Athenians the rulers of the very men who paid them.*²¹

467 BC

Cimon achieved a major double land/ sea victory over the Persians at the Battle of Eurymedon and then followed this up by defeating the Phoenician fleet off Cyprus. The Persian king had to agree to humiliating treaty terms which included keeping at least one day's distance from the Greek Asia



Cimon

¹⁸ Plutarch, *Cimon*, 8

¹⁹ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Book 1, 98

²⁰ Plutarch, *Cimon*, 8

²¹ Plutarch, *Cimon*, 11

Minor seaboard. Cimon began to use some of the funds gained to fortify and adorn the city of Athens.

465 BC

When the island of Thasos rebelled against the League, Cimon led a force aimed at quelling the revolt and making it clear no ally was allowed to leave. The city was besieged and eventually forced to surrender. The neighbouring territory and gold mines were taken over and a major Athenian cleruchy was established at a place on the Strymon River called 'The Nine Ways'. This would later be known as Amphipolis. Cimon had made it very clear than no state could leave the League. At about this time, Cimon successfully defended himself against a charge of bribery.²²

462 BC

While Cimon was away on another expedition, his political rivals in Athens, Ephialtes and Pericles, were 'democratising' the Athenian political system and removing powers from the aristocratic Areopagus. On his return, Cimon tried unsuccessfully to reverse these changes.

*...the democratic leaders combined to denounce him and tried to stir up the people against him by bringing up all the old scandals about his sister and accusing him of pro-Spartan sympathies.*²³

461 BC

In this year, Cimon was ostracised. There had been an earthquake in Sparta which had sparked a helot revolt. As the situation became more desperate for Sparta, the Spartans sought military assistance from Athens. Ephialtes was opposed but Cimon insisted it should be sent. However, the presence of Athenian forces in Sparta began to alarm the Spartan authorities. The Athenians were singled out from all the allies as "dangerous revolutionaries" and ordered home. This public humiliation of Athens destroyed Cimon's career.

*...They returned home in a fury and proceeded to take public revenge upon the friends of Sparta in general and Cimon in particular. They seized upon some trifling pretext to ostracise him...*²⁴

Cimon was ostracised for ten years.

457 BC

In the 450s BC, Athens found itself in military conflict with Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies.²⁵ In 457 BC, at the Battle of Tanagra, Cimon arrived, fully armed, ready to fight with his countrymen. However, the generals were suspicious of him and believed that he was trying to sow confusion in the Athenian forces and lead the Spartans against the city. As a result, Cimon was forced to depart.

(457 BC) 451 BC

Cimon was eventually recalled from exile. However, there is confusion about when this was. Plutarch mentions that it might have been after Tanagra but the argument against this is that Cimon was not mentioned in the generals' lists for the next six years. Cimon helps restore peace between Athens and Sparta with the Five Year Truce. Cimon is next heard of in 450 BC when he led an expedition against the Persians. This might tend to suggest that he did not return to Athens until 451 BC, when his ten year period of ostracism was over.

²² Plutarch, Cimon, 14

²³ Plutarch, Cimon, 15

²⁴ Plutarch, Cimon, 17

²⁵ See Chapter 13

450 BC

Cimon sailed to Cyprus with 200 ships to quell a revolt. Once there he sent 60 ships off to Egypt to assist Egyptian forces fighting the Persians. Cimon used the rest of his ships to gain control of Cyprus. Having defeated the Persian fleet, Cimon then laid siege to the city of Citium, on the south western corner of Cyprus. It was at this time that Cimon died, either from a sickness or from a wound he received.

What do the historians have to say about Cimon?

1. Victor Ehrenberg: From Solon to Socrates

Ehrenberg comments on Cimon's popularity inside Athens. He describes Cimon as a typical aristocrat, rich, related to the key families and an opponent of Themistocles. There were many stories of his wealth, generosity and his liking for building. As well as this, he was often unconventional and attracted much gossip. However, Ehrenberg argues that no matter what sort of life Cimon led, his career was of major significance for Athens.

...He was, however, a great patriot who never tried to gain personal power beyond that of a legally elected strategos. Like Aristides... Cimon was no diehard, no extremist in politics; he became one of the builders indirectly of democracy and directly of Athenian rule over the Aegean. ²⁶

2. Cornelius Nepos: Cimon

Cornelius Nepos summarises the successes of Cimon and shows how significant he had been for Athenian power. He lists Cimon's successes from victories in Thrace that saw the eventual establishment of Amphipolis to his major victory at the Eurymedon River in 467 BC.

...he experienced like good fortune by land on the same day; for after capturing the enemy's vessels, he immediately led out his troops from the fleet, and overthrew at the first onset a vast force of the barbarians. By this victory he obtained a great quantity of spoil; and, as some of the islands, through the rigour of the Athenian government, had revolted from them, he secured the attachment, in the course of his return home, of such as were well disposed, and obliged the disaffected to return to their allegiance. ²⁷

²⁶ Ehrenberg, V, *From Solon to Socrates*, Routledge, London, 1967, p 199

²⁷ Cornelius Nepos, *Lives of Eminent Commanders, Cimon, II*

Exercise 8.2

Read each statement. Indicate whether you think each is either true or false.

1	Plutarch has a fairly low opinion of Cimon's political and military skills.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
2	Cimon's private life attracted a fair degree of controversy.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
3	In political terms, Cimon seemed to be a natural opponent of Themistocles.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
4	Cimon was strongly opposed to Themistocles' strategy at Salamis.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
5	Skyrus was attacked because it was being used by the Persians as a base.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
6	The Battle of Eurymedon was not of any great significance for the Greek world.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
7	Cimon insisted that Thasos should not be allowed to leave the League.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
8	Democratic reforms continued inside Athens despite Cimon's opposition.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
9	Cimon's ostracism came about as a result of Athenian humiliation in Sparta.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
10	After his ostracism, Cimon was never able to serve Athens again.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE

Notes

Chapter 9

Transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire

The information to be covered in Chapter 9 (*Transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire*) and Chapter 10 (*Nature of Athenian imperialism: changing relations with allies*) covers very similar ground. In order to avoid too much duplication of information, the following approach will be used:

Chapter 9 will tackle the information in a predominantly narrative and descriptive manner. The aim of this chapter will be essentially to “tell the story” with little if any analysis. Consequently, this chapter will have fewer references to the ancient sources.

Chapter 10 will tackle the information in a more analytical manner. The aim of this chapter will be essentially to try and explain “the how and why” with more focus on analysis. This chapter will have far more references to the ancient sources.

The two chapters need to be read in tandem. Things might be referred to in Chapter 9 which are explained in Chapter 10 and vice versa.

By 467 BC, the Delian League seemed to have achieved the aims for which it had been formed. The threat of Persian attack had been neutralized. Xerxes was forced to sign an agreement in 467 BC which forbade his forces to be within a day’s march of the Greek seaboard. Cimon’s victory at the Battle of the Eurymedon River, and the subsequent attack on Cyprus, had brought security to the Greek states of the Aegean and Asia Minor. Those Greek states that had been under Persian control in Asia Minor were now free. Some of the booty from Persian defeats had been passed on to the Greek allies – some of course had also been passed on to Athens to strengthen its fleet and adorn its city.

If the reasons for the existence of the Delian League were now gone, surely this meant that the League was no longer needed. Athens quickly dispelled this notion in 465 BC when Thasos attempted to secede from the Delian League.

The defeat of Thasos: 465-63 BC

The Thasians resented Athenian encroachment in their traditional markets and growing Athenian control over the gold mining activities in nearby Thrace. The dispute between Thasos and Athens led to Thasos’ decision to secede from the Delian League.

- Thasos sought assistance from Macedon, and more importantly from Sparta (though Athens learned of this only later).¹
- Cimon defeated the Thasian fleet but it took a two year siege of the city before Thasos was brought to heel.
- The punishment for Thasos was severe:
 - Thasos was forced to hand over all its ships to Athens;
 - it had to surrender its claim to the goldmines;
 - it had to pay a large indemnity to Athens.

Athens had sent out a clear message to other allies: Athens would not be allowing any state to leave the League.

¹ Sparta was unable to assist Thasos due to internal problems – namely an ongoing Helot revolt following an earthquake in 464 BC.

The eclipse of Cimon and the rise of Pericles

Despite his string of successes, Cimon faced major opposition from his political opponents in Athens, led by Ephialtes and Pericles. These men sought the increasing democratisation of Athens, and the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy which would bring to Athens growing power, influence and wealth. Cimon was of a more aristocratic bent and sought a more conservative foreign policy.

- Following the Spartan earthquake of 464 BC and the subsequent helot revolt, Cimon had persuaded the Council to send him and 4000 troops to assist the Spartans.
- Cimon's rationale was that:
 - Greece needed a strong Sparta for future security;
 - a collapse of the Spartan state could be followed by a collapse of the Athenian state.
- However, the Spartans humiliated Cimon by sending him and his men back to Athens. Events now moved quickly. Cimon was ostracised, Ephialtes was assassinated and Pericles was able to begin establishing his political ascendancy.²

Growing conflict between Athens and Sparta³

Athens now proceeded to form better relations with Argos and Thessaly (both enemies of Sparta) and came into conflict with Corinth and Aegina (both friends of Sparta).

- In 459 BC, two of Sparta's allies – Corinth and Megara – became involved in a border dispute. **Megara** turned to Athens for assistance which the Athenians were only too willing to give.
 - Corinth now declared war on Athens and Megara, and was soon backed by Athens' naval rival, Aegina.
 - Athens now successfully fought a series of land and sea battles.
 - In 458 BC, it defeated Aegina, capturing 70 of its ships. Aegina was forced to join the Delian League.⁴
- Athens' continuing success in Greece alarmed Sparta. It sent troops to Boetia in 457 BC to assist its ally Doris against Phocis. Sparta then established a confederation under the leadership of Thebes.
 - Spartan forces then moved south but were intercepted by an Athenian force.
 - What followed was a major battle at **Tanagra** in 457 BC in which the Spartans were victorious.
 - Sparta did not feel strong enough to move on Athens and so returned to the Peloponnese.
- However, within only a few months, Athens had regained the initiative with a victory at the Battle of **Oenophyta**.
 - This gave Athens control of all of Boetia, except Thebes.
 - Phocis now joined the Athenian alliance. It was followed by Troezen, in Argolis on the eastern side of the Peloponnese.

² These events were covered in the Cimon section of Chapter 8. They will be covered more fully in Chapter 13.

³ This topic will be covered in more detail in Chapter 13.

⁴ Athens success over Aegina was even more impressive when one considers that 200 alliance ships were involved in the Egyptian Expedition (459 BC). The twin aims of the Egyptian Expedition were to defeat Persia and gain control of Nile Valley trade. After six years of campaigning, Athens was forced to pull out of Egypt having suffered a major defeat.

Athens at its peak and peace at last

In 454 BC, the **treasury** of the Delian League was moved from the temple of Apollo in Delos to the temple of Athena in Athens. Athens now had full control over League funds, though the move from Delos was really only a recognition of what had already happened.

Despite Tanagra and Egypt, Athens was at the height of its power. It controlled the seas from the Pontus to the Levant, and had a land empire that stretched from Thermopylae to the Isthmus. In 451 BC, Cimon negotiated a **Five Year Truce** with Sparta.

Cimon now led alliance forces against Persia with an expedition to Cyprus. Cimon died during this campaign.

- It was after this campaign that peace was finally achieved between the Persian Empire and the Athenian Empire with the Peace of Callias in 449 BC.⁵
 - Persia was not to come within three days march of the coast of Asia Minor;
 - Persian warships would avoid the Aegean and the Propontis;
 - Athens would not attack Persian territory.
- Both had reasons to seek an end to hostilities.
 - Pericles believed that Athens needed time to consolidate its empire and it was not strong enough to bring down the Persian Empire.
 - The Persian king, Artaxerxes, had internal problems to deal with.

Figure 9.1 Greece in the 5th Century



⁵ Whether or not there was a formal peace treaty between the Greeks and the Persians is open to dispute. Maybe both sides had decided that they each needed a break from continual conflict

Athens loses its land empire

Athens strengthened its hold on the empire in a variety of ways.⁶ One method was the establishment of cleruchies across the Aegean, a policy favoured by Pericles. Cleruchies had been established in Chalcidice and Skyros. Others were set up in Naxos in 450 BC, and later Andros and in the Chersonese.

Though Athens had been successful against Persia, it soon lost its land empire in Boetia. The towns of Boetia rose in revolt in the early 440s. An Athenian force was defeated at Coroneia. Those troops which survived the battle were held prisoners until 446 BC when Boetia was evacuated. Athens' loss of Boetia was quickly followed by that of Phocis and Locris.

- Athens then faced open revolt in Megara and on the island of Euboea.
- An Athenian garrison was destroyed in Megara but the Athenians held on to Pegae and Nisae north west and south east of Megara respectively.
- Pericles managed to hold on to Euboea and the Chalcis Decree of 447-46 BC which followed illustrated the true nature of the alliance. This will be dealt with in Chapter 10.
 - The people of Histaea were expelled and Athenian cleruchs placed on their land.
 - The whole island was reduced to a tribute paying status.

At this point Pericles made some major decisions. Athens faced some major challenges.

- Athens had a vast maritime empire to control stretching from the Pontus to the Greek coast and across to Asia Minor.
- Could it realistically hold a land empire as well?
- Dare it stretch itself so far when relations with Sparta were still tense, notwithstanding the Five Year Truce?
- What would happen if the Persians resumed hostilities?

Pericles' response was to give up the idea of a land empire. This decision had, of course, really been forced upon him with the loss of Boetia, Phocis and Locris. He also decided to establish a deeper and longer-lasting peace with Sparta. In 446 BC, Athens and Sparta signed a **Thirty Year Peace**.

Its main terms were:

- Athens gave up its Peloponnesian possessions, including Troezen, Achaea, Pagae and Nisaea.
- Each agreed not to accept into alliance a city that was an ally of the other.
- However, non-allied states were allowed to join either the Athenians or the Peloponnesians.⁷
- Any differences that arose between Athens and Sparta would be settled by arbitration.

In the years following the signing of the Thirty Year Peace, Athens **consolidated** its economic and military hold over its empire. Final steps were taken to strengthen the port of Piraeus, work begun much earlier by Themistocles. Walls linking Piraeus and the city were finally completed. A colony was established in Italy at Thurii in the Gulf of Tarentum. This helped with the promotion of trade with Carthage, Sicily and Etruria. In the 430s, Pericles led expeditions to Thrace and into the Pontus Euxinus (Black Sea) to warn local communities not to interfere with Athenian interests in those regions.



⁶ See Chapter 10

⁷ The background, organisation and activities of Sparta's alliance, The Peloponnesian will be covered in Chapter 13.

The revolt of Samos 440 BC

Athens faced one major threat at this time and that came from the revolt of the island of Samos in 440 BC.

- Samos and Miletus, on the Asia Minor coast, had come into conflict concerning Priene, also located on the Asia Minor coast just north of Miletus and south of Mycale.
- Both states were members of the Athenian alliance.
 - Miletus appealed to Athens.
 - However, Samos appealed to the Persian satrap of Sardis.
- Pericles took immediate action and sailed to Samos with 60 vessels to blockade Samos. This force was soon reinforced with another 40 vessels from Athens and 25 from Chios and Lesbos.
- Rumours of the pending arrival of a Persian fleet persuaded Pericles to briefly move his ships to the mainland coast. However, as more ships arrived from Athens, the blockade was resumed and soon Samos was surrounded by 200 ships.
 - After nine months, the Samians surrendered.
- The terms imposed on Samos were severe.
 - The walls of Samos were pulled down.
 - Samos had to surrender all its ships.⁸
 - An indemnity of 1500 talents was paid.
 - Hostages were handed over.

Samos had appealed to other states to join them. Only Byzantium heeded the call, and even then only half-heartedly. It soon ended its revolt and for its trouble had its tribute payments increased. Why did no other Greek states join the revolt? One reason could be that they were too fearful of Athens. However, another explanation could be that the Greek states had come to the conclusion that membership of the alliance had more advantages than disadvantages.

⁸ By this time, 440 BC, Samos was one of only three states still providing ships to the alliance.

Exercise 9.1

Place the events listed on the right in the correct chronological order.

1st event		TREASURY MOVED TO DELOS
2nd event		THE FIVE YEAR TRUCE WITH SPARTA
3rd event		THE OSTRACISM OF CIMON
4th event		ATHENS GAINS CONTROL OF BOETIA
5th event		MEGARA JOINS THE ATHENIAN ALLIANCE
6th event		BATTLE OF THE EURYMEDON RIVER
7th event		THE THIRTY YEAR PEACE WITH SPARTA
8th event		END OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION
9th event		THE LOSS OF BOETIA
10th event		THE BATTLE OF OENOPHYTA
11th event		CIMON LEADS AN ATHENIAN FORCE TO HELP SPARTA
12th event		THE REVOLT OF SAMOS
13th event		THE PEACE OF CALLIAS
14th event		THE BATTLE OF TANAGRA
15th event		THE REVOLT OF THASOS

Chapter 10


Nature of Athenian imperialism: changing relations with allies

Introductory points

What had begun as a voluntary union of Greek states in the early 470s – the Delian League – was transformed into a fully fledged, Athenian dominated empire within twenty five years.


- It is interesting to speculate when the “allies” realised that they had changed from being allies to subjects. For a state such as Thasos, the answer is easy enough: 463 BC.¹ However, for those states that had not experienced the full brunt of coercive Athenian power, one can only speculate when this realisation came about.
- Did the Athenians intend all along for the League to evolve into an Athenian dominated empire? The potential was always there from the start but there is little evidence that Athens had some secret conspiratorial plan to do this.
- If this is true, then the question needs to be asked: why did it happen? There are several possible explanations.

Figure 10.1 Athens takes over. Why?



¹ The date of the suppression of the Thasian revolt. See Chapter 9.

FIGURE 10.2: Summary of the means of Athenian control over its “allies”



How did Athens control its allies?

The changing status of the allies within the alliance/ empire

When the Delian League came into existence, there were essentially two classes of ally: those that provided ships and those that provided money. Clearly, a state which was providing ships would be able to maintain its autonomy because it had a means of defending itself against the encroachment of another power, ie Athens. The best way for Athens to increase its control over the allies was to encourage them to offer to provide money only and allow Athens to take on the responsibility for organising and manning the fleet. Many allies transferred their fleets to Athens voluntarily. They had become wary of having to fight in distant locations, especially once the threat of Persian invasion seemed to diminish. Athens was happy for the allies to do this. It meant they had control of the ships and the allies paid their crews and upkeep.

By the late 460s, there were now three classes of members of the League:

- Non-tributary allies who provided ships – by the late 460s, there were only three of these: Samos, Lesbos and Chios. Samos would lose this status after its revolt of 440-39 BC.
- Tributary allies who retained their independence – this was the status of many of the Asiatic Greek cities.
- Tributary allies who were subject – this was the status of states such as Thasos, following its failed revolt of 465-63 BC.

Clearly, it was in Athens' interest to reduce the size of the first class, and to push allied states into the second class, and into the third class if possible. New members who were forced to join the alliance immediately entered the third class.

Athenian control of the allied fleet

The changing nature of the status of the alliance members obviously worked in Athens' favour. Who could possibly oppose Athenian policy and control when, increasingly, the only state that controlled naval forces was Athens? Thucydides explains that the allies had only themselves to blame for this situation.

...For this position it was the allies themselves who were to blame. Because of this reluctance of theirs to face military service, most of them, to avoid serving abroad, had assessments made by which, instead of producing ships, they were to pay a corresponding sum of money. The result was that the Athenian navy grew at their expense, and when they revolted they always found themselves inadequately armed and inexperienced in war. ²

Athens' willingness to use force against its allies

Not only did Athens have control of the fleet, it made it crystal clear that it was willing to use it.

- Allies who tried to leave the alliance would be forced to remain as members, eg Thasos 465-65 BC.
- Allies who dared to look beyond the alliance to further their interests would be brought to heel, eg Samos 440-39 BC.
- States which were not yet members of the alliance but whom Athens believed should be members for the sake of Greek security, would be forced to become members, eg Carystus 472 BC.
- States which were not yet members of the alliance but whom Athens believed should be members even though there was no perceivable Persian danger, would be forced to

² Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Book 1, 99

become members, eg Skyrus, 474-73 BC.

Athens stationing of garrisons amongst the allies

Not only was Athens quick to deal with any rebellious allies, it acted to ensure future loyalty once a revolt had been suppressed. Military garrisons were placed in suspect states to keep them in check to ensure future loyalty to Athens. These garrisons became, in effect, an army of occupation.³ Another function of the garrisons was to protect the League commissioners who would be sent to the allied states to assess and collect the tribute.

...And the Athenians choosing four men shall send them to the cities, issuing receipts to those who have paid the tribute, and demanding from the defaulters the unpaid portion...⁴

The establishment of cleruchies across the empire

A cleruchy was an Athenian colony established away from Athens. Increasingly these colonies were settled on the land owned by alleged allies. The “cleruchs” who settled in these cleruchies were not strictly colonists as they retained their Athenian citizenships. Cleruchies were extremely useful for ensuring Athenian control of the empire.

- Some cleruchies were positioned in strategic locations, controlling waterways and the like. A cleruchy of 1000 people was established by Pericles in the Chersonese in 447 BC. This would have helped secure supplies of grain coming to Athens from the Black Sea.

...Pericles not only brought with him a thousand Athenian colonists and so provided the cities there with fresh strength and vigour, but he also secured the neck of the isthmus with a fortified line stretching from sea to sea.⁵

- Other cleruchies were established in Naxos and Andros.
- Cleruchies had a useful domestic political purpose as well. Many of the lower classes that might be unemployed or “disruptive” were sent to cleruchies.
- Cleruchies had another useful benefit for Athens.

...by installing garrisons among the allies, implanted at the same time a healthy fear of rebellion.⁶

The permanency of the oath taken by member states

The oath which allies were forced to take proved to be a slightly more subtle form of Athenian control. Swearing an oath had religious connotations. By throwing iron bars into the sea, the implication was clearly being made that the oath was meant to be permanent. To break the oath would “have consequences”. As time went on, the nature of the oath implied unambiguous subservience to Athens. The Chalcis Decree of 446-45 BC offers a flavour of the type of oath that member states were taking.

...I will not revolt from the Athenians... and neither by word nor deed will I obey anyone who has rebelled. If anyone does so, I will inform the Athenians, and I shall pay to the Athenians the tribute which I may persuade the Athenians to accept and I will be, to the best of my ability a most good and just ally...⁷

³ A modern equivalent of this practice was the policy of the Soviet Union stationing Red Army troops in those Eastern European states it dominated after 1945. The East European states were nominally independent but if they acted in a manner that threatened the Soviet Union's interests, the troops would take action as happened in the bloody suppression of the Hungarian rising in 1956.

⁴ The Cleinias Decree, 447 BC

⁵ Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens, Pericles*, 19

⁶ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 11

⁷ The Chalcis Decree, 446-45 BC

Athens' judicial control via its use of its law courts

Control of the legal affairs of the allies was another method by which Athens controlled allied states. Athenian legal controls expanded as time went on. At first Athenian legal interference concerned only political matters. This can be seen in the Erythrae Decree (453-52 BC). However, by the time of the Chalcis Decree (446-45 BC) the autonomy of local courts was being greatly limited. More and more cases were being heard in Athens itself.

...in the case of exile, death, and loss of political rights... there shall be reference to Athens...⁸

Political control via the imposition of democracies on allied states

Another means by which Athens imposed its control over the allies was to persuade/ force them to adopt systems of government similar to its own, ie democracy. There were several occasions when this occurred. One specific example came in 453-52 BC with the Ionian city of Erythrae. The following extract from the Erythrae Decree illustrates this:

...A council of 120 men is to be chosen by lot. Those balloted are to have their credentials examined before the Council: no one shall be admitted who is an alien, or less than thirty years of age... No one shall hold office more than once within four years...⁹

Control of empire and alliance members' finances

During the early days of the Delian League, the League treasury was controlled by the Congress of the Allies. However, in 454 BC, the treasury was moved from Delos to Athens on the grounds of security. The Congress of the Allies ceased to meet and the League treasury became part of the treasury of Athens. League funds were now spent in whatever manner the Athenian assembly saw fit. Funds were, of course, spent on the security of the empire. However, League funds were now also used for:

- the sacred treasury of Athena;
- Athenian building projects;
- and whatever Athens thought appropriate.

Growing Athenian control of trade and resources

The Athenians not only controlled League finances, made much easier by moving the treasury from Delos to Athens, but they also dominated the economic life of the empire. Athens gradually forced the allies to use Athenian weights and measures, and to adopt the use of Athenian currency. Local mints were closed down and states had to bring their money to Athens to be reminted. This measure was greatly resented as the minting of coins was seen as a sign of a state's independence and individuality. The Coinage Decree of 450-46 BC¹⁰ brought in these measures and they were rigorously enforced.

...And for the future, the Secretary of the Council shall add to the oath of the Council (taken on entering office) the following: "If anyone strikes silver coinage in the cities, or does not employ Athenian currency, weights and measures, I will punish and penalize him in accordance with the previous decree...¹¹

Athenian control of the foreign policy of member states

It obviously goes without saying that the foreign policy of Athens now became the foreign policy of

⁸ The Chalcis Decree, 446-45 BC

⁹ The Erythrae Decree, 453-52 BC

¹⁰ The date of the Coinage Decree is disputed by some historians who argue that the openly imperialist style of the decree suggests a later date, possibly the 420s BC, during the Peloponnesian War.

¹¹ The Currency Decree, 450-46 BC

the member states. Independent actions on the part of the allies were now impossible. With no fleet, subject to Athenian political, military and economic control, and often surrounded by Athenian cleruchs and a military garrison, an autonomous foreign policy did not exist.

- No moves towards Persia would be tolerated.
- Allies were not allowed to leave the alliance.
- Allies were not allowed to have relations with Sparta unless they were sanctioned by Athens.
- Allies' trading rights were restricted.
- Member states had no option but to accept Athenian garrisons and cleruchies.

Exercise 10.1

From the box below, select the action taken by the Athenians which matches the generalised explanation given on the left.

1	Establishing a colony of Athenian citizens in the territory of an allied state	
2	Denying an allied state the right to have relations with a state that Athens does not want it to have relations with	
3	Forcing allied states to adopt Athenian currency and weights and measures	
4	Denying an allied state the right to secede from the alliance	
5	Gaining control of the allied fleet	
6	Making permanent the oath taken by the allied states	
7	Forcing allied legal business to be heard in an Athenian court	
8	Forcing democratic systems of government upon member states	
9	The use of military garrisons to protect tax commissioners	
10	Increased Athenian control of allied finances	
11	Forcing states into the alliance who were previously not members	

Use of force against Carystus 472 BC	The Coinage Decree 450-46 BC
The setting up of a cleruchy in Naxos in 450 BC	The Cleinias Decree 447 BC
Moving the treasury from Delos to Athens	The Chalcis Decree 446-45 BC
The suppression of Thasos 465-63 BC	The Erythrae Decree 453-52 BC
Athenian opposition to Samos' appeal to Artaxerxes in 440 BC	
Thucydides' argument that allied preference not to fight made this possible	
Throwing iron bars into the sea	

What do the historians have to say about the Nature of Athenian imperialism: changing relations with allies?

1. Raphael Sealey: A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC

Sealey discusses the point at which the Delian League had become an Athenian Empire. It could be argued that the peace treaty with Persia precipitated a crisis in allied relations. Once peace had been made with Persia, why was a League necessary? Athens then increased pressure on the allies to ensure the alliance of Greek states would continue. Another possibility, says Sealey, is that it was the totality of events between 454-446 BC – the Egyptian disaster, worsening relations with Sparta, the Persian peace treaty and the eventual truce with Sparta – which created the empire. If there was more evidence of tribute lists and decrees from the pre 454 BC period, maybe the move to empire could be tracked to an earlier time.

...If there were equally rich evidence for conditions before 454 BC, some of the earlier developments might seem equally decisive. The proper conclusion is that the Empire was constantly in a state of tension and flux; it never settled down to stability under Athenian rule.¹²

2. N G L Hammond: A History of Greece to 322 BC

Hammond discusses the significance of the transfer of the treasury from Delos to Athens in 454 BC. Hammond refers to the legitimate security concerns, but argues that the real significance of the transfer was political. In one bound the financial resources of the Athenians had dramatically increased in comparison to the few remaining states that might have been considered autonomous. The Allied Treasury was now a department of Athenian finance. From this followed a further weakening of allied decision making.

...The Allied Synod ceased to meet. Decrees affecting the affairs of 'Athens and her Allies', were henceforth issued by the Athenian state. Now that she had the reins of power in her own hands, Athens dispensed with that empty formality of consulting the wishes of her sometime allies.¹³

3. Simon Hornblower: The Greek World 479-323 BC

Hornblower shows that for the population of Athens, the transition of the League to Empire had positive advantages. The lower classes were able to gain land either as a cleruchy (land still possessed by an ally) or as a colony (land on an evacuated site). The upper classes did not have to pay for the upkeep of the fleet. The upper classes now also had the possibility of owning estates overseas.

...All this meant that rich and poor Athenians were in agreement about the desirability of having, running and policing the empire; a solidarity not broken until the financial crisis after the Sicilian Expedition (during the Peloponnesian War).¹⁴

¹² Sealey, R, *A History of The Greek City States 700-338 BC*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976, p 304

¹³ Hammond, N G L, *A History of Greece to 322 BC*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (third edition) 1986, p 304

¹⁴ Hornblower, S, *The Greek World 479-323 BC*, Routledge, London, 2002, p 17

Chapter 11

Key democratic developments: influence of the thetes, ostracism, citizenship law

Introduction

The key internal development inside Athens during the first half of the 5th Century BC was the development of a radical democracy. The Athenians would not have used the word “democracy” until the end of the 5th Century. Pericles actually referred to the idea of “equality before the law” as the basis of the Athenian system. The prime force propelling Athens in the direction of democracy was the impact of the Persian Wars.¹ There were several key developments that affected the development of the Athenian democracy.

- The more Athens became involved in military affairs – whether against Persia, its erstwhile allies or Sparta – the more important became the role of the general or *stratego*.
 - Athens’ leading political figures from now on were one of the ten strategoi elected annually.
 - This included men such as Cimon, Themistocles and Pericles.
- Athens’ power rested with its navy. Themistocles set Athens off in the direction of naval power in the 480s, Salamis was the turning point of the Persian Wars, and it was naval power that created an Athenian Empire.
 - Naval power relied upon the rowers of Athenian triremes.
 - These men came from Athens’ lowest social class, the *thetes*. Increasingly, this group came to recognise its strength and demanded to be acknowledged.
 - Increasingly any upcoming politician knew he had to court the thetes if he was going to rise up the political ladder.
- As Athens became more democratic, and more and more citizens participated in the exercise of government.
 - Money was needed to pay them.
 - Increasingly, the resources of the empire provided this.
 - As more and more citizens participated, Pericles wanted to limit the benefits of citizenship to Athenian citizens only. This necessitated the tightening up of the meaning of “Athenian citizenship”.
- Several moves were taken to democratise the Athenian government. These measures will be discussed later. They included:
 - changes to the archonship;
 - the use of ostracism;
 - the weakening of the Areopagus;
 - the payment of jurors.

Background to Athenian Democracy

In order to understand the extent of the radical democracy of the 5th Century BC, a background

¹ The overall impact of the Persian Wars will be covered in Chapter 12.

explanation of earlier Athenian political developments is required. This will assist an understanding of the nature of change after the Persian Wars.

In **early Athenian history**, the kings of Athens disappeared. Athens' aristocracy (the *Eupatrids*) became the dominant political force in the polis. The powers of the previous kings were now shared by three magistrates who were called *archons*. In 683 BC the tenure for the archonship became annual.

Each archon had a specific function:

- the *archon polemarch* had the military power within Athens;
- the *archon basileus* had a religious function;
- the *archon eponymous* – who gave his name to the year – was in charge of civil administration.

As the business of the city grew, it became necessary to create six additional officials called *thesmothetae*, who decided cases and kept a record of their decisions. These were linked with the three chief magistrates and so became a board of nine archons.

- The main centre of aristocratic power in Athens was the *Areopagus*. It made the key decisions within the state.
 - Only former archons could become members of the Areopagus and only the aristocratic element in Athens could become an archon.
 - Hence aristocratic control of the political system was ensured.
- The people's assembly, or *Ecclesia*, had no real power at all.

By the early 6th Century BC, Athens was experiencing major social tensions. To deal with this situation, the archon for 594-93 BC, Solon, was given powers to modify Athens' system and stave off the possibility of political violence.

Solon's first step was to introduce a new class system. Athenian society was divided into four classes, based roughly on how many bushels of grain a man could raise. Solon also made changes to the political structure of Athens. These changes are summarised in Figure 11.1.

Solon






Figure 11.1 Social and political change under Solon



Solon's changes were only partly successful. Throughout the 6th Century BC, Athens continued to suffer social tensions. From the 540s to 510 BC, Athens was ruled by the Peisistratid tyranny. The tyrant, Hippias, was removed from power in 510 BC following the intervention of Sparta led by King Cleomenes.

Cleisthenes



Further unrest in Athens ensued but by 508-07 BC, Athens was now under the influence of **Cleisthenes**. Cleisthenes introduced a series of political reforms which turned Athens in a much more democratic direction.

- One of the main results of Cleisthenes' reforms was to reduce the power of the upper classes. He did this by introducing the deme system.
 - A deme was a small community or area of land and as of 507 BC every citizen became an equal member of a deme.
 - It did not matter whether that citizen was a pentacosiomedimnoi or a thete.

- The result of this was to end the special status that the aristocracy had enjoyed for so long.
- Each deme now became part of a *trittyes*.
 - There were to be three types of trittyes: the city, the inland and the coast.
- Cleisthenes then abolished the old tribes of Athens and created *ten new tribes* based on the regional divisions of Attica.
 - Each new tribe would contain three trittyes – one from the city, one from the inland and one from the coast.
 - A citizen would now be known as: “Mikis Torakis” of deme X, trittyes Y and tribe Z.
- Military organisation was also changed.
 - There were now ten generals, called strategoi who commanded the army.
 - The strategoi were chosen from each of the ten tribes.
- The Council of 400 was replaced by the Council of 500 known as the *Boule*. The Boule would eventually effectively replace the Areopagus and thus further the democratisation of Athens.
 - The Boule had 500 members, 50 chosen from each of the ten tribes.
 - The Boule would consider proposals for laws, examine them and then pass them on to the Ecclesia. If the Ecclesia voted in favour of the proposal, it became law.
 - The Ecclesia would meet about forty times a year and its decision on matters was final.

Athenian citizens were expected to participate in their democracy. With the 500 people in the Boule each year, and 6000 people in the Heliaea Court, after a few years very many Athenians would have actively participated in the government of the city.

Before the changes to the democracy between 500 and 440 BC are considered, it is a good idea to check how well the Athenian political has been understood.

Exercise 11.1

Match explanations on the left with the terms on the right.

1	Athens' pre-Solonian form of government was like this		STRATEGOI TYRANNY THE ECCLESIA ARISTOCRATIC THETES THE BOULE AREOPAGUS TRITTYES HELIAEA ARCHONS
2	These were the three annual magistrates of Athens		
3	Magistrates entered this council after their year in office		
4	The lowest social class in Solon's reorganisation was this group		
5	Athens experienced this type of government from the 540s		
6	The new tribes of Cleisthenes comprised three of these		
7	The ten generals, elected from each of the tribes		
8	The main court of Athens which had 6000 jurors		
9	Voted on laws and all citizens were eligible for membership		
10	Examined proposals for laws and then sent them to the ecclesia		

Changes to the Athenian Democracy after 500 BC

Figure 11.2 Changes in the Athenian Democracy (1): the Archons





Figure 11.3 Changes in the Athenian Democracy (2): Ostracism



Changes in the Athenian Democracy (3): Weakening the Areopagus

The Areopagus was the most conservative part of the Athenian constitution and clearly incompatible with the radical democratic direction in which Athens was headed. It comprised only ex-archons who originally had to come from the upper class. From 487 BC, citizens from the two top classes had been eligible to become archons (and hence members of the Areopagus). From 487 BC election to the archonship had been by lot which lowered the prestige of that office.

In the late 460s, Ephialtes organised an attack on the status and power of the Areopagus. Members were accused of corruption and fraud. With Cimon out of the country assisting Sparta with its Helot problem ², Ephialtes seized the opportunity to introduce laws which ended the political power of the Areopagus. Ephialtes' laws:

- ended the right of the Areopagus to punish public officials if they broke the law;
- ended the Areopagus' right to supervise government administration and ensure the laws were obeyed;
- ended the right of the Areopagus to investigate officials at the end of their term of office.

The former powers of the Areopagus were now transferred to the Boule, the Ecclesia and the Heliaea Court. The powers left to the Areopagus were now limited to:

- the right to hear cases of arson and homicide;
- the tending of the sacred olive trees of Athena;
- a share in supervising the property of the Eluesian gods. ³

From 458-57 BC onwards, the prestige and status of the archonship (and hence the Areopagus) was further reduced. Members of the third social class – the Zeugitae – could now be archons. Later on even members of the thetes could obtain the office. At about this time, the office of archon also became a paid post and so made it possible for any citizen to be one. Finally, the archons were eventually all chosen by lot with the preliminary elections of candidates being abolished. The office of strategos remained an elected post. It tended to attract men of wealth and social standing. Unlike the archonship, a man could be reelected time and again as a strategos (as indeed Pericles was). The strategoi were unpaid, except when they were on active duty.

Changes in the Athenian Democracy (4): Payment

Gradually, all offices became paid, including not only the archonship but also the Council of 500. Payment for public office was the natural follow on to election by lot. It was pointless opening up all the offices of state to every citizen, if those citizens could not afford to give up their time to be government officials.

The two engines of the democratic development were lot and pay. ⁴

In 457 BC, Pericles introduced payment for jurors of two obols a day, a measure that did much to increase his popularity. There were often as many as ten courts sitting at any one time, some of the courts had as many as 500 jurors listening to a case and the courts sat for up to 200 days a year. For “the idle rabble”, a living could just be made sitting on courts. Critics of the system pointed out that the poor and idle took much pleasure sitting around, listening to strange cases, being flattered by those pleasing their cases. Indeed, if the playwright Aristophanes is to be believed, jury service became an obsessive, full-time occupation for some Athenians. ⁵

² See Chapter 9

³ Not a great deal is known about Ephialtes. He was murdered soon after his reforms; it is not stretching things too far to suggest his assassination was the result of opposition to his reforms.


⁴ Bury, J B, *A History of Greece*, Macmillan, London, 1951 (Third Edition), p 349

⁵ For an amusing satirical look at the Athenian jury system, Aristophanes' play “The Wasps”, first performed in 422 BC, is an invaluable source.

Changes in the Athenian Democracy (5): The Citizenship Law of 451 BC

As Athens became richer and more powerful, and as opportunities were growing for people to participate in government and to be paid for it, it became imperative that limits and qualifications should apply for those people who might enjoy the benefits of Athens' democracy. With this in mind, Pericles introduced a tight citizenship law in 451 BC. So stringent were its terms, that had it existed earlier, neither Themistocles nor Cleisthenes would have been citizens, as their mothers were foreigners.

Figure 11.4 The 451 BC Citizenship Law



Exercise 11.2

Answer the following questions in the spaces provided.

1	How was the status of the archon reduced in 487 BC?	
2	Which office began to supercede the office of archon polemarch?	
3	How did an ostracism work?	
4	What was the original intention of ostracism?	
5	How was ostracism misused?	
6	How did Ephialtes weaken the power of the Areopagus?	
7	What made the office of the strategoi different?	
8	Why was selection for office by lot so significant?	
9	Why was payment for political office so important for democracy?	
10	What was the key element of the 451 BC Citizenship Law?	

What do the historians have to say about "key democratic developments: influence of the thetes, ostracism, citizenship law"?

1. Victor Ehrenberg: From Solon to Socrates

Ehrenberg raises questions about the connection between the radicalisation of Athenian democracy and the importance of the thetes. He acknowledges that the thetes obviously had a political weight which in pre-Athenian naval days they did not have. However, Ehrenberg suggests the issue is more complicated than that. He points out that the growth of the navy and sea power involved the whole population, and that the thetes were often absent from Athens. He points out that it was not only the thetes who manned the ships, but also some hoplites, metics and at times even slaves. He suggests further:

*... sea-power was also the basis of the flourishing Athenian trade, commerce, and to some extent of agriculture. In the assembly the urban middle and lower classes were generally the most numerous group, and though they included many thetes, the 'naval crowd' must frequently have been absent from Athens.*⁶

2. Raphael Sealey: A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC

Sealey spends some time discussing the reforms introduced by Ephialtes before his assassination. He suggests that the reforms which weakened the Areopagus were not perhaps as significant as they seem. During the early years of the 6th Century BC, gaining election as an archon placed a man on the verge of long-term political career. Thus, Sealey suggests, archons were not always keen to offer judgments on cases that came before them for fear of giving offence to the losing party, as this might hurt a man's career. As a result, Sealey suggests that archons often passed on the responsibility for making a judgment to one of the popular courts. Once archons were chosen by lot, and men of significance less likely to seek this office, this practice would only increase, suggests Sealey. This leads him to conclude:

*...Thus the change in the incidence of popular jurisdiction may have come about, not through specific enactments such as the reforms of Ephialtes but because of a personal factor, which sprang from the fears of the archons and hardened into custom. Important constitutional changes are not necessarily the result of specific enactments designed to bring them about.*⁷

3. Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War

Any discussion of Athenian democracy cannot omit reference to Thucydides' account of Pericles' Funeral Oration at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Pericles' speech is given in commemoration of the first who had died in the war. In the speech Pericles spends much time comparing the Athenian political system and way of life with that of Sparta. Thucydides is obviously attempting to make a propaganda point here by highlighting the positive elements of the Athenian system.

*...Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people...*⁸

⁶ Ehrenberg, V, *From Solon to Socrates*, Routledge, London, 1967, p 223

⁷ Sealey, R, *A History of The Greek City States 700-338 BC*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976, p 260

⁸ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Book 2, 37

Figure 11.5 highlights some of the ideas Thucydides placed in Pericles' speech.

**FIGURE 11.5:
Pericles discussing the nature of Athenian
Democracy in his Funeral Oration**

When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses.

No one, so long as he has it within him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity because of poverty ... We give obedience to those whom we put in positions of authority, and we obey the laws themselves...

Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well... we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all.



We Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussion: for we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly debated.

Athens appears to be the perfect democracy: any citizen can participate in the activities of government, indeed is encouraged to do so. Social class and wealth is no hindrance to this participation. Election by lot ensures fairness, pay ensures all can play a role.

To modern eyes, Athens' democracy seems less ideal. Women and metics are denied a role, the Citizenship Law ensures the number of citizens is limited. The whole system is arguably financed by a ruthless coercion overseas, and the mass participation of citizens made possible by the existence of a massive slave force at home.

Figure 11.6 Pericles – a statue in Athinas Street, Central Athens



Figure 11.7 The Parthenon – May 2018 “seemingly always covered in scaffolding”



ESSAYS 2

Responding to HSC questions on Development of Athens and the Athenian Empire

The purpose of this section is to provide some ideas for the type of questions which might be asked on the second section of the syllabus: Development of Athens and the Athenian Empire. These outlines are not presented as the 'be all and end all' responses to these questions. To provide a sense of reality to this section, what follows is a 'first draft response' to each question, ie what were the first ideas that came into the author's head as he thought about each question?

Essay No 1

Discuss the relationship between Athens and other Greek states in the years 479-450 BC.

This appears to be a fairly straightforward question. However, there are a few pitfalls about which students need to be aware.

- The main danger is that students will simply tell a story, ie narrate as many events as they can remember affecting the Greek world between 479 and 450 BC.
- Obviously, the narrative detail for this period needs to appear, but students must try to do more than this. They must try to present an argument in order to lift a response into a higher mark band.
- Note the dates. Only a passing mention is required on the Persian Wars. Also, students must not deal at length with post-450 BC events, though a mention might be acceptable if it helps to illustrate the argument for the designated period.
- This is not an exclusively Delian League question. "Other Greek states" presumably also refers to Sparta.
- Students need to support their argument with specific reference to the ancient sources, and critique these if appropriate.

Following the Greek successes against Persia in 480-79 BC, Sparta returned to its traditional isolationist policies and left control of the Greek alliance in Athenian hands. Persia was still a danger and compensation from the Persians was sought. As time went on, Athens' domination of the alliance became greater. This was partly the result of the actions of the allies, but also due to the policies implemented by Athenian leaders. By the 450s BC, the Greek alliance had been transformed into an Athenian Empire. All the while, the relationship between Athens and Sparta steadily deteriorated as a result of Athens' radical democratic and imperialist policies, and the fear that this caused in Sparta.

Begin with a brief explanation of Athens' assumption of leadership of the alliance:

- brief mention of success against Persia in the war, and carrying the conflict into Asia Minor;
- make reference to the behaviour of Pausanias, Spartan concerns at home and its return to traditional isolationism;
- Athenian leadership at this point seemed natural (explain why) and was accepted, by the allies and Sparta (refer to Thucydides).

Some information on the organisation of the Delian League could come in here:

- refer briefly to its aims, organisation, tribute, the role of Aristides in this;
- refer to the oath and the implications of this.

Some narrative detail can now be brought in to show that the Athenians were beginning to behave high-handedly with the allies:

- refer to campaigns in Eion, Skyrus, Carystus and Naxos;
- comment on each of these, eg the justification for Eion, but the apparent lack of justification for Skyrus;
- bring some analysis in here to explain that the aims of Athens were now becoming clear, eg Athenian control of the fleet, the Synod, etc.

Consider the Battle of Eurymedon and its implications:

- provide some narrative information and consider what the allies and Athens had gained by 467 BC and raise the issue of the future of the alliance;
- discuss the revolt of Thasos and its significance.

Athens was clearly the dominant power in the alliance and was behaving in an openly imperialist manner. Discuss explanations:

- was this Athens' intention all along?
- was it the allies' own fault (Thucydides' line)?
- can it be related to the eclipse of Cimon and the rise of the radical democrats inside Athens, such as Ephialtes and Pericles?
- this can lead to a brief look at the expansionary policies of the 450s.

Clearly the League had been transformed into an empire by the late 450s. Discuss this with reference to the ancient evidence (it may be necessary to refer briefly to post-450 BC issues here, but do not go too far):

- eventually only three states were providing ships to the alliance, comment on the significance of this;
- moving the treasury from Delos to Athens;
- the various decrees and their significance: Erythrae Decree, Chalcis Decree, Coinage Decree.

As the League was being transformed into an Athenian Empire, relations between Athens and Sparta were deteriorating:

- refer to fundamental differences between the two, differences which were accentuated as Athens moved further along the democratic path and Sparta's fears for his helots grew;
- bring in the helot revolt of the late 460s, Cimon's role and subsequent ostracism;
- make mention of Peloponnesian concerns, Battle of Tanagra and events leading to the Five Year Truce.

Sum up the essay's ideas in your conclusion: Athens taking control, its increasingly high-handed behaviour, the evolution of the League into Empire and the gradual worsening of Atheno-Spartan relations.

Essay No 2

Assess the careers of Aristides and Cimon during this period.

Issues of essay structure might be a problem here.

- should each man's career be considered separately? The danger with this is that the response might become two separate essays.
- however, if a comparative structure is attempted, the response might become overly complicated.
- perhaps a thematic and comparative structure could be considered, ie compare the role of each man up to and including the Persian Wars, their roles in Athenian foreign policy, their domestic political roles;
- note the phrase "during this period", thus students must be sure not to jump straight into Delian League issues.

For the purpose of this outline, each man's career will be considered separately.

Aristides played a key role in the campaigns against the Persians. Though outmanoeuvred by Themistocles in the 480s, he returned to direct Athenian and Delian League affairs. Trusted by one and all, Aristides was the key figure behind the organisation and running of the Delian League. Cimon was forthright in his desire to promote Athenian interests, at the expense of allies if necessary. He also favoured good Atheno-Spartan relations, a policy which would eventually bring him down.

Aristides played a significant role in the wars against Persia though he had his political setbacks in the 480s BC:

- refer to Aristides' actions at Marathon;
- discuss his differences in outlook with Themistocles in the 480s and his eventual ostracism;
- Aristides played a key role in the Persian invasion of 480-79 BC: make mention of his support for Themistocles at Salamis, Psyttaleia and his command of Athenian troops at Plataea;
- refer to Aristides' opposition to Themistocles' plan to destroy the Hellespont bridges and the significance of this.

Aristides played a major role in the organisation of the Delian League:

- he was deeply trusted, called "the just", discuss this with reference to Plutarch's accolades;
- discuss his organisation of the League tribute;
- his views on the oath to the League;
- finish off with the view of a historian(s) on his career and contribution to Athens.

Cimon played a major domestic and foreign policy role for Athens and was one of the key figures behind the development of Athenian imperialism:

- open with a general assessment of the sort of man Cimon was: refer to his courage, his political moderation and his honesty, and hence his opposition to Themistocles and support for Aristides;
- a minor role in the Persian Wars, principally his support for Themistocles at Salamis, when such support was crucial;

- Cimon was the leading general who led most of the early Delian League actions;
- Some narrative detail is needed here, eg Eion, Skyros (make mention of Theseus' bones and the support he gained because of this);
- it was Cimon who led Greek forces at the Battle of Eurymedon and during the suppression the Thasos revolt;
- provide some analysis: Cimon the political moderate, the Athenian imperialist and the man who finally ended the Persian threat.

Cimon believed in a pro-Spartan policy, as opposed to the more radical, anti-Spartan stance of his opponents at home like Ephialtes:

- discuss events in Sparta – the earthquake, helot revolt, siege at Mt Ithome;
- refer to Cimon's success in convincing the assembly to send troops to help Sparta and then his and Athens' subsequent humiliation when the Athenian forces were ordered out of the Peloponnese;
- what was the political significance of Cimon's absence from Athens (refer to Ephialtes' democratic reforms) and his humiliation?
- Cimon's ostracism and period out of Athens; he attempts a return at the time of Tanagra and is finally responsible for the Five Year Truce.

Sum up the key points of your essay in your conclusion: Aristides was a key player in the war against Persia, his integrity was legendary and he did much to make the Delian League workable. Cimon was a moderating voice in Athenian politics, was the key figure in developing the Athenian Empire but eventually fell because of his pro-Spartan sympathies. Clearly, both men had contributed much to the development of Athens and the Greek world during the first half of the 5th Century BC.

Other possible questions on the Development of Athens and the Athenian Empire might include:

- Discuss the purpose and activities of the Delian League during this period.
- Why was the Delian League formed? What benefits did it produce for Athens and for the allies?
- Assess the importance of the Delian League to both Athens and her allies.
- Explain the origins and organisation of the Delian League.
- Discuss the ways in which Athenian government became more democratic in this period.
- Explain the transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire.
- Explain the key democratic developments inside Athens during this period.

Section 3 ■ Athens and Sparta


Chapter 12: Impact of the Persian Wars

The Persian Wars had major short-term and medium-term results for the Greek world. These are summarised in Figure 12.1.

Figure 12.1 The impact of the Persian Wars



Xerxes, King of Persia



Much of the information relevant to this chapter has been covered earlier.

To avoid repetition, references to these sections will be given here.

1. The removal of the Persian threat, the Battle of Eurymedon (467 BC) and events which led to the Peace of Callias (449 BC) were dealt with in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
2. Sparta's reversion to isolationism and Athens' assumption of leadership of the allies was covered in Chapter 7. It will be further touched on below.
3. The evolution of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire was dealt with in Chapters 9 and 10.
4. The change in Athenian policies from Cimon's moderate foreign policy and conservative domestic policy into the expansionism and radical democracy of Ephialtes and Pericles were covered in Chapters 9 and 11. They will be further touched on below.
5. The development of Atheno-Spartan conflict will comprise most of this chapter.

The development of Atheno-Spartan conflict after the Persian Wars

In 479 BC, Sparta and Athens stood side by side in defence of Greece at the Battle of Plataea. Within two decades they were fighting each other at the Battle of Tanagra. By the mid-440s the two states had reached an accommodation. However, in 431 BC war broke out again which would last for 27 years and see the defeat of Athens and the brief ascendancy of Sparta.¹ The conflict between Athens and Sparta seems to have an air of inevitability about it.² However, nothing in history is inevitable and there was nothing pre-ordained about Atheno-Spartan conflict.

By the end of the 6th Century BC, Athens and Sparta were clearly the leading states in Greece. They had much in common:

- they shared a common language;
- they had a common culture;
- they both revered Homer;
- they worshipped the same pantheon of gods;
- they despised the same barbarians;
- and as the events of the Persian Wars were to prove, they could work together well in defence of Greece against the common enemy.

This scene from the early 1960s movie, "The 300 Spartans" suggests an idealised view of the close cooperation between King Leonidas (played by Richard Egan) and Themistocles (played by Ralph Richardson). They are discussing the tactics to be followed at Thermopylae and Artemesium.³



However, there were also significant differences:

Sparta was an essentially inward-looking state. With a social system based on the suppression (and fear) of an enslaved Helot population, it had developed into a conservative and isolationist state. Sparta spurned foreign adventures and preferred not to entertain foreign guests.

Athens was quite different. It was outward-looking and as time would show, was both eager and able

¹ This is the Peloponnesian War, which is the subject of Thucydides' historical work.

² Indeed, Thucydides is at pains to show the long-term causes of the conflict and the deeper differences between the two states.

³ See Chapter 4

to expand. Athens had a sizeable slave population but this did not comprise the peoples of an occupied conquered land as was the case with Sparta.

Sparta's political system was conservative and oligarchic. Athens was taking steps towards the development of a fully fledged democracy.


Economically Sparta had made little progress, and indeed did not wish to. Athens was becoming the commercial hub of the Aegean, a process which the Athenians pursued eagerly as the empire developed.

Sparta's military prowess was based on its much admired army. Athens was soon to develop into a major naval power.

As a result, Athens and Sparta clearly had some major differences: ideological, political, economic, social and military.

The fundamental impact of the Persian Wars was to bring these fundamental differences into sharp relief. Once the invader had been expelled, it was clear that Greece had changed. Sparta was still admired. However, its pre-eminence was now being challenged by a confident Athens eager to assume leadership of the Greek world. Figure 12.1 summarises the key developments in this process.⁴

Figure 12.2 Summary of growing Atheno-Spartan tensions



⁴ Some of these developments have been referred to already and will be dealt with only briefly in this section while issues not yet covered will be examined more closely.

Themistocles and Sparta

Relations between Athens and Sparta in the wake of the Persian Wars were good. Thucydides is keen to emphasise this point.

*...this was a time when Sparta was particularly friendly to Athens, because of the courage displayed by Athens against the Persians...*⁵

The first sign of worsening relations between the two states came with Athens' rebuilding of its city walls and the fortification of Athens. This was Themistocles' work and it alarmed Sparta. Sparta in fact offered a radical alternative.

*...The Spartans proposed that not only should Athens refrain from building her own fortifications, but that she should join them in pulling down all the fortifications which still existed in cities outside the Peloponnese...*⁶

Sparta's argument was that this would deprive any future Persian invader a base against Greece though their concerns at Athenian strength were the issue. Themistocles once again used his cunning and deceit. He went to Sparta himself and assured them that no building was occurring and that the Spartans should send envoys to Athens to see for themselves. The envoys were sent but were "held up" until construction had finished.⁷ Thucydides comments on how Sparta felt about this.

*...All the same the Spartans had not got their own way and secretly they felt aggrieved because of it. The delegates from both states returned home without making any complaints.*⁸

Sparta then proposed that all formerly neutral and pro-Persian states should be removed from the Amphictyonic Council⁹.

- Themistocles was strongly opposed to this as it would have left the Council dominated by Peloponnesian (pro-Spartan) states.
- Themistocles managed to persuade the other Greek states to reject the Spartan idea.

Plutarch suggests that this further added to the growth of antagonism between Athens and Sparta.

*...It was the stand he took on this occasion which gave particular offence to the Spartans, and made them try to strengthen Cimon's position by showing him favours and thus establish him as a political rival to Themistocles...*¹⁰

Themistocles had made many enemies over time in Athens. In 472 BC, they moved against him and he was ostracised. Following his ostracism, he went to Argos where he lobbied against the Spartans. He then became implicated in the affairs of Pausanias – almost certainly untrue – and he was accused of high treason. He fled to Corcyra, moved to Epirus, thence Macedonia, Ionia and finally ended up at the court of the Persian king, Artaxerxes. He prospered in Persia, and even rose to become the governor of Magnesia in Asia Minor. Themistocles died in c. 460 BC. Bury comments on Themistocles' (and Pausanias') flight to Persia.

*...Thus circumstances drove him to follow the example of Pausanias; and by a curious irony, the two men who might be regarded as the saviours of Greece, the hero of Salamis and the hero of Plataea, were perverted into framing plans for undoing their own work and enslaving the country which they had delivered...*¹¹

⁵ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Book 1, 92

⁶ Thucydides, Book 1, 90

⁷ Construction would continue under Pericles. Between 458 and 445, walls linking the harbour of Piraeus and the city were also built.

⁸ Thucydides, Book 1, 92

⁹ This was the religious body that controlled Delphi.

¹⁰ Plutarch, *The Rise and Fall of Athens, Themistocles*, 20

¹¹ Bury, J B, *A History of Greece*, Macmillan, London, 1951 (Third Edition), p 335

The impact of the Persian Wars on Sparta

The Persian Wars clearly had a mixed impact on Sparta. In some ways, Sparta's star had never risen so high before:

- its leadership of the Greek states during the war was unquestioned;
- Leonidas' example of sacrifice at Thermopylae had inspired all Greeks;
- Spartan skill and courage at the Battle of Plataea was such that Herodotus had been moved to say that Pausanias had won:

...a victory exceeding in glory all those to which our knowledge extends... ¹²

- though Athens' contribution to the victory over Persia had also been great, there was genuine gratitude for the Spartan effort;
- Sparta was admired and respected.

However, for the Spartans there was also a strongly negative side to the impact of the Persian Wars.

- Much of the Spartan population – Spartiates, perioeci and helots – had been shown the wealth of Persia, and shared in some of the spoils. This was dangerous as the tightly organised nature of Spartan society could become undermined if wealth and luxury were able to creep into Sparta.
- To underline this possibility, several members of the Spartan royal families had behaved in a decidedly “unSpartan” manner:
 - Pausanias had become carried away with his life away from Sparta, behaved arrogantly and cruelly, and took to aping Persian customs; ¹³
 - Cleomenes' had been suspected of tampering with the Oracle; ¹⁴
 - Demaratus was already living at the Persian court and had accompanied Xerxes in 480 BC; ¹⁵
 - Leotychides was convicted of corruption.
- This royal misbehaviour coincided with the growing power of the ephors at the expense of royal power.
 - The ephors decided that traditional Spartan ways and Spartan discipline needed reinforcing.
 - This was one reason for Sparta declining the continued leadership of the Greek allies after the Persian Wars.
- Pausanias' behaviour had hurt Spartan prestige. Sparta's position as head of the Peloponnesian League ¹⁶ needed reinforcing as the situation in the Peloponnese worsened for Sparta.
 - Within less than a decade of the Battle of Plataea, Sparta was in conflict with Argos and Tegea.
 - Some Peloponnesian states even moved in the direction of democracy, eg Elis and Mantinea.

The situation worsened considerably for Sparta following the earthquake of 464 BC which sparked a major helot revolt. Rebellious helots took up a defensive position on Mt Ithome. Sparta sought

¹² Herodotus, *The Histories*, Book IX, 64

¹³ See Chapter 7

¹⁴ See Chapter 3

¹⁵ See Herodotus, *Book VII*, 1-3, 103-07 for more on Demaratus and the Persians.

¹⁶ See Chapter 13

assistance from its allies. Cimon persuaded the Athenian assembly to let him lead a force of 4000 Athenian hoplites to help Sparta. Sparta feared Athenian strength and Athenian ideas.

... (the Spartans) feared that, if they stayed on in the Peloponnese, they might listen to the people in Ithome and become the sponsors of some revolutionary policy...¹⁷

Sparta ordered Cimon and his men to leave. This slap in the face for Athens had a major twofold effect:

- It rapidly soured Atheno-Spartan relations.


... They were deeply offended, considering that this was not the sort of treatment that they deserved from Sparta...¹⁸

- It spelt the end of Cimon's career as he was ostracised.

Chapter 9 provides a more detailed account of the twists and turns of Atheno-Spartan relations.

Figure 12.3 provides an outline of the key events.

Figure 12.3 Outline of Atheno-Spartan relations: 464-446 BC



¹⁷ *Thucydides, Book 1, 102*

¹⁸ *Thucydides, Book 1, 102*

Exercise 12.1

Using the terms in the box below, complete the following passage.

The Persian Wars had a major impact on both Athens and Sparta. Due to the “unSpartan” behaviour of _____ in Asia Minor, and fears over the impact of an inflow of _____ into the country, Sparta reverted to its traditional _____ policy. Spartan kings had let down their city state: _____ was accused of tampering with the oracle while _____ was accused of corruption. This led to a decrease in _____ power in Sparta and an increase in the power of the _____. The situation worsened for Sparta following the _____ of 464 BC and the subsequent _____ revolt. Following the revolt, Sparta asked Athens for assistance and the Athenian leader, _____, obliged with a force of 4000 hoplites. Sparta _____ the Athenians when it ordered the hoplites back to Athens. As a result of this, Cimon was _____. Athens now moved in a more radical _____ direction. Following the assassination of _____, the Athenian statesman, _____, came to dominate Athenian affairs.

EPHIALTES	PAUSANIAS	LEOTYCHIDES	CIMON	PERICLES
CLEOMENES	OSTRACISED	HUMILIATED	HELOT	DEMOCRATIC
ROYAL	WEALTH	ISOLATIONIST	EPHORS	EARTHQUAKE

Exercise 12.2

Indicate whether each statement below is true or false

1	Sparta was never happy with the fact that Athens led the Greek alliance.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
2	It was certainly not inevitable that Athens and Sparta would become long-term enemies.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
3	Sparta was an essentially inward-looking state, whereas Athens was a more outward-looking state.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
4	Themistocles was reluctant for Athens to rebuild its fortifications after the Persian Wars.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
5	Sparta consistently showed its favour of Themistocles over Cimon.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
6	Sparta did not provide assistance to Thasos in 465 BC despite the island's plea for help against Athens.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
7	Cimon's demise had little real impact on Athenian political life.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
8	Like Cimon, Pericles was happy to pursue a restrained foreign policy.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
9	During the 450s, Athens interfered in the affairs of Peloponnesian states.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE
10	By the mid-440s, Athens and Sparta had managed to achieve a peaceful accommodation with each other.	THIS IS TRUE/ THIS IS FALSE

Chapter 13:

The Peloponnesian League, Spartan responses to Athenian imperialism

The Peloponnesian League

Origins

Sparta had not always been the dominant state in the Peloponnese. Up until the mid-6th Century BC, Argos had been a force to be reckoned with and Sparta-Argos clashes were a feature of Peloponnesian political/ military life. Argos was finally defeated in 546 BC.¹ It was this victory that resulted in Sparta's final territorial annexation. Former Argive land to the north east of Sparta called Thyreatis, was incorporated as part of Spartan territory.

The Peloponnesian League came in gradually, developing from roughly the 580s to the 540s. In c. 580 BC, Corinth had become an ally of Sparta, following Sparta's assistance in removing the Corinthian tyrant. In 570 BC, Elis became an ally, following Sparta's help in securing for Elis the Olympic Games. Sparta fought a frontier war with Tegea in the 550s. However, following its victory, Sparta did not annex territory but instead forced Tegea to sign a treaty of alliance. This was a practice that Sparta now continued. From the 550s, Sparta formed similar alliances with other Peloponnesian states including Sicyon, Megara, Aegina, Troezen, Epidaurus, and other states from the north and central Peloponnese.

By the end of the 6th Century BC, all the states of the Peloponnese were Spartan allies, except Argos and Achaea. Even Athens was briefly a member following the Spartan intervention in Athens in 510 BC which had led to the removal of the last Peisistratid tyrant, Hippias.

Aims

At the time, the Peloponnesian League was known as "The Lacedaemonians and their allies". Superficially, the aims of the Peloponnesian League were clear:

- to oppose tyrants coming to power in Peloponnesian states;
- to maintain Spartan security against a revival of Argos; ²
- to generally support oligarchic or aristocratic forms of government.

Sparta aimed not at the territorial conquest of the Peloponnese; Sparta was a hegemon not a conqueror. It sought military hegemony of the peninsula, while allowing its allies to maintain their autonomy and integrity. This meant that the Peloponnesian League was a loose confederation of autonomous states.

However, the underlying purpose of the Peloponnesian League was to protect Sparta from what it feared most: helot revolt. Spartan society was based on the suppression of its large helot population. Disciplined Spartan society might be, indeed it was widely admired. However, it lived in constant fear that its helots could revolt and so society was organised around preventing this threat being realised. A secure Peloponnese with loyal allies would be a major factor in giving the Spartan state the security it craved.

...a rising of the helots lost half its terrors if the helots were shut in by states which were pledged

¹ Conflict between Sparta and Argos re-emerged in the 490s BC as Argos believed it could reassert itself, possibly even with Persian help. In 495 BC, a Spartan force landed on the Argive coast. In the ensuing Battle of Sepeia, 6000 Argives were killed.

² Having defeated Argos, Sparta sought to keep it isolated. Without allies, Argos would never dare take on Sparta. Modern historians would recognise a parallel here with the German Chancellor, Bismarck, who followed a similar policy towards France after Germany's victory over that country in 1871.

to help no one to attack Sparta. By limiting herself strictly to these principles and being careful to avoid any infringement of the domestic rights of her allies, Spartan policy, ever guided rather by fear than hope, achieved a solid if not brilliant success...³

Figure 13.1 The Peloponnese




Organisation of the League

The Peloponnesian League was set up principally to deal with the issue of war. Members were autonomous and their territorial integrity was guaranteed. The members of the League were allied to Sparta and not to each other. Indeed, League members could wage war on each other. Sparta was not bound to offer assistance if an ally was attacked.

*...The term 'league' is strictly a misnomer, for the members were not bound to each other but only each to Sparta. Subject to the claims of this alliance with Sparta the several states were left entirely free to manage each its own foreign policy; they might even make war on each other. The official title of the league was "The Lacedaemonians and their allies"...*⁴

³ Adcock, F E, *Athens under the Tyrants*, from *The Cambridge Ancient History, IV The Persian Empire and the West*, CUP, Cambridge, 1964, p 72

⁴ Adcock, F E, *Athens under the Tyrants*, from *The Cambridge Ancient History, IV The Persian Empire and the West*, CUP, Cambridge, 1964, p 72

Figure 13.2 The functioning of the Peloponnesian League

The allies did not pay tribute unless there was a war on. They had to provide two thirds of their forces in the event of war. No ally was ever to harbour helots within its borders. The allies did not always agree with Spartan decisions but they remained generally loyal. The Peloponnesian League was a stable organisation. It provided the core of the Hellenic League against Persia in 480 BC.

Hammond argues that the working of the Peloponnesian League was practical and realistic.

*...It revolved on the two points that without Sparta's leadership the alliance had no existence and that without the Allies' support Sparta was unwise to act. Sparta's submission to the will of the Congress in 505 BC afforded proof of a sincerity which ensured the success of the Spartan Alliance...*⁵

Exercise 13.1

Answer the following questions in the spaces provided.

1	Which state was dominant in the Peloponnese before the rise of Sparta?	
2	What were the superficial aims of the Peloponnesian League for Sparta?	
3	What was the more fundamental issue behind the formation of the Peloponnesian League?	
4	What political role did Sparta play in the Peloponnese?	
5	What were the alliance arrangements of the Peloponnesian League?	
6	Which two bodies comprised the "Council of Allies"?	

⁵ Hammond, N G L, *A History of Greece to 322 BC*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (third edition) 1986, pp 195-96

7	How was a decision reached in the "Council of Allies"?	
8	How much tribute did the allies have to pay Sparta?	
9	Was Athens ever a member of the Peloponnesian League?	
10	What did the Spartans and its allies get out of the Peloponnesian League?	

The Spartan response to Athenian imperialism

Athens-Spartan relations were generally quite good throughout the 6th Century BC, even during the years of the Peisistratid tyranny. However, Athens also had reasonable relations with Sparta's enemy, Argos. However, matters were complicated still further because Athens was a rival of the island state of Aegina, which was an ally of Argos.

King Cleomenes had led a Spartan force to remove Hippias from power in 510 BC, and, as was mentioned earlier, Athens even briefly became a member of the Peloponnesian League. Spartan efforts to intervene to remove Cleisthenes a couple of years later were rejected.

As Athens transformed itself into a major imperial power following the Persian Wars, Sparta became more preoccupied with its own internal issues. However, this does not mean that Sparta merely sat back and allowed events to take their course. As has been seen in previous chapters, Sparta became increasingly alarmed at Athens' growing power: ⁶

- As was explained in Chapter 12, there were deep differences of an ideological, political and social nature between Athens and Sparta.
- Sparta was disturbed by Themistocles' policy of rebuilding Athens' fortifications in the 470s despite Spartan objections.
- It clearly favoured Cimon – seen as pro-Spartan – as opposed to the more democratic politicians such as Themistocles.
- Sparta was asked by Thasos in 465 BC for assistance during its revolt against Athens, though it was unable to oblige.
- The Athenian hoplite force brought to Sparta by Cimon to assist it during a helot revolt in the late 460s, was ordered out of the Peloponnese.
 - This ruined Cimon's career, leading to his ostracism.
 - It also significantly soured Atheno-Spartan relations.
 - It assisted the radical democrats like Ephialtes and Pericles in their climb to power.

Athens began to interfere in the Peloponnese, traditionally a sphere of influence for Sparta. Such behaviour on Athens' part was far from welcome. Sparta might have been renowned for its military prowess but it was a society based on the suppression of its helot population. Should this population rise up in revolt – as it did in the late 460s – the basis of Spartan society would be fundamentally threatened. An Athenian presence in the Peloponnese, with its dangerous democratic ideas, might foment such a revolt. Consequently, Athenian interference in the

⁶ Some of the following points have already been covered but they are presented here for revision purposes.

Peloponnesians were both resented and feared.

- Athens had become a major trading rival to Sparta's ally, Corinth. Both cities vied for the trade of the western Mediterranean.
 - Geography gave Corinth a great advantage with its access to the Gulf of Corinth.
 - In c. 460 BC, this advantage was reduced when Athens captured Naupactus, positioned at the western end of the Corinthian Gulf.
 - To make matters worse for Sparta, Athens settled here helot refugees from the recent revolt at Mt Ithome.
- In 460 BC, Athens signed alliances with Sparta's enemies: Argos and Thessaly.
- Athens' position was further strengthened, and Corinth and Sparta were further discomfited, following Megara's desertion from the Peloponnesian League in 459 BC.
- Megara was involved in a border dispute with Corinth, left the League and became an Athenian ally.
- Athens soon found itself in conflict with Corinth, and with Aegina. Aegina was a traditional enemy of Athens and it feared Athenian naval domination.

...These states have indeed the Peloponnesian League behind them, and are helped by "Peloponnesian ships" and "Peloponnesian hoplites"; but at the same time, the war has not yet assumed a fully Peloponnesian character...⁷

- Athenian success in both campaigns was then followed by more disturbing developments for Sparta.
 - Democracies began to appear in the Peloponnesians, eg at Mantinea.
 - Achaean states were later encouraged to join the Athenian alliance.

In 457 BC, Sparta became involved in central Greece, in Boetia. Alarmed at Athenian expansion, it sought to strengthen Thebes and forced some Boetian cities to join the Peloponnesian League. As the Spartan forces moved south to return home, they encountered a major Athenian force near the Attic frontier at Tanagra. A bloody battle ensued which led to a Spartan victory.⁸

Cimon's return to Athens made possible an improvement of relations between Athens and Sparta and a Five Year Truce was signed in 451 BC. Two years later peace was achieved with Persia with the signing of the Peace of Callias. However, despite these arrangements, Athens now experienced some major setbacks. It lost control of its land empire in Boetia, following defeat at the Battle of Coronea in 447 BC. This was followed by anti-Athenian revolts in Euboea and in Megara. Pericles realised Athens was in danger as not only did he have to subdue a revolt in Euboea, he faced the prospect of a Peloponnesian force heading towards Attica.

Athens came out of these trials weakened but Pericles wisely cut his losses and consolidated. Control of Boetia was gone and Megara lost from the Athenian alliance. In 446 BC, a Thirty Year Peace between Athens and the Peloponnesians was now agreed upon. Its main terms were:

- Athens surrendered Nisaea, Pagae, Achaia and Troezen.
- Each side's allies were listed in the treaty and it was stated that neither side was allowed to accept into its alliance an ally of the other.
- Neutral states could join either alliance.
- Aegina's autonomy was ensured.

Despite the setbacks, Pericles could still later tell his people that Athens' maritime power remained

⁷ Bury, J B, *A History of Greece*, Macmillan, London, 1951 (Third Edition), p 334

⁸ Athens restored its position in Boetia following the Battle of Oenophyta later in 457 BC.

supreme, and that this was what really mattered. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles stated:

*...With your navy as it is today there is no power on earth... which can stop you from sailing where you wish. This power of yours is something in an altogether different category from all the advantages of houses or of cultivated land...*⁹

Exercise 13.2

Rearrange the events listed on the right into the correct chronological order.

1 st		The Battle of Tanagra
2 nd		The helot revolt at Mt Ithome
3 rd		Spartan intervention to remove Hippias
4 th		The Battle of Coronea
5 th		Megara becomes part of the Athenian alliance
6 th		The revolt of Thasos
7 th		The Thirty Year Peace
8 th		Themistocles' policy of rebuilding Athens' fortifications
9 th		The Five Year Truce
10 th		The Peace of Callias

⁹ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Book 2, 62

What do the historians have to say about "The Peloponnesian League, Spartan responses to Athenian imperialism?"

1. Robin Osborne: Greece in the making 1200-479 BC

Osborne explains that the decision of Tegea in the 550s to ally with Sparta was a crucial one. Tegea may have been defeated by Sparta at this time, but memories of defeats at the hands of Argos were still strong. Indeed, Argos had defeated Sparta itself in the 7th Century BC, and at the so-called "Battle of the Champions" in the mid-6th Century BC. ¹⁰

...Tegea's decision to go with Sparta both itself strengthened Sparta's hand, and may have been crucial in persuading further communities in Arkadia, and further potential victims of Argos, to throw in their lot with the Spartans... ¹¹

2. Anton Powell: Athens and Sparta

Powell comments on the significance of the Battle of Tanagra. The Spartans fought the Athenians with 1500 of their own troops and 10 000 of their allies (figure from Thucydides). Powell says that Sparta had restored the Peloponnesian League to reasonable shape after its recent setbacks. If the helot revolt of the 460s was still continuing, as was possible, Tanagra was a great tribute to Spartan skill and organisation. However, Powell also states that there were warnings for the Spartans.

...The Battle of Tanagra was won by Sparta, but the heavy losses on both sides would have acted as a warning to her, with her own relatively small population. The Spartans went home, and so far as we know, stayed there for several years... ¹²

3. Raphael Sealey: A History of the Greek City States 700-338 BC

Sealey ponders the longer-term significance of the Peloponnesian League. He suggests that late in the 6th Century BC and the early part of the 5th Century, the Spartans and their allies gave serious thought to a federal organisation, as the holding of at least one congress suggests. The Peloponnesian League lasted a long time, until the mid-4th Century BC. However, its roots were not mere local ties and common descent, says Sealey.

...it was an artificial creation, brought into being by political power. A League of this kind was a new experiment among the Greek city-states; there would be further attempts to found such Leagues and they would draw on the experience of the Peloponnesian League... ¹³

¹⁰ This was the battle in which Sparta and Argos agreed to put up 300 men each against each other. Whichever side had men left standing at the end would be declared the winner. Of the three men left at the end, two were Argives. However, their departure from the battlefield allowed the remaining Spartan to claim victory. (See Herodotus, Book 1, 82)

¹¹ Osborne, R, *Greece in the Making 1200-479 BC*, Routledge, London, 1996, p 289

¹² Powell, A, *Athens and Sparta*, Routledge, London, 1988, p 112

¹³ Sealey, R, *A History of The Greek City States 700-338 BC*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976, p 86

ESSAYS 3

Responding to HSC questions on Athens and Sparta

The purpose of this section is to provide some ideas for the type of questions which might be asked on the third section of the syllabus: Athens and Sparta. These outlines are not presented as the ‘be all and end all’ responses to these questions. To provide a sense of reality to this section, what follows is a ‘first draft response’ to each question, ie what were the first ideas that came into the author’s head as he thought about each question?

Essay

Assess the impact of the Persian Wars on Athens and Sparta

The main pitfall for students to be aware of in this question is the danger of providing a lengthy narration and no analysis. Possible errors could include:

- restricting the answer to a discussion of the Persian Wars, including issues such as the Battle of Marathon, preparations in the 480s and the battles during the invasion of 480-79 BC;
- alternatively students need to avoid merely describing what happened after the Persian Wars.

The key word in the essay question is “impact”. Thus, this question does need any information relating specifically to the conduct of the Persian Wars themselves, except if points raised affect what came after. The focus has to be on the effect the wars had on developments within and without Sparta and Athens, in the three or four decades after Salamis and Plataea.

Both Athens and Sparta came out of the Persian Wars proud states, having earned the gratitude of the other Greek states and with their reputations high. However, for Sparta the impact of the Persians Wars was to bring about national embarrassment and domestic fears. For Athens it led to brash confidence and the development of an openly imperialistic policy. At home the impact was to arguably push the city into a more democratic direction. The close cooperation between the two states during the war years would soon sour as the impact of the Persian Wars led to a major deterioration in Atheno-Spartan relations.

For the Spartans the pride of Leonidas’ example at Thermopylae and Pausanias’ skill at Plataea soon evaporated:

- refer to Sparta’s uncharacteristic adventuring in Asia Minor under Pausanias;
- Pausanias’ behaviour needs to be covered along with his demise;
- Sparta’s royal leaders were not setting the example of restraint and discipline that was expected of the society – refer to examples of poor royal misbehaviour, dangers to Sparta of the influx of wealth and the decision of the ephors to tighten up at home;
- though not a direct result of the Persian Wars, the helot revolt of the late 460s would have focussed Spartan minds on the dangers inherent in their social organisation; as was seen with the expulsion of the Athenians, the need for isolationism seemed even stronger.

As Sparta turned inward and reverted to its isolationism of old, this opened up the leadership of the Greek alliance to Athens:

- refer to Sparta's acquiescence in, and the allies' acceptance of, Athenian leadership;
- refer briefly to Athenian qualifications for leadership.

Thus, the immediate impact of the Persian Wars seemed to have been to persuade Sparta to revert to its inward-looking policies and for Athens to be given the opportunity to lead the alliance, with the potential that existed for Athenian imperial growth.

Brimming with confidence, and now handed the leadership of the alliance, Athens proceeded to pursue its imperialist policies:

- some narrative detail needed here: the Persians were "down but not out" and so the alliance was still needed;
- refer to early League organisation, tribute arrangements, the oath etc
- some detail on Athenian behaviour from Eion to Skyros to Thasos is required here;
- refer to the state of the alliance by the 450s and Athenian domination of the Empire which victory against Persian had made possible.

At home, victory in the Persian Wars had several results:

- it proved the correctness of the democratic system and spurred on more reform of the system;
- as the democracy became increasingly participatory, imperial expansion provided the means to pay for it and arguably increased the importance of the thetes in the political system.

As Athens grew stronger, as its democracy became more radical, it seemed to be, in the eyes of Sparta, a growing threat:

- briefly refer to the earthquake/ the helot revolt/ Cimon's ill-fated expedition to the Peloponnese;
- Athenian interference in the Peloponnese alarmed Sparta – provide examples;
- open conflict was the result – briefly describe the development of Atheno-Spartan conflict to the Thirty Year Peace of 446 BC.

Conclude by bringing the key points together. The main impact of the Persian Wars was to cause major internal problems for Sparta which led to their return to isolationism which, in turn, left the leadership of the alliance to Athens. Athens seized the opportunity to build an empire and a radical democracy. This resulted in conflict between the former anti-Persian allies.

Other possible questions on Athens and Sparta might include:

- Discuss the Spartan responses to the development of Athenian imperialism.
- Discuss the similarities and differences between the Peloponnesian League and the Delian League.
- For what reasons did the Peloponnesian League and the Delian League come into existence? What advantages did they provide for Sparta, Athens and their respective allies?
- Account for the growing conflict between Athens and Sparta in the period after the Persian Wars.

TIMELINE

Date: 5th Century BC	Event in the Greek World 500-440 BC
499	The Ionian Revolt
498	Athens and Eretria assist the Ionian Revolt
495	Sparta defeats Argos in the Battle of Sepeia
494	The Battle of Lade ends the Ionian Revolt
493	Themistocles as archon starts fortifying Piraeus
492	Persian force is wrecked off Mt Athos
490	The Battle of Marathon
489	Miltiades' Paros expedition
488	Death of Miltiades
487	War starts between Athens and Aegina; Weakening of the position of archon in Athens Introduction of ostracism in Athens
486	Death of Darius Xerxes becomes King of Persia
484	Xanthippus is ostracised
483	Silver is discovered at Laurium
482	Aristides is ostracised
481	Congress of the Isthmus
480	Aristides and Xanthippus recalled from exile The Battle of Thermopylae The Battle of Artemisium The Battle of Salamis
479	The Battle of Plataea The Battle of Mycale
478	Pausanias recalled to Sparta Athens assumes leadership of the Delian League Aristides assesses League tribute Fortification of Athens' walls
476-75	Capture of Eion
474-73	Defeat of Skyrus
472	Carystus forced into the Delian League Ostracism of Themistocles
469	Suppression of revolt in Naxos

468	Death of Aristides
467	The Battle of Eurymedon
465-63	Suppression of the revolt in Thasos
464	Spartan earthquake Helot revolt
462	Cimon's expedition to Sparta; Ephialtes' democratic reforms
461	Ostracism of Cimon Assassination of Ephialtes
460	Death of Themistocles Athens signs alliance with Argos
459	Athens supports Megara in Megara-Corinth conflict Start of the Egyptian expedition
458	Athens defeats Aegina Aegina forced to join Delian League
457	The Battle of Tanagra The Battle of Oenophyta Payment for jurors introduced in Athens
454	Delian League treasury moved from Delos to Athens Failure of the Egyptian expedition
453-52	The Erythrae Decree
451	The Five Year Truce between Athens and Sparta Athens Citizenship Law
450	Death of Cimon
449	The Peace of Callias
447	The Battle of Coronea
447-46	Revolts in Euboea and Megara
446	The Thirty Year Peace
446-45	The Chalcis Decree
440	The revolt of Samos

GLOSSARY

Amphictyonic Council	religious body that controlled Delphi
archon	magistrate in the Athenian government
areopagus	council of elders in Athens, comprised former archons
Artemisium	inconclusive naval battle of 480 BC between Greeks and Persians
boule	the Council of 500 in Athens, created by Cleisthenes
cleruch	an Athenian colonist
cleruchy	an Athenian colony
Delian League	alliance of Athens and its allies
Delphic Oracle	a priestess of Apollo at Delphi, gave ambiguous answers when advice was sought from it on future action
deme	local area of residence in Athens, part of Cleisthenes' reforms
ecclesia	the Athenian assembly
ephors	annually elected Spartan officials who oversaw the Spartan government
hegemon	a state which dominates but does not own a geographical area
heliaea	Athenian court
Hellenic League	alliance of Greek states formed against Persia
Hellenotamiae	Athenian officials who collected tribute from the members of the Delian League
Hellespont	waterway between the Chersonese (Gallipoli) and Asia Minor
helots	the enslaved class in Sparta
hippeis	the second ranking social class in Athens, created by Solon
hoplite	heavy infantry in a Greek army
hubris	arrogance, punished by the gods
Immortals, The	elite troops of the Persian army
Lacedaemonians	Spartans
Lade	site of the battle ending the Ionian Revolt
metics	immigrant workers in Athens
Mycale	scene of a Persian defeat against the Greeks in Asia Minor, 478 BC
oligarchy	rule by a few, often could be aristocrats
Oresteia	dramatic trilogy of Aeschylus

ostracism	expulsion of a citizen seen as a threat to the Athenian democracy
pantheon	collection of gods in a particular mythology
Peisistratid	family name of the tyrants who ruled Athens from the 540s-510 BC
Peloponnesian League	term describing Sparta and its allies
pentacosiomedimnoi	the top ranking social class in Athens, created by Solon
perioikoi	middle social group in Sparta who were involved in trade and manufacturing
phoros	money paid by members of the Delian League
Piraeus	the port of Athens
Plataea	site of the Greek victory over Persia, 479 BC
polemarch archon	Athenian magistrate with military responsibilities
Salamis	site of the Greek naval victory over Persia, 480 BC
satrap	regional governor of part of the Persian Empire
Serpent Column	commemorative column erected to celebrate Greek victory over Persia, names all the Greek allies who fought
Spartiates	male Spartans with full citizenship
strategoï	the ten generals in the Athenian system
Thermopylae	site of the stand of the 300 Spartans against the Persians 480 BC
thesmothetae	six judicial officials added to the three archons in Athens' government
thetes	the fourth and lowest social class in Athens, created by Solon
trireme	Greek warship with three sets of oars
trittyes	the new tribes in Athens created by Cleisthenes
Troezen Inscription	inscription found at Troezen which allegedly shows that Themistocles had always planned the evacuation of Athens in 480 BC
zeugitae	the third social class in Athens, created by Solon

DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Aeschylus	Greek dramatist
Aristagoras	one of the leaders of the Ionian Revolt
Aristides	Athenian strategos, known as "the just"
Artabanus	general in the Persian army
Artaphernes	Persian satrap of Sardis
Artaxerxes	Persian King after Xerxes
Artemesia	Queen of Halicanassis, ally of Xerxes
Atossa	wife of Persian King Darius
Callimachus	archon polemarch at Battle of Marathon, 490 BC
Cambyses	King of Persian 529-522 BC
Cimon	Athenian leader, 470s-450s BC
Cleisthenes	reformer of Athens' democracy, last decade of 6th Century BC
Cleomenes	Spartan king at the time of the Ionian Revolt
Cornelius Nepos	Roman biographer, 1st Century BC
Croesus	King of Lydia
Cyrus	Persian King, 550-529 BC
Darius	Persian King, 522-485 BC
Datis	Persian general during first Greek invasion of Greece, 490 BC
Ephialtes	radical democrat in Athens, assassinated c 461 BC
Eurybiades	Greek naval commander during the Persian Wars
Gorgo	daughter of Cleomenes, wife of Leonidas
Herodotus	the first historian (?), author of "The Histories"
Hippias	Athenian tyrant, expelled 510 BC
Histiaeus	former tyrant of Miletus, alleged instigator of the Ionian Revolt
Leonidas	Spartan King, killed at the Battle of Thermopylae, 480 BC
Leotychides	Spartan King, led forces at the Battle of Mycale 478 BC
Mardonius	leading Persian general during the 2nd Persian invasion
Megabates	Persian general during the siege of Naxos, 499 BC
Miltiades	Athenian commander at the Battle of Marathon, 490 BC
Nicodromus	Aeginetan who assisted Athens in its campaign against Aegina
Pausanias	Spartan general, victor of Battle of Plataea, 479 BC

Pericles	leading Athenian statesman from 460s-429 BC
Plutarch	Greek historian, c AD 45-120
Solon	Athenian lawgiver, 594-93 BC
Themistocles	Athenian naval commander during the Persian Wars
Thucydides	Greek historian, author of "History of the Peloponnesian War"
Xanthippus	Athenian statesman, father of Pericles
Xerxes	King of Persia, 485-465 BC

ANSWERS TO REVISION EXERCISES

Exercise i.i

1st – The Minoan Civilisation; 2nd – The Mycenaean Civilisation; 3rd – The period of colonisation; 4th – The century of Solon and Clesithenes; 5th – The Persian Wars; 6th – The Peloponnesian War; 7th – The Spartan supremacy; 8th – Rule of Philip II; 9th – The empire of Alexander; 10th – Roman defeat of Greece

Exercise i.ii

Mountainous – colonisation – Corinthian Gulf – Ionian Sea – Corinthian Isthmus – Peloponnese – Dorian – Ionian – Sparta – Athens – Aegean Sea – Asia Minor – Samos – Lesbos

Exercise 1.1

1 – Hippias; 2 – Darius; 3 – Histiaeus; 4 – Herodotus; 5 – Cleomenes; 6 – Croesus; 7 – Cambyses; 8 – Aristagoras; 9 – Artaphernes; 10 – Cyrus.

Exercise 1.2

1st – Croesus' defeat at the hands of Cyrus; 2 – Egypt becomes part of the Persian Empire; 3 – the death of Cambyses; 4 – Darius' Scythian campaign; 5 – Aristagoras' failed attack on Naxos; 6 – Aristagoras receives a message from Histiaeus; 7 – pro-Persian tyrants of Ionia driven from power; 8 – Aristagoras visits Athens seeking help; 9 – the burning of Sardis; 10 – the Battle of Lade.

Exercise 2.1

1 – true; 2 – true; 3 – false; 4 – true; 5 – false; 6 – false; 7 – true; 8 – true; 9 – false; 10 – false.

Exercise 2.2

1 – 1000 troops from Plataea; 2 – Callimachus, Miltiades; 3 – location/ the Athenian tactic of rushing the Persian centre; 4 – Athens lost 192 men; the Persians lost 6400 and were forced to return home; 5 – leadership/ armour/ geography/ morale; 6 – none – they were held up due to participation in a religious ceremony; 7 – full of admiration for Athens; 8 – The strong likelihood of a future, more extensive Persian attack; 9 – an offensive in the Cyclades and an unsuccessful attack on Paros; 10 – wounded on Paros; on his return to Athens impeached and fined; died in prison, 488.

Exercise 3.1

Miltiades – Paros – impeachment – Aegina – ostracism – Xanthippus – Aristides – Themistocles – naval – silver – Hellenic League – Spartan – Leonidas – Eurybiades – Syracuse – Argos – Delphi

Exercise 3.2

1 – opinion; 2 – fact; 3 – opinion; 4 – fact; 5 – opinion; 6 – opinion; 7 – fact; 8 – opinion; 9 – fact; 10 – fact.

Exercise 4.1

1 – false; 2 – false; 3 – true; 4 – false; 5 – true; 6 – true; 7 – false; 8 – false; 9 – true; 10 – true.

Exercise 4.2

1st – The Greeks abandon Tempe; 2nd – The Battle of Thermopylae; 3rd – The Battle of Artemisium; 4th – Athens is evacuated; 5th – Themistocles threatens to take Athens' ships to the west; 6th – Themistocles sends a message to Xerxes; 7th – The Persian defeat at Salamis; 8th – The Battle of Plataea; 9th – Persians defeated at Mycale; 10th – Athenian attack on Sestos

Exercise 5.1

1 – Pausanias; 2 – Themistocles; 3 – Eurybiades; 4 – Pausanias; 5 – Leonidas; 6 – Themistocles; 7 – Leonidas; 8 – Eurybiades; 9 – Pausanias; 10 – Eurybiades; 11 – Themistocles; 12 – Leonidas; 13 – Eurybiades; 14 – Leonidas; 15 – Pausanias; 16 – Themistocles.

Exercise 7.1

1 – The Athenians and their allies; 2 – behaviour of Pausanias, desire to return to isolationist policy for fear of a Helot uprising; 3 – he was universally respected and trusted; 4 – to maintain/ restore Greek freedom and to have Persia pay compensation; 5 – throwing iron bars into the sea with no chance they would float to the top; 6 – states would provide ships or they would offer money; 7 – location/ cultural significance/ lack of political importance/ a good harbour; 8 – league treasury officials; 9 – protection from Persia and a share of Persian wealth; 10 – Power, respect and wealth.

Exercise 7.2

1st – The Battle of Salamis; 2nd – The Battle of Mycale; 3rd – the capture of Byzantium; 4th – the recall of Pausanias; 5th – the siege of Eion; 6th – the defeat of Skyros; 7th – the attack on Carystus; 8th – the revolt and defeat of Naxos; 9th – The Battle of Eurymedon; 10th – defeat of the Phoenician fleet at Cyprus.

Exercise 8.1

1 – true; 2 – true; 3 – false; 4 – true; 5 – false; 6 – false; 7 – false; 8 – true; 9 – true; 10 – false.

Exercise 8.2

1 – false; 2 – true; 3 – true; 4 – false; 5 – false; 6 – false; 7 – true; 8 – true; 9 – true; 10 – false

Exercise 9.1

1st – BATTLE OF THE EURYMEDON RIVER; 2nd – THE REVOLT OF THASOS; 3rd – CIMON LEADS AN ATHENIAN FORCE TO HELP SPARTA; 4th – THE OSTRACISM OF CIMON; 5th – MEGARA JOINS THE ATHENIAN ALLIANCE; 6th – THE BATTLE OF TANAGRA; 7th – THE BATTLE OF OENOPHYTA; 8th – ATHENS GAINS CONTROL OF BOETIA; 9th – TREASURY MOVED TO DELOS; 10th – END OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION; 11th – THE FIVE YEAR TRUCE WITH SPARTA; 12th – THE PEACE OF CALLIAS; 13th – THE LOSS OF BOETIA; 14th – THE THIRTY YEAR PEACE WITH SPARTA; 15th – THE REVOLT OF SAMOS

Exercise 10.1

1 – The setting of a cleruchy in Naxos in 450 BC; 2 – Athenian opposition to Samos' appeal to Artaxerxes in 440 BC; 3 – The Coinage Decree 450-46 BC; 4 – The suppression of Thasos 465-63 BC; 5 – Thucydides' argument that allied preference not to fight made this possible; 6 – Throwing iron bars into the sea; 7 – The Chalcis Decree; 8 – The Erythrae Decree 453-52 BC; 9 – The Cleinias Decree 447 BC; 10 – Moving the treasury from Delos to Athens; 11 – Use of force against Carystus 472 BC.

Exercise 11.1

1 – ARISTOCRATIC; 2 – ARCHONS; 3 – AREOPAGUS; 4 – THETES; 5 – TYRANNY; 6 – TRITTYES; 7 – STRATEGOI; 8 – HELIAEA; 9 – THE ECCLESIA; 10 – THE BOULE

Exercise 11.2

1 – election by lot and the office was now open to the top two classes; 2 – the strategoi; 3 – if a man gained a majority of 6000 ostrakon votes cast, he was exiled for ten years; 4 – to protect against tyranny; 5 – it was used to remove one's political opponents; 6 – he ended their control of government and right to investigate government officials; 7 – it was an unpaid office (except when generals were on active service) and one could be repeatedly reelected; 8 – it meant that the richer classes could not use their influence and wealth to gain office; 9 – it meant that even the poorest classes could contemplate participating in the democracy; 10 – a citizen's parents had to be Athenian citizens and legally married.

Exercise 12.1

Pausanias – wealth – isolationist – Cleomenes – Leotychides – royal – ephors – earthquake – helot – Cimon – humiliated – ostracised – democratic – Ephialtes – Pericles

Exercise 12.2

1 – false; 2 – true; 3 – true; 4 – false; 5 – false; 6 – true; 7 – false; 8 – false; 9 – true; 10 – true

Exercise 13.1

1 – Argos; 2 – oppose tyranny and democracy/ support oligarchic government/ prevent the revival of Argos; 3 – fear of a helot revolt; 4 – hegemon; 5 – states were allied to Sparta but not to each other; 6 – Assembly of Spartiates/ Congress of the Allies; 7 – Both the Assembly of Spartiates and the Congress of the Allies had to be in agreement; 8 – Nothing in peacetime, only in wartime/ two thirds of armed forces to be made available to Sparta; 9 – Yes, briefly after the Spartan intervention in Athens of 510 BC; 10 – Sparta – security against a helot revolt; the allies – protection from outside attack and tyranny.

Exercise 13.2

1st – Spartan intervention to remove Hippias; 2nd – Themistocles' policy of rebuilding Athens' fortifications; 3rd – The revolt of Thasos; 4th – the helot revolt at Mt Ithome; 5th – Megara becomes part of the Athenian alliance; 6th – The Battle of Tanagra; 7th – The Five Year Truce; 8th – The Peace of Callias; 9th – The Battle of Coronea; 10th – The Thirty Year Peace.

